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Abstract
As insider threats and data security management concerns become more prevalent, the
identification of risky behaviors in the workplace is crucial for the privacy of individuals
and the survival of organizations. The purpose of this three-round qualitative Delphi
study was to identify real-time consensus among 25 information technology (IT) subject
matter experts (SMEs) in the Washington metropolitan area about insider threats and data
security management. The SMEs participating in this study were adult IT professionals
and senior managers with certification in their area of specialization and at least 5 years
of practical experience. The dark triad theory was the conceptual framework used for
describing behaviors attributed to reasons and motivators for insider threats in public and
private organizations. The research questions pertained to reasons and motivators for
insider threats in organizations, security strategies and early interventions used, and
potential policies and procedures to manage insider threats’ access to systems. One openended survey and two closed-ended surveys were disseminated via Survey Monkey. Data
analysis consisted of data reduction through consolidation, data display, and data
verification. Data were analyzed through categorization and direct interpretation using a
5-point Likert agreement scale. The findings revealed consensus about reasons and
motivators such as insufficient guidelines and training, lack of background investigations,
and financial gain and money; security strategies and early interventions; and policies and
procedures to manage insider threats’ access to systems. Overall, training was the most
important element preventing insider threats. The findings may inform how organizations
build safe working environments that increase employee recruitment, retention, and
loyalty while reducing identity theft and increasing data security in organizations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The increasing use of information technology (IT) for daily activities has
contributed to information systems’ vulnerabilities and insider threats in public and
private organizations (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2016).
Insider threats can be trusted employees, vendors, and associates with internal access to
systems in any organization who display a disregard for established access policies and
procedures. Insider threats’ unauthorized activities lead to fraud, theft, and data sabotage
(NIST, 2016; Rabai et al., 2014). This study provides real-time views and opinions from
IT subject matter experts (SMEs) about managing insider threats’ activities, identifying
insider threats’ risky behaviors, and what countermeasures need to be applied. Risky
behaviors may manifest as antisocial actions, as described in the conceptual framework
of the dark triad theory, leading to negative consequences for individuals and
organizations such as identity theft, loss of reputation, income, business, and trust (Crysel
et al., 2013). Spain et al. (2014) noted that personality traits related to the dark triad have
become more prominent in recent years. Furnham et al. (2014) defined dark personality
traits as characteristics that reflect a motivation to elevate the self and harm others.
Among other conceptualizations in the dark triad theory, narcissism, psychopathy, and
Machiavellianism have represented the most popular operationalization of dark
personality behaviors in social studies.
The relationship between the social networks and systems access by insiders at
work could be measured by any of the constructs of the dark triad (O’Boyle et al., 2012).
The study of personality characteristics has resulted in a model that has been used to
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describe insider threats’ behaviors (Goodboy & Martin, 2015). Such characteristics have
been traced to the dark triad’s traits of manipulation, self-centeredness, and a lack of team
and interpersonal relations (Jonason et al., 2017). With the current study, I provided an
opportunity for SMEs to provide real-time traits, based on their experiences, if applicable
to their organizations.
Understanding the dark triad behaviors could help managers in public and private
organizations to curtail insider threats’ antagonistic actions, manage a lack of
agreeableness in staff, and instill honest and ethical behaviors (Sokolowski et al., 2016).
As insider threats became more prevalent in this age of instant communication, it was
critical to identify current reasons and motivators for insider threats, as new security
policies and real-time strategies are needed to rapidly resolve the operational risks posed
by new technology requirements and unauthorized access to data (Green, 2014). New
technologies may have enabled faster communications, but also the unauthorized access
of insider threats to sensitive, confidential, and personally identifiable information in part
because of management’s urgency for system deployments, especially during the
implementation of emerging technologies (NIST, 2016).
The unauthorized access of corporate systems has been the result of actions by
untrained new hires, departing employees, and disgruntled employees (American Bar
Association [ABA], 2017; NIST, 2016; Ponemon Institute, 2017). By uncovering real
time strategies for onboarding, offboarding, systems’ management, and policies and
procedures, this study could help public and private organizations to develop awareness
and countermeasures to prevent insider threats and data breaches, especially during new
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system deployments. Running parallel efforts for security protocols acquisitions, and
innovative technology implementations is not always possible due to management
approvals, budgets, and employees’ buy-in (Green, 2014; NIST, 2016). The new findings
from the current Delphi study regarding risky and toxic behaviors may serve as a baseline
for developing employee training and development opportunities, along with new
security strategies, and controls (NIST, 2016; Trochim et al., 2015).
Demands from innovative technologies’ system implementations, human resource
management, training, and business requirements place additional burdens and challenges
on the roles and responsibilities that IT program and project managers exercise in public
and private organizations (NIST, 2016). IT managers are responsible for new systems,
security, implementations, and data management, along with staffing, making it a priority
to develop countermeasures to prevent unauthorized access to data systems and preserve
the confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility of data on a need-to-know basis (National
Initiative for Cybersecurity Education [NICE], 2016). The challenges that managers
experience include maintaining adequate access controls and staffing levels, hiring
personnel possessing the network systems and cybersecurity skills specified in contract
requirements, or the hiring organizations, and retaining current skilled IT personnel
(NICE, 2016). I included a purposeful sample in this study comprised of 25 IT SMEs in
the Washington metropolitan area, that is, Maryland, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia.
As insider threats continue to rise, creating known and unknown risks to society,
findings from this Delphi study could provide real-time strategies, best industry practices,
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and greater awareness of insider threats’ behaviors (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016;
Amigorena, 2014; Ponemon Institute, 2017). Managers could use the findings of this
study to generate early interventions to curtail insider threats’ toxic behaviors and data
breaches.
This dissertation consists of five chapters and appendices. Chapter 2 is a
comprehensive literature review that includes insider threats’ past events, history, and
present challenges (Walden University, n.d.). Chapter 3 addresses the study methodology
and includes data gathering, analysis, and strategy. Chapters 4 and 5 include reporting of
the Delphi study’s final analysis, conclusions, and recommendations.
Background of the Study
Data breaches occurring at the Office of Personnel Management, Department of
State, Internal Revenue System, Department of Defense, Democratic National
Convention, Marriott, the Microsoft Corporation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
and Equifax were eye-opening examples of the impacts of insider threats’ intentional, or
unintentional data breaches in public and private organizations. Gelles et al.’s (2012)
“Mitigating the Insider Threat” quantitative survey indicated that 40% of the employees
interviewed responded that they were treated unfairly, or unethically by employers; 27%
did not consider the ethical consequences of posting comments, photos, and videos
online; and 74% said that it was easy to damage a company’s reputation using social
media. Data losses stated in the Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Report averaged
$4.63 billion. (FBI, 2016c).
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Problem Statement
Insider threats and data security have been an ongoing problem for public and
private organizations (NIST, 2016; Padayachee, 2016). As insider threats increase in this
era of fast communications, it was important to discover the reasons and motivators of
insider threats in the workplace, as new security protocols and real-time strategies were
required to be developed to quickly address the operational risks that were introduced
with innovative technologies (Green, 2014). The general problem is that insider threats’
activities lead to data breaches in public and private organizations (Greitzer et al., 2013;
Hampton et al., 2014; NIST, 2016; Ponemon Institute, 2017; Rosenfeld et al., 2012;
Sokolowski et al., 2016).
In 2017, insider threats accounted for 54.4% of all incidents and losses among the
SMEs surveyed by the Ponemon Institute (2017). As insider threats become more
prevalent, increased awareness of risky behaviors and real-time solutions must be
gathered from SMEs who can share their knowledge and opinions on the subject.
Because insider threats continue to rise, increased awareness of risky behaviors and realtime strategies needed to be gathered from SMEs, who could share their experiences
about the subject of insider threats, and their antisocial or risky behaviors. Spain et al.
(2014) and Roeser et al. (2016) found that risky behaviors can manifest as antisocial acts
that have negative workplace consequences. The specific problem was that there was no
current consensus among SMEs concerning employees’ risky behaviors, preventive
strategies, and controls needed to protect data in public and private organizations (Pew
Research Center, 2017; Rosenfeld et al., 2012; Sokolowski et al., 2016). SMEs identified
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risky behaviors and activities that predispose some employees to commit data security
breaches have not been recently addressed in current qualitative studies (Abdallah &
Gheyas, 2016; Amigorena, 2014; Greitzer et al., 2013).
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study was to uncover what real-time
consensus existed among 25 IT SMEs in the Washington metropolitan area for managing
insider threats and data security in public and private organizations. The purpose
statement supported the problem statement of the study (Locke et al., 2004). SMEs in the
Washington metropolitan had an opportunity to provide feedback about security
strategies and preventive controls used to deter insider threats and risky behaviors and
protect data in their organizations (Hampton et al., 2014; Rosenfeld et al., 2012;
Sokolowski et al., 2016). By creating greater awareness about employees’ risky
behaviors, I hoped to facilitate early interventions to prevent insider threats and data
breaches in public and private organizations (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016; Amigorena,
2014; Ponemon Institute, 2017). The dark triad theory was the conceptual framework of
this study for identifying and classifying activities and risky behaviors as viewed by
SMEs. Recent qualitative research on data security breaches with a focus on employee
behaviors was lacking in the literature. Instead, quantitative research that was heavily
focused on the financial impact of insider threats was extensive, leaving a gap for realtime qualitative research on the subject (Ponemon Institute, 2017). This Delphi study was
used to convene a targeted sample, or panel of 25 SMEs in public and private
organizations to achieve consensus on reasons, motivators, strategies, and best security
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practices, policies, and procedures to manage insider threats in public and private
organizations (Hoffmann et al., 2018).
Research Questions
The research questions were derived from the problem statement and the purpose
statement. Hancock and Algozzine (2015) noted that a well-formulated research question
can be used to support the purpose and meaning of the statements and that these
questions do not present an ethical constraint. Twenty-five IT professionals holding
certifications in the Washington metropolitan area were selected as the sample for this
Delphi study. During Round 1, the overarching research question was the following:
RQ1. What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding the
reasons for insider threats in organizations?
The sub questions included in the study were:
SQ1. What are the motivators for insider threats in the workplace?
SQ2. What are the security strategies and early interventions used by
organizations to prevent data breaches and insider threats?
SQ3. What policies and procedures can be developed to manage insider threats’
access to systems in organizations?
Conceptual Framework of the Study
The dark triad was the conceptual framework that grounded this study for
recognition of the essential behaviors of insider threats as described by industry SMEs
(Legg, 2017). Although other frameworks were considered for this study, a conceptual
framework was preferred to raise awareness for detecting behaviors that could help to
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respond to insider threats (Beck & Harter, 2015; Cohen, 2015). A conceptual framework
allows for social constructs, data gathering and analysis, and data saturation when
sufficient consensus has been reached.
The use of the dark triad theory as a determinant for behavioral observation,
combined with industry-standard monitoring systems and controls, can uncover more
possibilities for developing preventive actions, policies, and procedures to improve
security efficiency (Legg et al., 2017). Dark triad theory offered a framework for
previous studies that was used to justify the need for this study. Traits such as
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy, were used as behavioral markers to
ground this study and can be seen in the examination of the literature review in Chapter
2, as the central elements of this conceptual framework (Walden University, n.d.). Little
empirical research had been conducted to study the phenomenon of reasons and
motivators for insider threats (Thoroughgood & Padilla, 2013). The dark triad theory was
developed to offer explanations on traits that have been traced to manipulative social
behaviors associated with insider threats’ behaviors, feelings, disregard for following
guidelines and organizational policies, and risky activities, as can be observed in Table 4
(Sokolowski et al., 2016; Thoroughgood & Padilla, 2013). Giammarco and Vernon
(2015) noted that individuals displaying narcissism have an inflated self-view and focus
on themselves. Psychopathy is characterized by arrogant and deceitful personality, high
impulsivity, low empathy, low anxiety, and thrill-seeking behaviors (Giammarco &
Vernon, 2015).
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Nature of the Study
A qualitative Delphi method was my chosen research methodology for this study,
while other research methods such as grounded theory and case study were also under
consideration (Charmaz, 2014; Urquhart et al., 2010). However, due to the iterative
nature of insider threats and the changing requirements for IT professionals, gathering the
consensus of SMEs could render a better real-time outcome for identifying toxic
employee behaviors, noting industry best practices, and discovering real-time security
countermeasures for insider threat behaviors and data breaches. The changing nature of
insider threats and innovative technologies create a major demand for determining what
industry best practices are followed by SMEs in the Washington metropolitan area. The
phenomenon of insider threats has been an increasing problem for systems users in
academia, banking, medicine, and practically any area that requires confidentiality,
privacy, and for the safe transferability of personally identifiable information (PII)
(NIST, 2016). Insider threats and data security have been ongoing challenge for public
and private organizations (NIST, 2016; Padayachee, 2016). As insider threats increase in
this era of fast communications, it is important to uncover the reasons and motivators for
insider threats in organizations (Green, 2014). I presented real-time security
countermeasures used by SMEs that, when utilized in the workplace, these may prevent
insider threats’ toxic behaviors and data breaches as better access controls are
implemented. I applied the conceptual framework of the dark triad theory to help
understand what makes insiders turn against their organizations, how insider threats are
fostered in organizations, and how to bring to light security strategies that may help shape
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attitudes about the security of innovative technologies, data confidentiality, integrity, and
accessibility. These findings could generate early interventions to prevent insider threats’
toxic behaviors and data breaches in public and private organizations.
I used a qualitative Delphi study to gather consensus from 25 IT SMEs in the
Washington metropolitan area about reasons and motivators for insider threats, and what
real-time strategies, policies, and procedures they used to manage insider threats and data
security in public and private organizations. These SMEs possessed at least 5 years of
experience in an IT position managing security, information systems, cybersecurity, and
risk management, as stated in their LinkedIn professional profiles and as required to
achieve their certifications. I selected a Delphi study because it was suitable to develop a
deeper knowledge and understanding of the topic and to uncover real-time experiences
and lessons learned from SMEs, and I used three rounds of surveys (Marshall &
Rossman, 2016; Yin, 2014).
The Round 1 open-ended survey questions addressed reasons and motivators for
insider threats in public and private organizations, strategies and and early interventions
used in participants’ organizations for data breaches and insider threats, and what policies
and procedures could be used to manage insider threats and protect data. The responses
from the Round 1 survey open-ended questions were used to establish the closed-ended
questions for the Round 2 survey. In this qualitative study, the 25 SMEs’ level of
agreement for reaching consensus was achieved when at least 60% of them agreed,
strongly agreed, and the combined consensus numbers fell in the agree, or strongly agree
range of the 5-point Likert-type scale used in this study (Habibi et al., 2015).
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Cleary et al. (2014) noted the importance of gaining qualitative data from
individuals that could provide potential for exploring a topic in depth within the
boundaries of an interpretative, or conceptual framework, or even perspectives. The
findings in this study stemmed from the SMEs' experiences with insider threats, and these
may be useful in raising awareness among individuals and organizations about insider
threats’ identifiable traits and behaviors as depicted by the dark triad theory (Cope, 2013;
Habibi et al., 2015).
The findings in this Delphi study may be valuable to readers, scholars, and
researchers looking to learn more about insider threats, data security, and the dark triad
theory because they are representative of the security tools, and approaches that SMEs
use in public, and private organizations. Further definitions may assist in increasing the
reader’s understanding of security measures, and protocols.
Definitions
The following section contains definitions of terms used in the current study. A
glossary appears in Appendix A.
Access: Access is the ability to gain entry to a location, and make use of any
assets, systems, resources, and information (NIST, 2016).
Big data: ‘Big data’ are extremely large data sets that may be analyzed
computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, especially relating to human
behavior, and interactions. Big data offer the potential to collect large amounts of
documents gathered from various sources (Hashem et al., 2015; NIST, 2016).
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Breach: A breach is an unauthorized disclosure of classified, or unclassified
information (NIST, 2016).
Cyber: Cyber refers to internet-related technology offering deliberate actions to
alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy (NIST, 2016).
Data security management: Data security management is the prevention of data
loss, or integrity resulting from the exposure of proprietary, sensitive, or classified
information, either through a voluntary, or involuntary data leakage, or unauthorized data
access (NIST, 2016).
Insider: An insider is any person with authorized access to any department, or
agency resources to include personnel, facilities, information, equipment, networks, or
systems (NIST, 2016).
Insider threat: Insider threat refers to the threat that an insider will use authorized
access, wittingly ,or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States through
the unauthorized disclosure of information, or through the loss, or degradation of
departmental resources, or capabilities (Center for Development of Security Excellence,
n.d.).
Subject matter expert (SME): A SME is a person with bona fide expert knowledge
about what it takes to do a job. For this study, SMEs included first-level supervisors,
managers, directors, and incumbent supervisors who could capture the key requirements
of a position and provide multiple points of view on the criticality of the tasks and
competencies (U.S. Office of Personnel Management [OPM], 2020).
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Assumptions
General assumptions implied in this study included factors and observed
behaviors affecting organizational performance, as well as how information technology
professionals viewed job satisfaction and management perceptions (Ghazzawi, 2008;
Kurtessis et al., 2015; Maslow, 2012). As a trusted member engages in risky behaviors
that affect an organization’s systems, networks, data, and reputation, the life of an
organization may be at risk. Beebe and Rao’s (2010) and Willison and Warkentin’s
(2013) studies showed that insider threats might exert power by holding authorization and
access to an organization. Security breaches affect the financial performance of public
and private organizations with factors such as reputation, tangible and intangible assets,
and trust issues (Avery & Ranganathan, 2016). Because of the findings in these studies,
three primary underlying assumptions were considered in this study.
The first assumption was that the SMEs had experienced situations whereas a
trusted member of the team engaged in a risky behavior that led to data breaches, spilling,
or similar risks, or rising to positions of power, and that the SMEs’ responses on this
subject were provided truthfully and in good faith and without the fear of retribution due
to the nature and confidentiality of a Delphi study. Second, I assumed that the feedback
provided in areas of insider threat behaviors, management, and security strategies was
such that it could help students, new researchers, practitioners, and new hires in public
and private organizations to raise awareness and to develop better strategies to protect
their assets. Third, I assumed that none of the SMEs responding to the survey engaged in
insider threat activity. Assuming SMEs’ responses could alleviate outcomes and
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performance impacts, Avery posited that information on security breaches affects the
financial performance of organizations with factors such as reputation, tangible and
intangible assets, and trust issues (Avery & Ranganathan, 2016).
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this study covered insider threats’ risky behaviors (i.e., reasons and
motivators); best strategies for detection, prevention, and data security management; and
policies and procedures to manage insider threats in public and private organizations, as
agreed upon by 25 SMEs in the Washington metropolitan area. Insider threats and data
security have been an ongoing problem for public and private organizations (NIST, 2016;
Padayachee, 2016; Yaseen & Panda, 2011). Ponemon Institute (2017) researchers
reported in a 2016 survey that malicious insiders represented 54.4% of all events. In
2016, the Ponemon Institute (2017) survey showed losses with the sum of $3.6 billion.
Panetta’s (2017) report of disruptive technologies addressed the potential impact of
artificial intelligence and all intelligent things in increasing risks and disruptions within a
broad industry, opening the door to data vulnerabilities and further opportunities for
insider threats in public and private organizations (Garner, 2018).
Due to emerging technologies and industry changes, it is necessary to manage
insider threat escalations successfully (NIST, 2016). Therefore, increased awareness
about the risky behaviors of insider threats and real-time strategies require subject matter
consensus (NIST, 2016). Risky behaviors may manifest as antisocial actions leading to
negative consequences in the workplace (Roeser et al., 2016; Spain et al., 2014).
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Antisocial behaviors have been identified in insider threats using a dark triad
theory categorization; such examples have included famous insider-threat incidents such
as those involving Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning (Azizli et al., 2016; Kaplan &
Hecker, 2014). Using a panel of SMEs from public and private organizations including
government, contractors, and other industries within the certified IT participant pool
could render a cross-sectional discussion of antisocial behaviors, and best practices to
identify and control risky behaviors in the workplace; adding new knowledge about best
industry strategies to protect data and manage insider threats from a global perspective,
rather than from an individualized organizational perspective.
These certified IT SMEs could consist of program/project managers, chief
information officers, chief information security officers, security administrators, security
and systems analysts, network engineers, software developers, and database and website
administrators with a minimum of 5 years of IT and system management experience. My
findings in this study may help remind systems and computer users of what is
appropriate, or not when accessing websites, using social media, clicking on links,
granting access, and ignoring basic computer security activities (such as logging in and
out of one’s computer and keeping passwords confidential).
In this dissertation, I have included a definition of terms section and a description
of the methodology, findings, and conclusions to ensure that readers become familiar
with the key topics of the study and to assist with the transferability of knowledge and
lessons learned (Hohmann et al., 2018). Houghton et al. (2013) noted that for purposes of
transferability, readers must be able to understand a study’s findings. Supporting this
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understanding has involved a thorough effort on my part to provide detailed information
for readers, including methodology, data collection, sample processes, research methods,
findings, and summaries, which could provide value to readers’ own studies (Houghton et
al., 2013).
Delimitations of this study include unresolved measures for credibility, or
trustworthiness, transferability, dependability, and confirmability for ensuring unbiased
qualitative results (Charmaz, 2014; Firmin et al., 2014; Lincoln & Guba, 2000).
Specifically, this study addressed strategies for insider threat prevention and data security
from the perspective of 25 SMEs. Data analysis included three main categories that
contributed to data reduction through consolidation, data display, and data verification
(Adler & Clark, 2015). No demographic data were requested from SMEs that might have
included race, gender, or national origin. The data gathered were analyzed through
categorization and direct interpretation (Yazan, 2015). The findings may lead to better
risk detection and data confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility as agreed upon by
participating SMEs (Singh, 2014). These findings may also generate early interventions
to prevent insider threats’ toxic behaviors and data breaches.
Significance of the Study
This Delphi study was conducted to provide an opportunity to contribute to the
body of knowledge in the IT field and increase awareness about insider threats’ risky
behaviors and new security strategies. The participation of a panel of 25 SMEs from
public and private organizations rendered a cross-sectional discussion of best practices,
adding new knowledge about industry strategies used by these SMEs to protect data and
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manage insider threats viewed from a global perspective, rather than from an
individualized organizational perspective. A 2015 Ponemon Institute survey uncovered
that an additional 237 organizations experienced data losses resulting from insider threat
activity—an increase of 29% relative to the institute’s 2013 report (Ponemon Institute,
2017); thus, generating early interventions to prevent insider threats’ toxic behaviors and
data breaches in the workplace was always a best security practice. This qualitative
Delphi method was used to provide SMEs’ expert opinions about best security practices
on insider threat prevention and identification that could help public and private
organizations when developing policies, procedures, and training (NICE, 2016). My
conclusions from these findings may contribute to narrowing the gap in the literature on
understanding how to effectively recognize and prevent insider threats’ activities and
risky behaviors, how to implement best industry practices, and what type of new training
programs could support professional development and enhance the IT profession. With
this study, I may also increase awareness about strategies to identify, detect, and prevent
insider threat activities such as the ones identified in Figure 1 in public and private
organizations.
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Figure 1
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Note. From 2017 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis Benchmark Research, by
Ponemon Institute, 2017. In the Public Domain.
(https://www.ncsl.org/documents/taskforces/IBM_Ponemon2017CostofDataBreachStudy
.pdf).
SMEs’ responses about insider threat prevention could serve to support
practitioners in the field and to develop more effective policies and procedures (Ferreira
& Otley, 2009; Loeser, 2013). Because researchers conducting quantitative research have
focused on the impact of monetary losses, or bottom-line impacts generated by insider
threats’ actions, rather than the behaviors of those who perpetrated threats, this Delphi
study could provide the baseline needed to identify and deter insider threats. The results
of this study may also significantly reduce systems failures and occurrences of lost, or
stolen confidential information, such as the one experienced by OPM and Equifax Credit
Reporting that affected many individuals (Maasberg et al., 2016). A Delphi technique

19
provides a manager with an excellent platform to develop better employee programs that
discourage employees from turning against their organizations (Stolfo et al., 2013).
Significance to Practice
Research is required for a variety of purposes, including gaining, or improving
subject knowledge, comprehending facts and situations, and developing new skills.
Because research is such an important first step in resolving a wide range of personal,
professional, educational, and socioeconomic issues, this qualitative Delphi study can be
used as a starting point for anyone looking for more information and lessons learned
about insider threats that 25 SMEs provided based on their past experiences with insider
threats’ reasons and motivators, and the strategies, policies, and procedures that they used
in public and private organizations. These findings are not intended to be a one-size-fitsall solution for all insider threat behaviors and countermeasures; rather, as the demand for
speedier communications grows and newer technologies necessitate quick responses,
these findings may become more relevant as the need for faster communications
increases and emerging technologies demand expeditious electronic communications for
business, education, and other industries, sometimes overlooking the role that security
management, training, and access controls play in opening the door to intentional, or
unintentional insider threats’ mishaps in organizations (NIST, 2016).
Because insider threat activities continue to disrupt productivity in public and
private organizations, and because awareness of the reasons and motivators for insider
threats as viewed by the 25 participating SMEs can alleviate some of the cultural issues
often overlooked during a process, this Delphi study may be useful to program managers,
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project managers, IT practitioners, researchers, and students. Several quantitative
surveys, such as those of the Ponemon Institute (2017), the Deloitte (2013) TMT Survey
Security findings, and the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2020) survey, have been
introduced to show how insider threats continue to grow and be a challenge for IT
managers. These surveys heavily focus on the financial impact of data losses, not the
reasons and motivators for insider threats and what opportunities social media and social
engineering provide employees for facilitating data breaches (Hashem et al., 2015).
Insider breaches are user centric; therefore, continuous monitoring and controls are
needed for early interventions (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013). The real-time feedback and
consensus of the SMEs resulted in helpful identifiers, methods, and controls for
managing insider risks and data breaches in private and public organizations.
Significance to Theory
This qualitative Delphi study included a unique perspective from SMEs in
understanding real-time preventive strategies and controls to identify and decrease insider
threat behaviors and data breaches in public and private organizations. This research was
enhanced by the application of the dark triad theory as the conceptual framework to
develop new insights into real-time traits and behaviors that could provide new
opportunities to enhance the body of knowledge and the profession. The feedback that I
received from SMEs may lead to better deterrence strategies and improved recruitment
and training practices (Greitzer et al., 2013; NIST, 2016). Limited qualitative research
existed that could explain why information technology practitioners turned against their
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organizations and allowed cyber compromises and breaches to network systems (Stolfo et
al., 2013).
While the proposed relationship between the dark triad personality traits, related
constructs, and external process antecedents was derived from past literature, further
empirical research was needed (Maasberg et al., 2016). The results of this qualitative
Delphi study could help clarify issues that affect IT practitioners, researchers, and new
employees, helping organizations increase their return on investment by preventing data
breaches and increasing employee morale and retention, hence diminishing a lack of
loyalty and costly departures. Pinder noted that there is a link between employee loyalty,
commitment, and turnovers (Parker, 2008; Pinder, 2008). Employee departures can leave
an organization vulnerable to threats and breaches in system management (Evans &
Reeder, 2010; Kramer et al., 2011; Mahoney, 2011).
Significance to Social Change
Social change occurs when employees feel empowered, work in a risk-free
environment, and are trusted and valued by their employers (Project Management
Institute [PMI], 2015). Historically, organizations with good countermeasures had less
stressful environments, along with higher employee morale and retention, thus facilitating
positive social change (NIST, 2016). Knowledge sharing and industry best security
practices are essential to the survival of organizations (NIST, 2016). Upon this
foundation, the prevention of insider threats and misuse of organizational assets could
benefit from a real-time deeper understanding of the role that corporate behaviors,
training, best industry practices, and employee buy-in have in improving data security
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countermeasures and preventing insider threats in organization. This Delphi study’s
findings can be used for transferable approaches to raise awareness about the importance
of employee security training and development and to sustain safer environments, as
agreed upon by 25 SMEs in public and private organizations.
In the literature review, case studies provided a historical review of the
similarities and differences between prior psychological research on insider threats’
activities and behaviors (Baughman et al., 2014); therefore, the social change
implications of this study may be that, as systems and cybersecurity threats and attacks
become more frequent and sophisticated, a greater awareness may be created about the
relevance of security training programs and knowledge sharing as a perspective for the
survival of public and private organizations (Baughman et al., 2014). Upon this
foundation, risk management frameworks could become a prime function in the
prevention of intrusions, identity theft, and misuse of organizational assets (Hampton,
2009).
Many quantitative studies’ researchers have focused on lack of technological
innovations as an excuse for insider threats. However, less has been written about how
insider threats are grown in public and private organizations, and the role that managers
and culture play as enablers of insider threats (Hoffmann et al., 2012). The SMEs’
consensus presented in this Delphi study could support the implementation and
development of training programs that could lead to professional development and
employee recognition, thus enhancing positive social change that supports the
organization.
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Summary and Transition
The value of safeguarding sensitive assets in public and private organizations by
maintaining data integrity and developing policies and procedures that address emerging
technologies and cyber security were critical aspects of this study (NIST, 2016). As a
result, countermeasures that 25 SMEs in the Washington metropolitan area used in their
day-to-day operations to protect their data were uncovered in this Delphi study. In
Chapter 1, I gave an introduction of the study, including the background, problem
statement, purpose, research questions, conceptual framework, nature of the study,
concepts, assumptions, scope, delimitations, and significance of the study to practice,
theory, and social change. The 25 IT SMEs who took part in this study provided real-time
data, strategies, and impartial opinions about the effect of emerging technologies on
untrained, or disgruntled workers, all while remaining anonymous thanks to the
SurveyMonkey electronic tool. In Chapter 2, I present a comprehensive literature review
to support the need for this study, as well as the main impacts of insider attacks and the
effects of risky employee behaviors on data security management.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Insider threats and data security have been an ongoing problem for public and
private organizations (NIST, 2016; Padayachee, 2016). As insider threats increase in this
era of fast communications, it was important to discover the reasons and motivators of
insider threats in the workplace, as new security protocols and real-time strategies were
required to be developed to quickly address the operational risks that were introduced
with innovative technologies (Green, 2014). The general problem is that insider threats’
activities lead to data breaches in public and private organizations (Greitzer et al., 2013;
Hampton et al., 2014; NIST, 2016; Ponemon Institute, 2017; Rosenfeld et al., 2012;
Sokolowski et al., 2016).
The increasing use of IT systems has led public and private organizations to look
for new security strategies and controls during the implementation of innovative
technologies (NIST, 2016). Countermeasures, policies, training, and strategies needed to
prevent insider threats are underrepresented in the present literature, that primarily
focuses on the quantitative (financial) aspects of losses resulting from insider threats
(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2013, NIST, 2016). The awareness needed to
identify and decrease insider threat opportunities in public and private organizations
during systems innovations and upgrades could be achieved through training and risk
awareness efforts that could generate early interventions to prevent insider threats’ toxic
behaviors and data breaches in schools and businesses (Spector et al., 2005).
The findings from this Delphi study provide real-time strategies and best industry
practices and may create greater awareness of the employee behaviors representing
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known and unknown risks to society; these findings could facilitate early interventions to
prevent insider threats’ toxic behaviors and data breaches (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016;
Amigorena, 2014; Ponemon, 2017).
The dark triad theory’s constructs may aid in the development of a conceptual
framework for classifying the risky behaviors and activities that the SMEs defined as
predisposing certain employees to commit data security breaches, that had not been
discussed in recent literature. Insider threat theories and best business cybersecurity
practices are supported and facilitated by the following areas: employee and management
perceptions, innovative technologies, the role of security awareness and training, best
industry practices, risk management frameworks, and federal mandates, as introduced in
this chapter.
Literature Search Strategy
The tools and databases that I used for this review included the Walden
University Library, Google Scholar, JSTOR, ScienceDirect, ProQuest, Wiley, and
libraries. Additional materials included the Federal Information System Management Act
(FISMA), NIST, and Department of Defense-approved manuals for cyber detection,
prevention, and correction. The method for identifying newly published journal articles
included a Boolean approach. The search for relevant materials included keywords
included in the definitions noted in Chapter 1, such as access, classified information,
compromise, employee, insider, insider threats, security, and unauthorized disclosure. In
addition to these main categories, articles specifically related to references and definitions
concerning areas such as cybersecurity, information technology/systems, cybercrime,
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computer security, and risk management underwent another Boolean search for
clarifications throughout the study and as feedback was received from the responses to
the surveys.
A literature review aids in gaining a deeper understanding of a topic under
investigation and provides readers with a better understanding of the nature and breadth
of the analysis (Torraco, 2005). I carefully examined the breadth of insider threats
literature reviews, several case studies, and the general population at the beginning of this
process. According to Torraco (2005), the scope of the literature review, the number of
studies, and the general population are often analyzed at this stage. French et al. (2002)
noted that a reviewed subject and conclusions could ground a study and provide a deeper
understanding of areas of a research study. My primary objective for the literature review
strategy was to provide supporting data and evidence of the need for new and updated
strategies to prevent insider threats in public and private organizations and present viable
actions to increase individual and organizational awareness. Ninety percent of the
literature cited in this review was published within the last 5 to 7 years, with the
remaining 10% representing older publications needed to explain the history of IT and
insider threats in their early beginnings.
Conceptual Framework
The dark triad theory has been used to assess key features and sources of
information regarding the motivations of insider threats as depicted by Abdallah and
Gheyas (2016). Insider threats’ core features, such as callousness, disagreeableness, and
interpersonal exploitation, were previously tested constructs of the dark triad theory
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traits, that is, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and narcissism (Figueredo et al., 2015;
Hodson et al., 2009). Recent findings in the psychology field have identified traits such
as self-serving behaviors and a life strategy for immediate gratification and risk-taking
behaviors as traceable to insider threats’ traits and the dark triad (Spain et al., 2014).
Maasberg et al. (2016) noted that dark triad personality traits could be traced to
the insider threat cases of individuals such as Brian Regan, Robert Hansen, Aldrich
Ames, Ryan Anderson, Ronald Hoffmann, and Michael Penn. Table 1 provides traceable
examples of insider threats and dark triad traits depicting an unusual need for attention, a
sense of entitlement above the rules, arrogance and compensatory behaviors for selfesteem, lack of impulse control, lack of conscience, and a chronic history of disobeying
the rules and organizational policies as being shared by most individuals (Maasberg et al.,
2016).
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Table 1
Insider Threat Cases and Dark Triad Personality Traits
Dark triad personality

Brian

Robert

Ames

Ryan

Ronald

characteristics in insider threat

Regan

Hanssen

Aldrich

Anderson

Hoffmann

Unusual need for attention

x

x

x

x

x

Sense of entitlement/above the

x

x

x

x

x

Arrogance

x

x

x

x

x

Compensatory behaviors for

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

cases

rules

self-esteem
(Lack of impulse control
Lack of conscience)
Chronic rule violations as in
sociopathy
Note. From “Law Enforcement Enterprise Portal (LEEP),” by Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2016
(https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/leep). In the Public Domain.

Literature Review Related to the Concept of the Dark Triad
Table 1, drawn from the FBI 2016 Internet Crime Report, depicts famous insider
threat cases that align with characteristics of the dark triad personality traits. For
example, former Master Sergeant Brian Regan, a father of four, was an Air Force retiree
who worked as a contractor for TRW at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) in
Chantilly, Virginia. Former MSgt Regan had accrued over $117,000 in credit card debt
and was said to be paranoid about the future. He sold secrets to Libya and China until
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finally arrested by FBI agents at Dulles International Airport for stealing classified
materials from the NRO (FBI, 2016b). Regan showed compensatory behaviors for low
self-esteem due to his dyslexia. He also lacked impulse control, showing symptoms of
paranoia (Maasberg et al., 2016).
FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen had authorized access to a multitude of
national security data. He voluntarily provided information to the former Soviet Union
and Russia. Because of his assignments within the FBI, Hanssen gained access to some of
the most sensitive and highly classified information in the U.S. government. For his
espionage, Hanssen received over $600,000 (FBI, 2016d). Insider threat Hanssen showed
an unusual need for attention, a sense of entitlement, arrogance, and a lack of conscience,
or sociopathy (Jordan et al., 2016; Maasberg et al., 2016).
CIA 31-year veteran Ames Aldrich was a case officer who was fluent in Russian
and an expert in foreign intelligence. He spied for Russia from 1985 until the day of his
arrest in February 1994. Like the previous insider threats, Aldrich had accumulated
excessive debt and lived beyond his means. He was paid over $1.88 million for his
treason (FBI, 2016a). Aldrich showed arrogance, greed, and financial need that
transferred to a sense of entitlement by selling national security secrets; he also showed a
lack of conscience (Maasberg et al., 2016).
Former Private First Class (Pfc). Ryan Anderson, an Everett native, and
Washington National Guardsman, wanted to defect from the United States to join alQaida, train its members, and conduct terrorist attacks against the United States (Poe,
2011). For his efforts, he was arrested by FBI Agents while still on duty at Joint Base
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Lewis-McCord. While on duty, Anderson displayed a sense of entitlement and
compensatory behaviors to increase his self-esteem; he displayed chronic rule violations
with a disregard for military life in general and his open desire to join forces with alQaida (Maasberg et al., 2016).
A former sailor with a top-secret clearance and a job dealing with sensitive
information in the Navy, Robert Hoffmann had achieved great exposure to information
on U.S. nuclear fleets and operations that he was willing and able to sell to the enemy.
Hoffmann was disgruntled and resentful toward the Navy. Hoffmann blamed the Navy
for his divorce and lack of career advancement. Near his retirement in 2011, Hoffmann
attempted to divulge top secret national defense information. His efforts fell short, and he
was arrested and found guilty of espionage in 2013 (FBI, 2017). Hoffmann demonstrated
an unusual need for attention and a sense of entitlement above the rules; he was also
arrogant and lacked mindfulness (Maasberg et al., 2016).
Insider threats are not exclusively attributed to men. In 2001, Ana Montes, a
highly respected former senior analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency assigned to
translate and analyze data from Cuba, whose family tree extended to siblings working for
the FBI, was arrested in Washington, DC for providing classified information about
intelligence, military strategies, and other sensitive operations to the Cuban government
(Carmichael, 2007; Tucker, 2002). Montes’s treason was ideological, as she
demonstrated during her sentencing, where she unapologetically stated, “I obeyed my
conscience rather than the law” (Tucker, 2002). Because of Montes’s risky behaviors and
disregard for national security policy, four American undercover agents lost their lives in
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Cuba. Montes’s behaviors can be construed as above the rules, lacking mindfulness, and
psychopathic, as described by Maasberg in relation to insider threat cases and dark triad
personality traits (Goodboy & Martin, 2015).
Unhappy, or unengaged employees may develop risky behaviors consistent with
the character traits posed by the dark triad theory (Maasberg et al., 2016). Mahoney
(2011) contended that there is a link between employee loyalty, commitment, and
turnover that can leave an organization vulnerable to threats and data breaches, that may
be linked to employee behaviors, perceptions, and buy-in. A lack of work continuity,
training, and familiarity with organizational policies are also identifiable factors for
facilitating insider threats in public and private organizations (Evans & Reeder, 2010;
Mahoney, 2011; Pinder, 2008). Gelles et al.’s (2012) survey identified the most common
behaviors that insider threats exhibit as including public and private disclosures, violent
behaviors when addressing a problem, social media leaks, and a lack of compliance with
security practices. Social media access, workforce demographics, and changes in
computing and networking have been identified as the most motivating factors (Gelles et
al., 2012). As stated earlier, innovative technologies may open the door to intentional, or
unintentional insider breaches due to a lack of training, privacy, security, and institutional
knowledge (Brenner, 2010; NIST, 2016).
The dark triad theory is used for interest alignment and relational distance to
measure self-interests, corporate interest alignment, and social interactions (Gottschalg &
Zollo, 2007). In the cases of insider threats presented above, motivations were the driving
force behind risky behaviors and betrayals, regardless of whether these were for financial,
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ideological, or religious reasons, or whether they were purely the result of retributive and
manipulative personalities. Social dominance, power, and authority have been considered
as leading drivers of the dark triad constructs (Burris et al., 2013).
Machiavellianism is considered a manipulative personality characteristic that
reflects relational strategies marked by self-interest, deception, and manipulation
(Baughman et al., 2014; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Jakobwitz and Egan (2006) noted
that Machiavellianism has been represented by manipulative personalities, self-interest,
deception, and manipulation. Narcissism, a form of a clinical personality disorder,
presents the elements of grandiosity, entitlement, dominance, and superiority (Azizli et
al., 2016; Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006).
Individuals displaying narcissism have an inflated self-view and focus on
themselves (Giammarco & Vernon, 2015). Paulhus and Williams (2002) noted that traits
of psychopathy were characterized by arrogant and deceitful personalities, high
impulsivity, low empathy, low anxiety, and thrill-seeking behaviors. Traits of
Machiavellianism and psychopathy have often been associated with negative creativity,
while narcissism has been associated with less fluency and creativity (Jonason et al.,
2017). These constructs were tested in two item response theory studies conducted by
Persson et al. (2017) and Jonason et al. (2017). The characteristics mentioned have been
associated with past examples of insider threats that have included Edward Snowden’s
2013 disclosures of the government’s extensive surveillance of private citizens’ phones
and email records (Peterson, 2014; Pew Research Center Project Survey, 2017) and

33
Chelsey Manning’s data security breaches of sensitive and classified information from
U.S. military networks (Londoṅo, 2014).
Data breaches have also occurred at the OPM, the Department of State, the
Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Defense, the 2016 Democratic National
Convention, and the CIA (Bennett, 2016; Flaherty et al., 2016; Schleifer, 2016). These
historical precedents support the need to further investigate insider threats and identify
real-time security strategies that could effectively protect data during the deployment of
new technology (Talke & Snelders, 2013).
Additional traits and dimensions are applicable to socially malicious behaviors.
Adverse personality traits are characterized by observable socially malicious behaviors,
such as emotional coldness, duplicity, self-promotion, and aggressiveness (Baughman et
al., 2014). Paulhus and Williams (2002) identified three-personality empirical and
conceptual overlaps within the known personality traits of the dark triad theory. These
traits were neuroticism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy that are associated with low
conscientiousness.
Paulhus and Williams (2002) and Ramsay and Westerlaken (2016) explained in
their studies that insider threats shared a sense of entitlement, superiority, privilege, lack
of remorse, lack of empathy, and a tendency to exploit others. Jonason et al. (2017) and
Persson et al. (2017) found that psychopathy was associated with narcissistic and
deceitful attitudes, high impulsivity, low empathy, low anxiety, and thrill-seeking
behaviors. Machiavellianism and psychopathy have often been associated with negative
creativity, while narcissism has been associated with less fluency and creativity. In their
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evaluations of two constructs during the item response theory studies, narcissism,
psychopathy, and Machiavellianism were identified as behaviors that portrayed a flexible
approach to interpersonal control (Jonason et al., 2017; Persson et al., 2017).
Stolfo et al. (2013) noted that the efforts for controlling unauthorized access to
electronic resources and malicious behaviors had been a part of organizations since the
creation of electronic systems (Stolfo et al., 2013). This can be evidenced by the
Kemmerer and Porras’s development of an Intrusion Detection Framework in 1995.
Therefore, as technologies change, so should the security strategies of public and public
organizations (Stolfo et al., 2013).
Jakobwitz and Egan (2006) noted that Machiavellianism has been represented by
manipulative personalities, self-interest, deception, and manipulation. Narcissism, a form
of a clinical personality disorder, presents the elements of grandiosity, entitlement,
dominance, and superiority (Azizli et al., 2016; Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006). Individuals
displaying narcissism have an inflated self-view and focus on themselves (Baughman et
al., 2014; Giammarco & Vernon, 2015; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Organizational and
personal online activities that could be affected by the above threats include banking,
schools, and universities; e-Commerce, hospitals, the entertaining industry, the IRS,
OPM, trade, intelligence, and scientific organizations (NIST, 2016). It was because of the
economies of scale and the organizations’ dependency on IT system that it becomes
crucial for entities and individuals to maintain their information in a confidential, needto-know, and unaltered manner (Diller & Nuzzolilli, 2012; Harris, 2010). A model
defining classes and levels of threat impacts was developed by Rabai et al. (2014). This
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comprehensive model accounts for threats that include viruses, computer worms, and
even political warfare that were caused by intentional, malicious, outsider’s human
actions (NIST, 2016). This qualitative study, using a dark triad theory as a conceptual
framework, did not address political warfare. On Table 2, I showed levels and types of
insider threats’ activities and consequences.
In 2017, the Pew Research Center conducted a research study on network and
systems, finding out that 49% of the world was connected online, and that an estimated
8.4 billion was connected worldwide via Internet, iPhones, iPads, Laptops and Desktop
computers. The greater the connectivity, the greater the risks and concerns about data
privacy and insider threats. Failing to maintain a privacy policy affects businesses, and
individuals regarding their finances, health information, personal identifiable
information, and any other confidential information (Pew Research Center, 2017).
As employees continue to open emails at work from unknown sources and
unknown links, and visit social networking websites, organizations would be at risk of
phishing, spear phishing, whaling and vishing. Each one of these techniques have been
associated to social engineering (Meyers, 2018). Phishing is conducted via email across
large audiences, spear-phishing targets an individual. Whaling targets high-value targets,
such as executives. Vishing uses telephones to attract its victims (Information Assurance
Support Environment, 2013; Panetta, 2017).
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Table 2
Levels of Threat Impacts
Types of insider threats’ activities and consequences
Malicious

Nonmalicious

Unintentional

Intentional

Corruption of information

Destruction of information

Theft, loss of information

Corruption of information (viruses)

Illegal usage

Theft, loss of information

Disclosure of information

Illegal usage

Denial of use

Disclosure of information

Elevation of privilege

Elevation of privilege

Destruction of information

Denial of usage

Unintentional

Intentional

Corruption of information, theft, illegal use

Destruction of information,
corruption, loss

Disclosure/destruction

Illegal usage

Denial of use

Disclosure of information

Note. From “Classification of Security Threats in Information Systems,” by B. A. Rabai,
M. L. Jouini, B. Aissa, and A. Milli, 2014, Journal of King Saud University—Computer
and Information Sciences, 25(1), p. 493. (https://doi.org/11.0016/j.jksuci.2012.06.002).
Copyright 2014 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (2016) has emphasized the
need for real-time security standards and best practices that address interoperability,
usability, and privacy during emerging technologies, and this continues to be a critical
goal for the public and private sectors (NIST, 2016; Panetta, 2017). Innovative
technologies such as the Cloud, Big data, mobile technologies, social media, and
Websites needed to expedite communications were likely to deliver new risks and
vulnerabilities during the implementations phase and thereafter (Claycomb & Nicoll,
2012). Likewise, telecommuting, and remote access create a boundary-less system that
can facilitate unauthorized access. Managers in public and private organizations that are
not cognizant of the need to train, develop and value their employees could fall victims of
disgruntled employees and insider threats’ actions (Castellion & Markham, 2013). Insider
threats’ actions can generate low loyalties and high turnover in public and private
organizations that can affect working environments, data management, and security,
widening the costly gap between employee coercive behaviors and organizational
performance (Figueredo et al., 2015).
New employees who lack the expertise to identify and manage threats could
heighten the impact of risks, insider threats and financial loses (Dinev & Hu, 2007;
Assante & Tobey, 2011; NIST, 2016). Public and private organizations that experience
high turnover lose money and time getting new employees indoctrinated, trained and
knowledgeable of policies and procedures to secure a compliant environment (Anderson
& Moore, 2006; Ghazzawi, 2010). Other issues enabling an increment of unintentional
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insider threats using the internet and computers may be the result of skilled IT staff
(NIST, 2016).
As more threats were introduced to the systems, the appearance of hackers
accessing systems without authorization were enabled by employees accessing links and
the internet (NIST, 2016). As external threats were welcomed in by insiders, they exploit
the speed, convenience, and anonymity of the Internet to commit a range of damages to
individuals and organizations worldwide (NIST, 2016). These damages can be
exemplified by impersonations, crimes such as child pornography using somebody else’s
credentials and financial gain. It was important to introduce a footnote into external
threats because they represent the second element of systems breaches, as insider threats
facilitate their entry into organizations. The Federal Information System Management
Act (FISMA) of 2002 designated the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) to develop standards and guidelines necessary to build risk management
frameworks and security controls for the prevention of cyber attacks and insider threats
(NIST, 2016).
Benefits of the Dark Triad Theory
The Ajzen's theory of planned behavior was representative of associations among
Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy, as predicted in the dark triad theory
(Zhao et al., 2016). The Ajzen’s theory using the dark triad theory was proven beneficial
when analyzing tendencies for corruption in a series of studies using hypotheses about
corruption and beliefs (Bai et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2016). The author concluded that the
dark triad personality behaviors positively predicted bribe-offering and bribe-taking
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intentions (Zhao et al., 2016). The study findings associated traits such as Narcissism and
psychopathy with the belief that one could get away with wrongdoing without suffering
the consequences. This research is important because it examines the theoretical and
functional effects of the dark triad personality traits, as well as why individuals
participate in crime despite the consequences. The reasons may vary for those depicting
innate dark triad antisocial traits and those seeking monetary rewards. Cybersecurity was
defined as the state of protecting business assets, data, and systems against criminal, or
unauthorized use, and the security measures were taken to achieve this effort (ISACA.
https://www.isaca.org). Some of the insider threat opportunities occur while accessing
websites, opening links, and connecting with social media. External hackers and
unauthorized users could look for potential loopholes to access passwords, personal
information, identity theft, financial information, health records and other sensitive data
to damage a system, ruin an organization’s reputation, or gain financial rewards by
disclosing trade secrets, confidential and classified information to third parties (NIST,
2016). According to Verizon's 2016 Data Breach Incident Report, 30% of 2015 security
incidents were caused by a lack of employee preparation and knowledge of the
organization's best cybersecurity practices.
Insider Threats Discussion
Insider threats perpetrate unauthorized access activities leading to fraud, theft, and
data sabotage (Rabai et al., 2014). Insider threats are not new to the industry (NIST,
2016; Padayachee, 2016; Stalla-Bourdillon et al., 2014). Early efforts for data access
controls can be traced to the Kemmerer and Porras’s Intrusion Detection Framework
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developed in 1995 for handling unauthorized computer access. Historically, people have
played a key role in the execution of data management activities (Stalla-Bourdillon et al.,
2014). For this reason, intentional, or unintentional damage to data systems has been
attributed to new, untrained, disgruntled employees, or to those seeking financial rewards
and recognition (NIST, 2016; Posey et al., 2011).
The impact of innovations and emerging technologies has given rise to some of
the enablers of insider threats in public and private organizations, increased by the ability
to interact in social media activities leading to spear-phishing and social engineering that
raise the level of data vulnerabilities through a lack of employee security awareness,
cybersecurity training, and password protection utilization, or by using poorly configured
and patched devices (Information Assurance Support Environment, 2013; Panetta, 2017).
Data leakage can easily occur via social networking, and accidental disclosure, or
loss of information and, or company equipment (Spitzner, 2013a. Through the art of
“Phishing,” or ‘the act of obtaining personal information directly from the user through
the Internet’ (Kaspersky, 2013). Mallery (2009) noted that one important factor in
information security implementations was to properly provide training for employees and
the development of a security culture within an organization (Mallery, 2009). D’Arcy et
al. (2009) established the need for ongoing research on security awareness and noted that
current research often refers only to the relationships between security awareness and
behavioral intentions indicating the need for studies examining the relationship between
the former and the actual information security-related behaviors, that was, compliance
with information security policies (Assenza et al., 2019; D’Arcy et al., 2009).
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Rabai et al. (2014) classified security threats in information systems, as malicious
and not malicious. Within this group, activities affecting security may be intentional, or
unintentional (Rabai et al., 2014). Today, employees that telework and those working
from disperse locations may present a concern for public and private organizations facing
security breaches, and intentional, or unintentional data leaks (NIST, 2016). Malicious, or
intentional insider threats were widely recognized as motivated by money, politics, or
revenge (Software Engineering Institute (SEI), 2013). However, the Software
Information Institute (SEI) noted that unintentional breaches can occur from present and
former employees, contractors, or business partners, or anyone who has, or has had
authorized access to an organization’s network, the system in a myriad of ways (SEI,
2013). However, negligence has been identified as the most common cause for
unintentional insider threats according to the Ponemon 2015 survey (The Ponemon
Institute: Unintentional Insider Risk in the United States and German Organizations, June
2015). Other instances of unintentional insider threats were identified as accidental
disclosures of sensitive information via Internet, improper disposal of records, such as
paper documents; and use of devices such as cell phones, laptops and other devices
containing confidential information, either lost, or stolen (SEI, 2017; Ponemon, 2017).
Abdallah and Gheyas (2016) developed an insider threat prediction model
providing three classifications and domain factors to address insider threats that is a part
of this study. Abdallah and Gheyas (2016) noted that this model accounts for the traits
observed in the dark triad theory however, these classifications were developed as
guidance, and should not be viewed as a panacea for new insider threat activities arising
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from innovative technologies (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016). In this model, the first factor
introduces a predisposition to malicious behaviors that may seem to indicate that
perpetrators were inclined to disobey laws and regulations and that they have a disregard
for authority (Dang, 2014). This behavioral feature was based on evidentiary sources that
were linked to past delinquent behaviors (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016). The second factor
in Abdallah and Gheyas (2016) model directs us to problems associated with mental
disorders medically diagnosed as depressive behaviors, paranoia, schizophrenia, and
bipolarity. In this instance, social networking activities may also provide valuable
information about patterns of behavior and personal targets (Papageorgiou et al., 2017).
Abdallah and Gheyas (2016) viewed personality factors such as Narcissism.
psychopathy, sociopathy, and neuroticism, like those portrayed in the dark triad theory,
using evidentiary sources such as insiders’ self-centeredness, social distancing, moral
disengagement, and a lack of responsibility for their actions. On Table 3, I depicted a list
of behavioral features and evidentiary sources, as stated by Abdallah and Gheyas (2016).
With the advent of innovations and constant changes in information technologies,
the risks of telecommuting, and remote access, poorly trained personnel using social
networks, may neglect to change, or protect their passwords, or even sign off when
stepping away from their laptops and desktop computers (Talke & Snelders, 2013). These
practices present a problem for public and private organizations due to the opportunity
for free access to their networks and data (NIST, 2016). Reasons for this poor judgment
on the part of users have been attributed to a lack of training, security policies and
supervisory oversight (Majchrzak & Markus, 2013; NIST, 2016).
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stated that Cybersecurity risks and
vulnerabilities assimilate diverse approaches. For example: Phishing has been the most
effective method due to a mix of user ingenuity and awareness; Hacking consists of
gathering identity and data information; Social engineering, or social networking used to
gather information via Internet; scanning and enumeration takes advantage of security
loopholes in the organization to infiltrate the network and damage systems; BOTS are
programmed to obey remote instructions, create spam, and attack target systems, and
networks, BYOD (Bring your own Device), represented by any personal iPhones, iPads,
or personal computers used in the workplace (Department of Homeland Security, 2013;
NIST, 2016).
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Table 3
An Insider Prediction Model
Domain factors

Behavior features

Evidentiary sources

predisposition to

predisposition towards legal

social networking sites. Interaction

malicious behavior

regulations and authority. Delinquent

with honeypot files in the

behavior in the past

honeypots (designed to purposely
engage and deceive hackers); past
criminal history

mental disorders

personality factor

paranoia, depression, schizophrenia,

clinical diagnoses. Social

bipolarity

networking activities

narcissism, psychopathy, sociopathy,

dark triad theory

neuroticism, self-focus,
social distancing, moral

language, email communication

disengagement, feelings of closeness,

patterns, website visit pattern, the

perception of punishment.

temporal pattern of online and PC
usage, online behavior. Insider
communication, and a number of
social media website visits.

Note. From “Detection and Prediction of Insider Threats to Cybersecurity: A Systematic Literature Review
and Meta-Analysis,” by A. E. Abdallah and I. A. Gheyas, 2016, Big Data Analytics, 1, Article 6
(https://doi.org/11.0186/s41044-016-0006-0). In the Public Domain.

45
Hewlett Packard conducted a study where 97% of employee devices contained
private information, 75% did not have enough data encryption presenting a risk and
vulnerability Escalation and misuse of employee privileges due to improper logins, and
password resetting has been generated by a lack of adherence to policies and procedures.
Employee-generated risks and vulnerabilities were the subject of the National Initiative
for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) workshop sponsored by NIST in Gaithersburg, MD
during the week of November 13-18, 2017. The mission of NICE was to facilitate and
sustain an active network to promote education, training, and workforce development.
NICE’s educational initiatives support the practice of protecting the confidentiality,
integrity, and accessibility of data systems that could become essential to corporate and
individual performance (NICE, 2016).
The National Institute of Standards and Technology has identified several reasons
for insider threats’ motivation, this study; however, did not cover acts of terrorism, war,
and political motivations. Past examples of insider threats have included leaks from
Edward Snowden, and Bradley Manning, whose name subsequently changed to Chelsey
Manning (Londoño, 2014; Bennett, 2016; Schleifer & Scott, 2016). Data breaches into
the Office of Personnel Management, the Department of State, the Internal Revenue
System, Department of Defense, the Democratic National Convention (Flaherty et al.,
2016); the CIA, and Equifax (www.equifax.com; Flaherty et al., 2016). These patterns of
behavior create a need for real-time strategies that could be applied to new training and
development activities. Given the iterative nature of innovative technologies, a greater
awareness about what risks and vulnerabilities were most prevalent in the IT community
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could help thwart insider threats in public and private organizations, or at a minimum
assist in the updating and revisions of security policies and standard operating procedures
(NIST, 2016).
Computing Technology Advances and Vulnerabilities
The 1970s and 1980s saw the evolution of computing from the Wang, IBM,
DELL, ACER, and Macintosh computers to the Microsoft and Apple Computers and
processors, providing sophisticated laptops and desktop technologies (Whitworth &
Ahnad, 2014). In 1990s Microsoft, created a more personalized approach to computers
giving ordinary people tools such as word-processing at home. Soon thereafter,
companies such as Google and the World-Wide-Web provided the ultimate access to the
Internet. In the early 2000’s computing evolved once more to become the social network
that we now today with sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn®, Myspace, WhatsApp, and
others (Hilbert & Davis, 2015; Whitworth & Ahnad, 2014). These innovations and
software programs were created to increase communications and to provide faster, more
efficient e-commerce transactions (Avery & Ranganathan, 2016).
The relationship between information systems and human interactions was
undeniable, and its mutual influences were parallel with changes in information
technology (Niederman et al., 2016). Niederman et al. (2016) also noted that as each
technical innovation takes place, a need for new technical skills was born with each
innovation creating a surge of requirements for technical skills that could require end
users to learn new skills through training and development.
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Cloud Computing
Many public and private organizations rely on Cloud computing services, peer-topeer applications for file sharing, telecommunications, face-to-face conferences, Web
portals, and high-bandwidths to conduct business activities. Although the definition of
insider threats has had different connotations during pre and post technology innovations,
all definitions seem to lead to the conclusion that, these are threats that occur inside the
organization, by trusted people.
Therefore, knowing what was needed during systems upgrades, data migration,
Cloud implementation and the decommissioning of legacy systems could require clear
guidelines and an understanding of how to protect information assets from unauthorized
access (Hunton & Norman, 2010; Sanbonmatsu & Strayer, 2013). Several technologies
were developed to control breaches and data security in 199; however, I found limited
qualitative research in the literature for one of the most dangerous threats, that was, the
trusted individual who knows and has access to a privileged and confidential information,
and his, or her motives for turning against the organization.
Insider threats can be intentional, or nonintentional (NIST, 2020; Rabai et al.,
2014). In the past, most insider threats, or “internal threats” were classified in the context
of logistical issues such as systems degradation (e.g., wires, building destruction, fires,
water damages, equipment malfunction, information losses, and accidental damage of
important files) (NIST, 2016). However, the human element has taken the front seat in
separating insider threats from internal threats. An insider threat was a malicious threat to
an organization that comes from people within the organization, such as employees,
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former employees, contractors, or business associates, who have inside information
concerning the organization's security practices, data and computer systems. An internal
threat was any failure of the infrastructure, communications, logistics, and IT resources
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files; Salya & Ravi, 2013).
Salya and Ravi (2013) viewed the overutilization of innovative technologies in
the form of web portals, Cloud, peer-to-peer applications, and web portals using highbandwidth wireless networks as enablers of risks and easily accessible doors for insider
threats (Salya & Ravi, 2013). Business in the Cloud, as it was the case of the Amazon
Corporation, and many others has become an integral part of most individuals’
purchasing options. Market changes and e-Commerce have led public and private
organizations to explore with innovative, or cutting-edge technologies to become
competitive, or get the best products, or services first (Heilbrun & Brown, 2011; Schubert
& Leimstoll, 2007).
Honeypot Technologies
A honeypot is an isolated collection of systems, with the primary purpose to elicit
exploitation from attackers either using real, or simulated decoy computer system to
determine weaknesses in the system configuration, or passwords’ strength (Kuman &
Morarjee, 2014; Sastry, 2011). Honeypots were designed to purposely engage and
deceive hackers and identify malicious activities performed over the Internet (NIST,
2016; Sastry, 2011). Spitzner’s (2013b) research focused on the fact that Honeypot
technologies can be used to detect, identify, and gather information on specific threats
(NIST, 2016; Spitzner, 2013).
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Network-Based Threats
Many network controls exist as one layer of support to protect data. The most
prevalent ones include Access by unauthorized persons, this can be internal, or external;
however, external access has commonly known to occur due to internal failures. This
means that users need to be always authenticated. The act described as Spoofing occurs
when the configuration to networks, systems, or devices was affected (NIST, 2016). This
happens when outsiders provide credentials to access another person’s access.
Eavesdropping, occurs when transmissions were intercepted by using someone else’s
login credentials, e-mail messages, or communications between servers. Malware occurs
when an external attacker launches viruses to propagate from system to system (NIST,
2016).
This excessive use of the network can overflow the servers preventing any traffic.
Denial of Service (DoS) attack was an attack that causes the system to malfunction, or
crash preventing organizations from doing any business. Access Bypass was an
individual’s ability to attach devices to Wi-Fi, modems, or networks and gain access to
the system bypassing security controls. Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack was used to
disrupt communications by impersonating parties and acting as if the communications
were legitimate, but instead, these communications were conducted by the MITM (NIST,
2016; Gregory, 2017).
Tracing the source to systems threats is important for public and private
organizations because of business continuity (Avery & Ranganathan, 2016). Therefore,
having the security of controls that manage access to the systems in the organization was
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paired to its survival (NIST, 2016). Kui et al. (2012) noted that not having direct access
to the same trusted domain made monitoring threats difficult due to enforcing access
control policies of the organization and user levels of access. In case of a potential insider
threats’ attack, sensitive data might be exposed, leaving the data owner vulnerable (Kui et
al., 2012).
Big Data and the Internet of Things
Big Data files are stored in the Cloud and access through the Internet of Things’
(IoT) connected devices. As Big Data move to the Cloud, hackers may follow the data
(Ziegeldorf et al., 2014). The term Big Data was created to depict how information was
received from multiple sources and formats (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012; Walker,
2014). The use of Big Data in several sectors ranges from businesses, national security,
science, and the public creating new challenges that require a new level of professional
expertise and countermeasures for preventing and managing insider threats’ incidents
(Nurse, Buckley et al., 2014a; Page, 2015). Claycomb and Nicoll (2012) noted that
developing risk management frameworks and security countermeasures while accessing
the Cloud’s Big Data and social networks may be a greater challenge as faster and
quicker systems are developed.
Because the confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility of data are essential when
conducting Internet activities, the speed of innovative technologies will call for better and
stronger security strategies and more skilled personnel to prevent breaches, intrusions,
and vulnerabilities (NIST, 2016). Chen and Zhang (2014) argued that the benefits of Big
Data had surpassed the challenges of managing information systems. Some of these
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benefits have included increased business opportunities and progress in many
evolutionary and scientific fields (Chen & Zhang, 2014). Clark (2016) noted that a code
of conduct for information systems should include contributing to the well-being of
society to protect the privacy, integrity, and confidentiality of data (Clark, 2016).
The National Initiative for Cyber Education (NICE) noted that managing such
innovative technologies could require a new breed of IT professionals possessing the
right skills to operate sophisticated IT networks and systems (NICE, 2016). Heilbrun and
Brown (2011) viewed IT risks in the form of early deployments of innovative
technologies and a lag on training, as enablers of stressful environments where managers
were rushed to deploy software and systems without the benefit of appropriate training
(Heilbrun & Brown, 2011). This practice increases the likelihood of threats and
vulnerabilities to the IT systems in public and private organizations. Poorly planned
deployments of IT networks and software allowed for intrusions, denial of services,
viruses, and spyware (Moore et al., 2008). Schubert and Leimstoll (2007) and other
researchers have noted that virtual and remote teams increase the risks of cyber intrusions
because of easy access from friends and family who could be trusted and can easily gain
access to social network sites using corporate systems (Hunton & Norman, 2010;
Majcrzak, 2013; Schubert & Leimstoll, 2007).
Although IT Managers share the responsibility for securing corporate systems, the
data owners, or virtual employees have the ultimate responsibility for using and not
sharing passwords, and for logging in and out of the systems while away from the
computer (Rabai et al., 2014). The constant use of the Internet to conduct daily activities,
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such as online banking, maintain hospital records, make doctors’ appointments, attend
virtual schools and university classes, shopping, dating, gaming, and even tax reporting
creates a significant user dependency on IT systems and networks, making it vital for any
organization and individuals to keep this information confidential, accessible, and
unaltered (Majchrzak & Markus, 2013; NIST, 2016).
Cappelli et al. (2012) found that employee disgruntlement, or resentment was a
recurring theme in IT sabotage cases. Fifty-seven percent (57%) of insiders who
committed IT sabotage were disgruntled and often expected certain technical freedoms to
have control over their organization’s computer and network systems, or expected
recognition, or prestige from management that did not occur (Cappelli et al., 2012).
Zulkefli and Jemal (2014) noted that insider attacks were facilitated by the same benefits
that faster communications can provide. One example was the emergence of Cloud
computing that has become very popular with public and private organizations to store
their data remotely using a subcontractor as a Cloud service manager. This new outlet has
opened the door for increased risks, and security problems, such as contractors guarding
the data may not exercise due diligence with the security protocols, or timely backups,
the Cloud was borderless, and data may be stored anywhere needed to prevent cyber
attacks (NICE, 2016, NIST, 2016).
Private and Public Cloud provides extended services to subscribers; however, this
flexibility increases the possibilities that malicious insider attacks may occur to exploit
the Cloud Big Data. The exchange for greater flexibility and cost-effectiveness in
communications and accessibility could ultimately be costly if public and private
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organizations fail to protect the data physically, or if its confidentiality and integrity
become compromised (NIST, 2016; Tang et al., 2012). For example, contractors and
third parties manage the Cloud. When corporations and individuals store their data in the
Cloud, they relinquish their physical control over emails, banking, or financial
information, tax returns, and other personal data to the Cloud service provider. Once a
data owner places personal information into the Cloud, he, or she may also lose control
over the information distribution if hacking, or other data theft actions occur (Tang et al.,
2012), for example breaches in Equifax and other reliable service providers (Equifax,
2017).
Sundararajan et al. (2011) noted that clients were often concerned with this loss of
control over their data. The main security concerns of clients were a loss of direct control
of their data and being forced to trust a third-party provider with safeguarding
confidential information. Security threats in the Cloud may consist of malicious system
administrators, who pose a serious risk to clients (Sundararajan et al., 2011). Threats to
data were not only originated by insider threats; while the latter has been often labeled as
responsible for enabling external threats either by giving access, or by not following
security policies (NIST, 2016).
Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats
Insider threats are conduits for technological threats because of their physical
access to restricted areas, buildings, and any other designated area where software, or
hardware can be stored. Salya and Ravi (2013), and NIST (2016) noted that an insider’s
motivation was linked to personal, professional, religious, political, and cultural goals. In
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addition to systems and data management, insider threat crimes include espionage,
identity theft, child pornography, and credit card fraud (FBI, 2016c). Unintentional
threats are those threats introduced without the insiders’ awareness. These threats include
the accidental modification of software by corrupting data, programming error, user, or
operator error (NIST, 2016; Rabai, Jouini et al., 2014). Rabai Jouini et al. (2014)
developed a security system for insider threat classifications for Cloud computing
environments that lists the most obvious external threats. Human, natural disasters and
logistical threats run alongside external threats (Rabai et al., 2014).
Impact of Breaches
Because of unauthorized access, the security impacts can be described as the
destruction of information, corruption of data, theft, or loss of information; disclosure of
information, denial of service, user elevation of privileges and identify theft (NIST, 2016;
Computer Software and Applications Conference, 2012). Tang, Wang, and Ming (2012)
maintained that some of the most severe aspects of insider threat actions were intentional
degradation of systems and data, blocking of computer and network resources, and the
elevation of user privileges perpetrated through unauthorized password changes and the
illegal usage of system functions (Tang et al., 2012).
Maasberg et al. (2016) noted that government and industry initiatives exist to
implement security-operating procedures; however, the increasing numbers of insider
threat incidents were a concern (Maasberg et al., 2016). Some of these initiatives were
regulations, laws, governance, and others industry recommended practices, such as
International Standards Organization (ISO) and CMMi designed as guides to achieve data
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management security (Maasberg et al., 2016). New types of threats to IT systems appear
to be on the rise (Maasberg et al., 2016; Ponemon Institute, 2017). Ayofe and Irwin
(2010) noted the benefits that providing education and hands-on training to employees
and contractors had on organizational performance. NIST/NICE provides continues
education on risk management using the NIST Risk Management Framework (Ayofe &
Irwin, 2010; NIST, 2016). Leadership’s awareness of the tools and risk management
strategies used by industry’s SMEs could increase awareness of risk management
techniques that could align with the organization’s mission (Evans & Reeder, 2010;
NIST, 2016).
Rabai et al. (2014) created a model that accounts for most NIST identified
security threats and known risks to network systems (Rabai et al., 2014). These findings
may facilitate an understanding of the scope and impact of insider threats in public and
private organizations. Rabai et al., 2014 argued that this kind of classification was
appropriate for organizations adopting large-scale systems where various user levels
communicated through public networks (Rabai, Jouini et al., 2014).
Cyber Security Legislation
Cybersecurity initiatives for accessing government data include mandatory laws
and regulations under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA)
(2002), the Federal Modernization Act (2014), and the Federal Information Technology
Reform Act (FITARA) (2014) just to mention a few. Several standards have been
developed, such as The Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) (1999), also known as the
Financial Services Modernization Act (1999), and the Payment Card Industry Data
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Security Standards (PCI-DSS) (2004) for online payments incorporated in Washington,
DC in 2010. These regulations that define requirements that public and private
organizations must follow to handle the security of credit card information and the
security of IT systems (NIST, 2019).
Also, the ANSi/ASQ quality standards for quality assurance; DoD Series 8500 for
employees accessing government networks. FIPS 199 and FIPS 200 for privacy and
personal identifiable information, IEE1220 series, ISO; NIST and OMB Circular A-130
and A-123 are mandatory regulations and standards for the government. Private
organizations that may be struggling to develop successful strategies to fit technological
innovations have been able to benefit from the baselining of such standards to manage
security transactions while doing business with the government (FedRamp.
https://marketplace.fedramp.gov). The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) (1996) is a framework used to control how public and private organizations
share the process and transmit electronic patient health information (ePHI) (Public Law
104-191) (Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html).
Quality standards such as those issued by the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) (2013), and the International Electro-Technical Commission (IEC;
15408-1; 2009), and directives such as Presidential Orders (HSPD-12); guidelines, and
policies include the U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directives (Department of
Homeland Security, www.dhs.gov). The Personal Identifiable Information), FIPS-199, or
Sensitive Personal Information FIPS-200, were privacy information security mandates.
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These mandates were used as standalone, or in conjunction with other security
requirements to identify and protect sensitive, proprietary, and personal information
(NIST, 2016).
The Department of Homeland Security has developed information security threats
and situational awareness training programs that include security, education, training, and
awareness (www.dhs.com). One of DHS’s training initiatives for dealing with contractors
and employees includes the Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance (SETA). The
goals of SETA were supportive of guidance to develop knowledge and training related to
information security, as provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(Gansler et al., 2012). NIST is leading public and private organizations by changing the
way organizations view their human and technological assets, changing how
organizations manage security, social markets, e-Commerce, acquisitions, and employee
relations that require that employees who access government systems be certified by a
qualified organization (DoD-8500, DoD 8570 policy series, http: disa.mil/policy). IT
audits were covered under the umbrella of FISMA (2002) and the Federal Information
Systems Control Audit Management (FISCAM) of 2009. FISCAM provides a
methodology for performing information systems control audits of federal entities as
provisioned by the General Accounting Office (GAO) Financial Audit Manual (FAM).
Other security controls can be observed under the umbrella of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
(SOX) of 2002, for separation of duties (NIST, 2016), that was, funding recipients cannot
be the approvers of their own disbursements (Arping & Sautner, 2012).
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The Role of the Information Technology Program/Project Manager
in Systems Security
IT Managers play a pivotal role in the management and security of network
systems. An IT program, or project manager must understand and participate in the
acquisitions of information systems in the organization (NIST, 2016). Such was the
importance of the IT program/project manager that public and private organizations have
budgeted and dedicated entire departments to the management of information systems.
Pearlson et al. (2016) noted that possessing the right IT skills for securing network
systems was critical to add value to the organization (Pearlson et al., 2016). Drucker et al.
(2008) considered the integration of efforts of management and staff to achieve common
goals in the organization. This practice continues for IT managers during the information
technology innovations and changes, needing to align personnel behaviors with security
practices so that security governance and IT compliance could become the norm (Hasib,
2013; NIST, 2016).
The Role of the Leaders in Information Technology
Insider threats are risks to public and private organizations (NIST, 2016).
Leadership awareness of the tools and risk management techniques used by industry
could help their mission with the protection of data assets necessary to conduct
expeditious business, personal and commercial activities (Jerko et al., 2019). eCommerce
has created an information-dependent society in the United States and the world (Denis,
2012). The need to buy and own innovative technologies to be competitive needs the
support of knowledgeable and willing employees that could safeguard systems
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implementations and data access (Bharati & Chaudhury, 2009). Heilbrun and Brown
(2011) viewed risks in the form of early deployment of emerging technologies and a lag
on training, creating stressful environments whereas managers were rushed to manage
threats without the benefit of prior training (Latest Technologies, 2011, Gartner, 2018).
Ayofe and Irwin (2010) noted the importance of providing education and hands-on
experience to safeguard cybersecurity and increase employee retention (Ayofe, 2010).
The 2011 Latest Technologies survey reported $2.28 million Cybersecurity
professionals worldwide and a projected need to increase to $4.2 million in 2015 (Latest
Technologies, 2011). Mahoney (2011) noted the need for retaining qualified cyber
professionals and the role of training to protect IT infrastructures in the public and private
sectors. Latest Technologies researchers (2011), noted the need that organizations had to
develop adequate staffing levels, that was, trained and experienced IT professionals.
Proficiency for defending cyber attackers requires several years of practice and education
to efficiently protect data assets and organizational infrastructures (Hoffmann et al.,
2018). Hoffmann et al. (2012) believed that cyber and digital crime could only increase
and become more pervasive with time, that was, in the absence of countermeasures
(Chang, 2010).
Although IT Managers share the responsibility for securing corporate systems,
data owners, or collocated employees could have the ultimate responsibility for using, not
sharing their passwords and for logging in and out of the system during absences (Sedighi
et al., 2011). Managers in public and private organizations have been more cognizant of
the impact that Cybersecurity breaches, internal threats, and vulnerabilities have in their
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ability to expand their operational bases safely through their projects’ lifecycle (NIST,
2016). Private organizations must maintain security controls to avoid the costly
consequences of data breaches (Ciampa, 2010). For example, a private organization may
not be able to compete for federal contracts due to a lack of security controls as those
required Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP). FedRAMP
is a U.S. government-wide program that provides a standardized approach to security
assessment, authorization, and continuous monitoring and controls (Avery &
Ranganathan, 2016; FedRAMP, 2017; U.S. General Services Administration (GSA),
n.d.).
The Federal Information System Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 has
influenced information security, governance and cybersecurity in the government using
security frameworks such as the NIST Risk Management Framework (NIST, 2016,
Maasberg, 2016). The diffusion of emerging technologies and the commercialization of
communications turn the role of information systems into a resource equal in value to the
traditionally important resources of property, labor, and capital, according to Drucker's
Management Challenges for the Twenty-First Century studies (1993). Nonetheless,
Drucker (1993) argued that employees must properly understand the goals of the
organization to successfully perform and complete their tasks (2008).
The Deloitte (2012) survey provided results indicating that the trend and speed of
innovative technologies will continue as the result of Cloud services, social media,
mobile devices, big data, and the Internet of Things (IoT) (Deloitte, 2013). Boss et al.
(2009) contended that organizations that do not account for people as a part of
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information systems and only gear their investments towards the acquisition of software
and hardware were bound to pay the price for not realizing that people, as the weakest
link in the information security process could have to be included in the planning and
execution phases of innovative technologies to be successful. Deloitte (2012) TMT
Global Security Survey findings indicated that the highest number of threats resulted
from the adoption of innovative technologies such as the Cloud computing and mobile
devices, in addition to threats derived from employee errors, omissions, and abuse of
information systems.
What Senior Leadership Needs to Know?
Although variations exist about the risk appetite of public and private
organizations and how these translate into policies and procedures for the maintenance of
systems, and networks, the advent of the Congress enacted Federal Information
Technology Acquisition Act (FITARA) of 2014, has changed how these organizations do
business with the government. FITARA through FedRAMP requires that organizations
doing business with the government observe the same security guidelines and restrictions
for data access, confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility, as their counterparts. FITARA
has vested tremendous responsibilities and accountability on the role that the Chief
Information Officer (CIO) holds for providing oversight for all IT portfolios, innovations,
and changes (FITARA, 2014).
The Federal Information System Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 has
influenced information security, governance and cybersecurity in the government using
security frameworks such as the NIST Risk Management Framework (NIST, 2016,
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Maasberg et al., 2016). Striving a balance between organizational and individual goals
may present a challenge during IT implementations because of the way that innovative
technologies could affect the employees’ working routines and how leadership addresses
changes (Denis et al., 2010, 2012).
Ethical Procedures and Data Security
The American Bar Association (2017) affirmed that the ethical rule in information
security was the duty to protect the confidentiality of client confidences. The American
Psychological Association (2015) also recommended that, while individual practitioners
should and do bear the ultimate responsibility for confidentiality and privacy, data
storage and communication concerns resulting from poor and/or naïve risk management,
it was important that an organization provided constant, up-to-date guidance for
practitioners and date users. Because IT departments may work in isolation, opening-up
for discussions in a forum such as a Delphi group could increase awareness on how to
identify employees who were at high risk for insider threat activities; and develop
security policies and standard operating procedures (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016).
The same was conveyed by FISMA, NIST, and other governance previously
mentioned in this study. Innovative technologies and social networking can tempt users
to click on links with interesting offers, or those seeming familiar, even when they know
it was against organizational policies. This sense of entitlement disregards threats to data
stored in the system and information security policy (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). The risks
were increased with the utilization of consumer-friendly devices and Cloud computing.
Public and private organizations managers providing access from anywhere need to
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assure data owners that the confidentiality and integrity of their information is protected
to avoid costly lawsuits and damage to their reputations (Nurse et al., 2014b).
Siponen and Iivari (2006) noted that managers have an ethical responsibility for
their organizations’ IT assets. It was also the responsibility of senior management to
protect the organization's assets against involuntary and voluntary harm resulting from
employee lack of training, departures, and transfers could be best managed with a
knowledgeable workforce (Siponen & Iivari, 2006). Furthermore, a major factor in an
employee’s decision to stay in an organization may be influenced by the organization’s
management approach as a key factor in determining the employee’s loyalty, and
retention (Kuean et al., 2010). In this circumstance, the IT program/project manager's role
in delegating and supervising system access becomes critical. The American Bar
Association recommended learning from other industries’ experiences and lessons
learned and to apply industry standards and security frameworks when implementing
innovative technologies (ABA Cybersecurity Framework, 2017).
Summary and Conclusions
In Chapter 2, I discussed the increasing problem of insider threats, the research
concerning behaviors associated with traits in the dark triad theory; theories, constructs,
and concepts formulated for the identification and prevention of insider threats. I also
discussed the historical perspective of insider threat classifications, reviewed theoretical
and conceptual frameworks that included security awareness, training and the new
challenges that innovative technologies present to senior leadership, managers, and users
(Assenza et al., 2019). These factors generate a gap for real-time consensus about what to
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look for to contain insider threat behaviors, risky actions and how compliance with
regulations facilitate innovative technology implementations (Albrechtsen & Hovden,
2010; Adkins, 2015). The findings in this study may shed light on the internal and
external factors influencing employee risky behaviors and security practices leading to
insider threats in public and private organizations as viewed by the participating SMEs
consensus.
In Chapter 3, I provided an overview of the research methodology, design, and
rationale, the role of the researcher and the SMEs selection logic; instrumentation,
procedures for recruitment using a qualitative Delphi method to illustrate my research
methodology, data analysis plan, issues of trustworthiness, ethical procedures, and
summary (Hohmann et al., 2018). This study presents an opportunity to narrow the gap in
the literature by providing new strategies for managing risks, insider threats, and data
breaches as viewed by the SMEs participating in this study. It also presents an
opportunity to provide knowledge on areas of threat definition, recognition, avoidance,
and individual responsibilities. This study hopes to provide an increased security
awareness about insider threat facilitation and prevention and human behaviors under the
dark triad theory categories. This study takes the view that SMEs in the field of
cybersecurity and data security management were the best-positioned sources to provide
new approaches and updated strategies to develop relevant security policies, governance,
risk management plans, and employee training and development (NICE, 2016).
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study was to uncover what real-time
consensus existed among 25 IT SMEs in the Washington metropolitan area for managing
insider threats and data security in public and private organizations. By identifying realtime reasons and motivators for employees’ risky behaviors and insider threat prevention
through strategies, policies, and procedures, this study may facilitate early interventions
to prevent data breaches (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016; Amigorena, 2014; Ponemon, 2017).
The research methods used to perform the current study are described in this chapter.
In Chapter 3, I outline the research design and rationale for this study, the role of
the researcher, SME selection logic, ethics, data collection techniques, analysis, and
ethical practices. Also included in this chapter are the logic behind the SMEs’ selection,
issues of suitability, trustworthiness, and ethics to describe the credibility, transferability,
and confirmability of this inquiry. The first section focuses on the research design and
rationale, the methodology, and the application of the rationale for employing the dark
triad theory as the conceptual framework. Second, the data gathering procedures are
provided, as well as information regarding the data. Third, I focus on data analysis for
SMEs’ consensus and underline the study’s operational definitions.
Research Design and Rationale
Billies et al. (2011) noted that the Delphi method is suited to contexts where little
academic literature exists, but experiential knowledge is vast. Because one of my goals
for this study was to raise awareness and discover the most recent and most successful
strategies to prevent insider threats, the information gathered from SMEs using a Delphi
method and the dark triad theory conceptual framework may help point to a variety of
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human behaviors and security factors for insider threat identification and prevention
(Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Kritzinger & Smith, 2008).
The dark triad theory was the conceptual framework of this study for identifying
and classifying activities and risky behaviors as viewed by SMEs. Recent qualitative
research on data security breaches with a focus on employee behaviors has been lacking
in the literature. Instead, research has been heavily focused on insider threats and the
impact of financial losses in public and private organizations (Ponemon Institute, 2017).
This Delphi study was used to convene a targeted sample, or panel of 25 SMEs in public
and private organizations expecting to combine best security practices about innovative
technologies, systems management, and strategies for insider threat prevention.
I considered other research methods such as grounded theory and case study, but a
Delphi study seemed more suitable to gather real-time information from SMEs on the
real-time growing problem of insider threats. Yang et al. (2012) noted that the suitability
of a research method such as Delphi is best assessed when it can demonstrate that it is the
most suitable approach to address the research problem and answer the research question.
Because of the iterative nature of insider threats and the changing requirements for IT
professionals, gathering the consensus of SMEs could render better real-time outcomes
for identifying toxic employee behaviors, industry best practices, and real-time security
countermeasures for data breaches.
In choosing a Delphi method, I was cognizant of the advantages and
disadvantages of such a method. In making my final decision, I recognized that the
advantages far exceeded the disadvantages of the Delphi method, as I focused on the
most relevant aspects of what Joyner and Smith (2015) described as a method that
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provides consensus in areas of uncertainty, provides knowledge-sharing opportunities,
and presents flexibility and simplicity when using surveys, allowing for freedom of
expression, confidentiality, and ease of communications, thus eliminating researcher bias,
as there is no face-to-face interaction that could produce likes, dislikes, or favoritism. The
anonymity of a survey may open the door to boundaries and cost-effective efforts when
compared to face-to-face and phone interviews (Joyner & Smith, 2015).
For this study, I used the Delphi method as the research design. The research
rationale for using a qualitative Delphi method with a dark triad conceptual framework
was that it allowed a panel of experts to respond in real time, based on their subject
matter expertise and the best industry tools and practices that they used in their day-today operations (French et al., 2002; Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). Because a Delphi study
provides anonymity, SMEs may be able to freely provide feedback without the
researcher’s influence, or the fear of retribution from their employers (Charmaz, 2014).
These real-time findings may help decision makers to plan and assess risks during new
hiring, employee departures, and systems access during implementations of innovative
technologies, or simply for data security management (NICE, 2017; NIST, 2016). A
Delphi method could be useful in the following areas: to develop policy, to develop
strategies to address a specific problem, to forecast the future; and to engage in better
decision-making processes (Avella, 2016). The 5-point Likert scale classification
technique allows SMEs to agree, strongly agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or
strongly disagree on a topic. This technique continues to be used to help organize
answers in gathering SMEs’ consensus findings, or lack thereof (Patton, 2015; Wise,
2015).

68
This study’s survey inquiry for gathering SMEs’ data consisted of one
overarching question that drove this study and three sub questions, as follows:
RQ1. What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding the
reasons for insider threats in organizations?
The sub questions included in the study were the following:
SQ1. What are the motivators for insider threats in the workplace?
SQ2. What are the security strategies and early interventions used in
organizations to prevent data breaches and insider threats?
SQ3. What policies and procedures can be developed to manage insider threats’
access to systems in organizations?
I developed open-ended questions for Round 1 based on the increasing need for
qualitative research to demonstrate better prevention and real-time strategies to protect
data and identify insider threats’ activities and toxic behaviors (Guo, 2013; Hu et al.,
2012; NIST, 2016); subsequently, I developed closed-ended questions for Round 2, and
upon receipt of Round 2 responses, I developed closed-ended questions for Round 3 that
further clarified SMEs’ positions and consensus (Habibi et al., 2015). Förster and Von
der Gracht (2014) argued that the level of agreement has been a method often used to
achieve consensus, that becomes illustrative when used in conjunction with a Likert-type
scale.
In this qualitative study, the 25 SMEs’ level of agreement for reaching consensus
was achieved when at least 60% of them agreed, or strongly agreed, and the combined
consensus numbers fell in the agree, or strongly agree range of the 5-point Likert-type
scale used in this study (Habibi et al., 2015). Cleary et al. (2014) noted the importance of
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gaining qualitative data from individuals that could provide the potential for exploring a
topic in depth within the boundaries of an interpretative, or conceptual framework, or
even perspectives. Ultimately, these findings were developed based on SMEs’ output and
may raise awareness among individuals and organizations about the dark triad theory’s
identifiable traits and behaviors (Cope, 2013; Habibi et al., 2015).
The feedback from the Round 1 survey provided a baseline of responses for
subsequent surveys, as per prior discussion. During this phase, the data gathering process
consisted of a laundry list of ideas that were classified and consolidated in an Excel
spreadsheet to group a 60% consensus and to develop the Round 2 survey closed-ended
questions. At this phase, the goal of Round 1 was not to achieve consensus, because it
would have not been realistic, given the magnitude of answers and a lack of maturity in
the research process, but also because it would have not followed the guidelines for
conducting a Delphi study.
As I gathered raw data on reasons, motivators, strategies, and policies in Round 1,
I consolidated similar responses provided by SMEs. For example, money and/or financial
gain and revenge, or retaliation were provided simultaneously to depict the reasons
(RQ1) and motivators (SQ1) for insider threats in organizations. Other examples,
including update software regularly, virus protection, download protection, and using
antiviruses such as Bitdefender, were consolidated in one category to depict virus
protection. Another consolidation took place for duplicated entries such as limiting
access, need to know access, different levels of access, and access controls, under the
category for access controls. Lack of knowledge and training were consolidated under
training. The same approach was used to present questions about strategies (SQ2) and
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policies and procedures (SQ3), that consolidated multiple instances of risk management,
and where reference checks and background investigations were used to indicate the
same outcome.
For clarity and validation, the questions achieving 60% agreement in Round 1
provided the baseline for questions in the Round 2 survey. The SMEs were asked to make
revisions, or validation of the data provided, as follows: “Based on the responses to the
first round of interview questions, the following categories were identified by SMEs
about insider threats’ reasons, motivators … Do you (5) Strongly Agree, (4) Agree, (3)
Neutral, (2) Disagree, (1) Strongly disagree?” Neutral responses may not have added
much value to the research, not that there were any. Disagree responses did not yield a
minimum of 60%; in fact, the highest rate when it came to religion was 17%, for a
motivator of insider threats, as discussed in the study’s review. Strongly disagree elicited
no responses.
The Role of the Researcher
According to my research design and methodology, my role as the researcher
consisted of selecting the SME panel, developing the survey questions in SurveyMonkey,
submitting the surveys to SMEs, collecting data, categorizing data, analyzing data,
developing themes, documenting findings, and maintaining the research schedule. My
role also included securing data access and maintaining the highest ethical standards to
avoid personal bias, or the perception of unprofessional practices. There were no face-toface interviews as the design of this Delphi study did not require them. This made it
easier to avoid accessibility problems and privacy issues, because many of the SMEs
worked on their clients’ sites, and many of these sites did not allow visitors, or
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interviewing activities. Gaining access could have extended the timelines for data
gathering, or jeopardize the data collection (Moustakas, 2015).
Interviews can also put the SME in a difficult position that could defeat the whole
purpose of using a Delphi method due to confidentiality issues. Issues of credibility,
validity, and reliability are measured against the researcher’s knowledge and
independence from the SMEs’ responses (French et al., 2014). Halpern and Leite (2015)
noted that truth, accuracy, transparency, and familiarity of the subjects under study are
essential skills in a researcher (Halpern & Leite, 2015). As I observed and assessed the
progress of this study, I gathered recent peer-reviewed journals’ information on insider
threat impacts that might help in understanding security and innovative technologies
and/or support the need for additional research on this topic.
My Professional Background
I possess over 30 years of program and project management experience
supporting large organizations and the federal government in areas of information
assurance, cyber security, FISMA/FISCAM audits, accreditation and certification, and
technology business management/capital planning and investment controls. I have
achieved several professional certifications such as the Defense Acquisition University’s
(DAU), Contracting Officer Representative (COR) certification; the Project Management
Institute’s (PMI), Project Management Professional (PMP), ISACA’s Certified in the
Governance of Enterprise IT (CGEIT) certification, the Information Technology
Infrastructure Library V3 (ITILV3) and ITIL V4 certifications, the Technology Business
Management (TBM) Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council’s, Certified Technology
Business Management Executive (CTBME) certification, and the Scrum Alliance’s
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Certified Scrum Master (CSM) certification. In addition, I have participated in Delphi
studies before. As a federal employee, I held positions as IT project manager, COR, and
requisitioner for the intelligence community (IC). As a federal contractor, I performed at
the program manager Level III contract labor category, and as a key member of the
Cybersecurity Division at one of the largest contracting organizations in the Washington
metropolitan area.
As a member of the CIO Council, AFCEA, PMI, and ISACA, I keep abreast with
technological changes, IT modernization, and emerging technologies. In that capacity, I
may share a similar association and certification status with some SMEs or may possibly
share a LinkedIn professional network; however, there has not been any business
relationships, or investment participation that could have affected the outcome of these
findings.
Having certified members as SMEs was important to me because it added
credibility to the study and validated SMEs’ knowledge, lessons learned, and positions as
industry-recognized experts. Certified SMEs gain status by passing a rigorous 4-hour
exam in their field of expertise, having a minimum of 5 years of experience and/or an
advanced college degree, and maintaining over 100 hours of continued education (CEU),
or risk retaking their certification (ISACA, 2015; PMI, 2015). Participants did not need to
use their names when responding to the surveys, as they were coded in the system (Fink,
2000; Habibi et al., 2015; Halpern & Leite, 2015).
Personal Relations, Biases, and Reflexivity
Because I work in environments that use emerging technologies and may share
social media connections and training with members of the organizations listed above,
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who may or may not be participants in this study, my only personal bias, or favoritism,
may be my trust in certified professionals, due to their strict continuing education
requirements and my belief that they could provide best IT industry practices. I
considered them an elite group. However, the topic of insider threats and the need for
better security countermeasures far outweighed my personal consideration for the SMEs
participating in this study. The outcomes and responses took a front seat in this journey,
far exceeding any personal, or professional consideration.
Personal relations did not present any issues in this study, as the only unforeseen
exposure that I could have had with an SME could have been attending a Cybersecurity
Summit, PMI evens, or AFCEA Conference. Biases and power relations were not
enabled as there were not face-to-face interviews that could have influenced me due to
status, culture, or demographics (e.g., race, gender, age, or political status). Visual biases
serve as moderators in research, and online surveys do not provide the ability to control
cues in people’s behaviors, whereas face-to-face interviews can result in rendering
judgments easily and before gathering any information (Maddox & Mehta, 2011). In
addition to these considerations, I was cognizant of my ethical duty to report accurately
and without any influences derived from my own experiences, or personal meaning.
Through reflexivity, I was able to use introspection, reflection, intuition, and thinking to
channel my strengths and weaknesses (Maslow, 2012; Schneider et al., 2015). Reflecting,
intuiting, and thinking are used as primary evidence in qualitative research (Schneider et
al., 2015).
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Methodology
The methodology of a Delphi study was my preferred approach for gathering
consensus among SMEs for identifying reasons and motivators for insider threats and
risky behaviors in public and private organizations that have become increasingly
common with the advent of innovative technologies (Che Ibrahim et al., 2013; Walker,
2012). This Delphi study convened a targeted sample, or panel of 25 SMEs in public and
private organizations in the Washington metropolitan area, with the expectation of
combining the best security practices and strategies for insider threat management.
Applying the conceptual framework of the dark triad theory, I was able to gather reasons,
motivators, risky behaviors, social interactions, and security guidelines that served as
anchors to classify insider threat behaviors and present options for developing best
security strategies and policies that may increase positive outcomes in the workplace.
Ludwig (1997) and Nguyen et al. (2013) noted the importance that a Delphi study has for
making future predictions; combined with the dark triad, a researcher could introduce a
visual analytics system approach and risk framework for insider threat identification,
hence reducing systems false threat indicators.
As previously indicated, I used SurveyMonkey to exchange inquiries with 25
certified IT professionals holding IT positions of responsibility in the Washington
metropolitan area. I used LinkedIn first, to explore target availability and submit
additional information. I administered three surveys in this study; however, a fourth
survey was an option, if consensus had not been reached, or if there was a need for
further validity. This alternative was noted on the Participants’ Consent Form.
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The Round 1 survey was submitted in December 2019, receiving a quick 2-week
response. I classified SMEs responses to the open-ended questions in the Round 1 survey,
using a 5-point Likert-type scale to gather similarities (Wise et al., 2015). Because Round
1 provided

similarities on the SMEs responses to the same questions, such as financial

gain and money, these responses were consolidated into one category. Then I developed
the Round 2 survey, using the information that the SMEs had provided in the open-ended
questions in Round 1. The second round of questions provided an opportunity for the
SMEs to confirm their previous selections, but also to add additional information. Once
Round 2 was sorted out and classified, I developed the final questionnaire for Round 3
that served to confirm and validated SMEs consensus, using 60% Agree and Strongly
Agree ratings as the determinants of consensus. After the three surveys were completed, I
shared the findings with the SMEs to ensure that they had an opportunity to comment,
make changes, and validate that the surveys had been conducted ethically and in
accordance with the original questions, however, I received no subsequent changes.
Figure 2 was a composite of the process followed during expert panel composition,
survey development, data gathering, classification and final consensus.
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Figure 2
Delphi Technique Theoretical Framework

Note. From “Delphi Technique Theoretical Framework in Qualitative Research,” by A.
Habibi, A. Sarafrazi, and S. Izadyar, 2014, International Journal of Engineering and
Science, 3(4), p. 13. (https://theijes.com/papers/v3-i4/Version-4/B03404008013.pdf).
Adapted with Permission.
Consensus was defined by Skulmoski et al. (2007) as the ability to agree on a
subject, or having the majority agreeing, or disagreeing on a subject. In this study, the
greater number of Agree and Strongly Agree answers per questions (i.e., reasons,
motivators, type of strategy, policies, procedures) were reflected by the minimum 60%
consensus. Although not a quantitative, or mixed study, 60% agreement in this study
represents consensus, or the majority totals where SMEs have jointly selected the same
options for Agree and Strongly Agree, or Disagree and Strongly Disagree (Asselin &
Harper, 2014; Habibi, 2014; Vernon, 2009). Contrary to quantitative studies, consensus
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can be determined by numbers derived from a mean, or median of responses in the
mathematical calculations (Wakefield & Watson, 2014).
During the preparation of the Round 3 survey, I incorporated the closed-ended
responses from the Round 2 survey that reached the minimum 60% consensus. The
objectives of Round 3 were: (a) to gather additional information to enforce saturation and
sufficient consensus through the selection of the same answers; (b) for SMEs to have an
opportunity to verify, or change their answers and seek clarification; (c) to use Round 3
as a checkpoint for consensus; and (d) to provide SMEs with opportunities for changes, if
they had changed their minds regarding a reason, motive, strategy, policy, or procedure
provided in the Round 2 survey responses/findings.
The three Delphi surveys aligned with the problem and purpose statements of this
study. These surveys began in December 2019 and concluded in August 2020. Chapter 4
provides the raw data and percentages for each question, an analysis of Rounds 2 and 3
survey responses, a comparison table was presented with explanations, as Round 1 was
considered a baseline and a source of free-ranged responses. Responses to Round 1 openended questions are addressed under that section (pp. 123-125).
The goal for confidentiality was facilitated by the application of the
SurveyMonkey tool. The SurveyMonkey tool’s configuration management was
standardized to produce consistent options throughout the three surveys. The surveys’
cut-off date was automatically set to close upon receipt of 25 completed surveys. Upon
receipt of the 25 surveys, I was able to close the surveys. For SMEs’ identification, all
respondent information (names, e-mail addresses, and custom data) were excluded from
the survey results. I set a 5-day reminder notice for those SMEs who had not responded
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to the new survey. There were not any IP address restrictions, or blocking of specific IP
addresses; that was, a SMEs could take the survey from any computer. However, a
“Survey Closed” notice appeared after survey completion. The surveys were password
protected to restrict access and maintain the privacy and confidentiality required.
Although a feature for sending disqualified respondents to a custom disqualification
(URL with an email notification was available, it was not needed and SMEs were able to
access their surveys electronically from any location, at their leisure.
Surveys assure privacy, confidentiality, and workable possibilities to complete a
functional study (Maxwell, 2013). This qualitative study focused on the discovery of
what reasons, motivators and risky behaviors enabled unauthorized access to personal
and corporate data creating internal and external threats to individuals and organizations.
This Delphi method and dark triad conceptual framework may help systems users to
protect their data, and public and private organizations may be able to develop
countermeasures and raise awareness regarding toxic and risky behaviors (NIST, 2016).
Participant Selection Logic
I carefully selected a diverse group of SMEs for this study that would reflect the
various disciplines in the field of information technology and systems security
management. The experts’ qualifications for a Delphi panel were critical for the
successful outcome of a study and credentials such as certifications in their fields of
practice may provide credible, identifiable, and measurable evidence of their expertise
(Hasson et al., 2000; PMI, 2015).
The preferred SMEs’ selection pool for this study consisted of a purposeful
sample of 25 IT certified practitioners, at least 21 years old, working in the Washington
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metropolitan area, that was, Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
Participants who meet the criteria to be called SMEs in a Delphi study meet industry
standard criteria from certifying organizations. The logic for this selection was that
because these IT practitioners serving as SMEs must have information technology and IT
program management certifications, such as IT PM, PMP, CGEIT, CISSP, A+,
Security+, CISA, and CISM; and may have responsibilities working as a project
manager, database manager, security and/,or system manager, network engineer, chief
information officers, chief information security officers, security administrators, security
and systems analysts, network engineers, software developers, and database and website
administrators, these 25 SMEs meet the criteria to sufficiently provide rich and robust
data for reaching saturation (Hancock & Algozzine, 2015). Because these SMEs must
follow stringent industry association requirements to maintain active certifications and
memberships, and work in the IT environment, they can be considered heterogeneous,
their knowledge may provide a quicker saturation for a small number of SMEs given
their training and experience on insider threats (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Skulmoski et al.,
2007).
Panel Size
I selected a panel size of 25 SMEs with the assumption that the selected sample
possessed common characteristics to address the survey questions; that was, they were
experts in their field, as can be validated by their active certifications, have at least 5
years of experience in information technology, possess business acumen and accessibility
for the researcher. Habibi et al. (2014) noted that a panel size and composition depend on
the nature of topics covered, time limitations and money (Habibi et al., 2014). The SMEs
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in this study were members of public and private organizations and represented a diverse
workforce in the Washington metropolitan area. Given the design of the study, this small
Delphi panel was appropriate for purposive sampling (Miles et al., 2014).
Participant Selection Criteria
An expertise screening inquiry took place based on the requirements of this study
and the literature review. Certified SME were IT certified and have at least 5 years of
experience managing information technology and cybersecurity issues. Industry
standards for IT experts include specialized skills and the highest level of experience and
training for performing job-related technical tasks (NIST, 2016). Only SMEs holding
active industry-certifications, who were at least 21 years old, and have at least 5 years of
experience in the IT and cybersecurity fields in the Washington metropolitan area (e.g.,
D.C., Virginia, and Maryland) were approved to participate in this study. Because
certifying organizations have an extensive number of members, recruiting SMEs should
not be a risk. This selection criterion represents heterogenous participation, whereas
SMEs shared similar backgrounds, experience, training, certifications, and location.
Gallego and Bueno (2014) stated that there were two types of expert panels, a
heterogeneous, whereas SMEs share similar traits such as gender, culture, age, values,
and attitudes, but different levels of knowledge; this study focused on a heterogeneous
group that was comprised of SMEs with similar levels of knowledge and expertise in the
IT field (Förster & Gracht, 2014).
Instrumentation and Data Collection
The instrument of choice for this study was the electronic survey tool,
SurveyMonkey®. The basis for using an electronic survey for collecting data was that
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surveys provide an actionable and reliable data access tool that was timely and costeffective. The electronic survey option was expeditious and accurate when sending,
tracking, and analyzing data (Wakefield & Watson, 2014). Surveys have been used for
many years as the preferred mode of empirical research (Boone & Boone, 2012). In 1983,
Rossi et al. (1983) endorsed the use of surveys for data gathering in the social science
disciplines and their associated fields. The authors noted that their application was an
important tool for applied purposes in the public and private sectors (Rossi et al., 1983;
Tourangeau, 2018).
I engaged a 25 SMEs in this Delphi panel for data collection process using
SurveyMonkey questionnaires that provided accessibility, privacy, and confidentiality to
SMEs. The SurveyMonkey survey questions were framed within the parameters of the
problem statement and purpose statements that were grounded within the dark triad
theory conceptual framework.
I developed questions of substance during the open-ended Round 1 inquiry (see
Appendix B); however, SMEs had the opportunity to ask any questions needed to clarify
the meaning of these questions. Because this study was developed to increase awareness
and present real-time best security practices used by SMEs in their daily activities, it was
important that the SMEs clearly understood the problem statement and the purpose of the
study. The analysis of responses to the Round 1 survey informed development of the
Round 2 survey (see Appendix C). The analysis of responses to the Round 2 survey
informed creation of the Round 3 survey (see Appendix D).
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study was to uncover what real-time
consensus existed among 25 IT SMEs in the Washington metropolitan area for managing
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insider threats and data security in public and private organizations. The purpose
statement supported the problem statement of the study (Gallego & Bueno, 2014; Locke
et al., 2004; Patton, 2015). Personal preferences and biases were not a part of this study
because face-to-face interviews, or physical interactions that could develop biases and
issues of perceptions, likes and dislikes did not take place (Jacob & Ferguson, 2012).
Content validity was accomplished through SMEs validation of the final responses
(Patton, 2015). This verification technique was successful in ensuring the study findings’
validity, credibility, dependability, and confirmability (Kornbluh, 2015).
In analyzing the data, neutral responses such as neither agree nor disagree, were
not taken into consideration because these could not assist in developing
countermeasures, strategies, policies, or in identifying risky behaviors, or support
consensus (Boone & Boone, 2012; Wise, 2015). Wise (2015) noted that neither agree nor
disagree responses were the result of Likert’s 1932 5-point scale response options, or
what was called the “Neutral Middle” (Wise, 2015). The “Neutral Middle” does not
provide great value to a survey, other than to indicate the number of people who
abstained from voting. Neither agree nor disagree represented the same as not responding
to a specific question (Wise, 2015). In comparison, in quantitative studies the neutral
middle receives a scoring number of 3, pulling the means to the middle of the measuring
scale that influences the scored responses because it can make responses to appear more
similar while hiding the distribution in a standard deviation, thus making statistics
misleading (Wise, 2015). In this qualitative study, the level of agreement for reaching
consensus was at least 60% if the combined numbers fell in the Agree/Strongly Agree
range on a 5-point Likert-type scale (Cleary et al., 2014).
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Figure 3
5-Point Likert-Type Scale
Agree – Strongly Agree –Neither Agree- nor- Disagree –Disagree – Strongly Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

Note. From “Likert Scales and Data Analyses,” by I. E. Allen and C. A. Seaman, 2007,
Quality Progress, 40, p. 64-65 (https://asq.org/quality-progress/2007/07/statistics/likertscales-and-data-analyses.html). In the Public Domain.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
A professional group of 25 (SMEs holding industry-certifications from accredited
institutions were recruited for this study. These SMEs were at least 21 years old and had
at least 5 years of experience in the IT and cybersecurity fields. In accordance with
standard practices for email notification of the study, I submitted SMEs an invitational
letter (Appendix E) with information and instructions about the study, their participation,
rights for confidentiality, consent, risks, and rights to withdraw at any time as described
in the Consent Form.
As to the procedures for data collection, I collected the data from SMEs, within a
2-week interval after each survey round submission and recorded emerging themes and
categories using a 5-point Likert-type scale. Emerging themes were comprised of
categories such as insider threats’ reasons, motivators, behaviors, and security prevention
strategies as depicted on Figure 3. Consensus on the data gathered was determined by the
minimum 60% frequency and number of responses with the same meaning, or
categorization (Yazan, 2015). I analyzed data, formed data segmentation, and developed
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direct interpretation, or themes starting at 60% similarities (Talanquer, 2014; Yazan,
2015). Data segmentation, categorization, and analysis were key elements in qualitative
studies (Talanquer, 2014).
If consensus was not reached within the specified three rounds of surveys due to
issues such as a greater incidence of neutral questions existed, or SMEs withdrew, I
reserved the right to develop a fourth closed-ended questionnaire (Round 4), as indicated
earlier in the Consent Form. The SMEs were informed of their right to continue or
withdraw at any time and for any reason; therefore, they had the final decision to
continue, or stop participation. Likewise, SMEs were informed that no compensation
could be provided for their participation and that their responses were confidential.
Hsu and Sandford (2007) noted that a Delphi technique allowed for several
rounds of questionnaires ending when consensus had been achieved (Hsu & Sandford,
2007). Three rounds of questionnaires are enough to establish consensus, if the
qualitative inquiry was trustworthy and met the rigor resulting from a rich data collection
(Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Raley et al., 2016; Rosenthal et al., 2015). My standards and
familiarity with this form of inquiry as a previous Delphi panel member dictated that I
could complete this study in 3 months if I followed the same disciplined method I used as
a Delphi SME participant to meet submission deadlines. However, if Round 1 did not
render enough responses due to a lack of participation, I kept the option open to recruit
more SMEs through LinkedIn, or any other professional organization that could provide
SMEs to complete the analysis. According to Che Ibrahim et al. (2013), a Delphi analysis
took between 3 and 6 months to complete. As there were no extenuating circumstances, I
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was able to process each survey round in a 2-week period (Davies et al., 2016; Raley et
al., 2016).
As a part of the data collection process, I emailed reminders to the SMEs 3 days
before the expected questionnaires submission. I submitted the Consent Form for
Participation to SMEs electronically with a request to return surveys within 10 days after
receipt. SMEs received a summary of their responses after the third survey to allow for
revisions and clarifications. I sent SMEs thank you notes electronically and will keep all
records of these survey material protected for a period up to 5 years at that time, I will
delete and destroy these documents. Although a period of 3 years was acceptable for
nonacademic IT research’s document retention, 5 years will be observed in this study in
accordance with the Walden University guidelines.
This research did not include face-to-face interviews, or pilot tests. Before my
research proposal was accepted by the Institutional Review Board (IRB), there were no
research, or agreements attempts to obtain access to SMEs, or data gathering activities.
On December 11, 2019, Walden University granted ethics approval for this study.
Contact information at Walden University Research Participant Advocate - USA number
001-612-312- 1210. Email address: IRB@mail.waldenu.edu. Walden University IRB
Approval No. 12-11-19-0429821. The research was conducted ethically and respectfully
in accordance with the National Institute of Health (NIH) guidelines.
Data Analysis
The data analysis included data visualization, assessment and interpretation based
on the feedback from 25 SMEs in Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. with roles
in the public and private sectors as information technology and cybersecurity
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professionals. There were three rounds of survey questions in this Delphi study. Excel
spreadsheets and tables were used for data visualization to put data into context and
provide summaries to SMEs. To provide meaning to the obtained data, I used content
analysis for narrative data interpretation. Generalizations and data association were used
in the interpretation of findings with the same meaning (e.g., money and financial gain).
The raw data for analysis and subsequent questions came from responses to
Round 1 open-ended questions. Data gathered were analyzed through categorization and
direct interpretation using a 5-point Likert agreement scale (agree, strongly agree,
disagree, and strongly disagree) for responses achieving 60% agreement. The responses
to Round 1 questions, as well as any common themes that emerged from those baselines,
were used to construct Round 2 questions. In Round 2, SMEs were asked whether they
agreed, or disagreed with the Round 1 responses. SMEs were asked to make any
necessary adjustments at this point. If more tools existed at the time they received the
second survey, extra boxes were supplied to add further reasons, motivators, strategies,
policies, and procedures. SMEs had to confirm and agree on the previously verified
concepts supplied by the participating group. Round 3 required SMEs to validate and
come to consensus with the previously vetted concepts provided by the participating
group. In Chapter 4, I used group of tables as a source of information visualization.
Hancock and Algozzine (2015) and Hancock et al. (2016) noted that narrative data can be
analyzed by individual, grout, or commonalities until reaching saturation.
Data Analysis Process for Round 1 Survey Open-Ended Questions
During the data analysis process, I grouped SMEs open-ended responses into
categories and interrelated clusters, summarizing and assigning descriptive, or conceptual
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labels using thematic concepts and raw data saved into an Excel spreadsheet (Gale et al.,
2013). Brady (2015) noted that a thematic content analysis applies to identify response
patterns to open-ended questions. As recommended by Brady (2015), as responses were
received from Round 1, I used a thematic content analysis to identify similar themes in
Round 1 that could depict employees’ risky behaviors, insider threats’ motivators,
strategies, and early interventions used to prevent data breaches, and recommended
policies and procedures issued to prevent insider threats.
Conrad and Schober (2000) found that survey respondents can misunderstand the
questions and unintentionally answer in a manner that could produce misalignments in
the outcome of a Delphi study. For that reason, I analyzed responses to Rounds 2 and 3
closed-ended questions in a manner that addressed the original survey inquiry and
provided SMEs real-time responses that addressed the original problem and purpose of
this study. Irrelevant information concerning political views, religion, demographics, or
personal information inserted in the questions during this survey, were not be a part of
this study (Charmaz, 2014; Patton, 2015). Because this study’s survey questions had been
designed to gather a diverse number of opinions, my assumption was that three surveys
could be enough to achieve consensus, as this Delphi study’s conceptual framework
supported the overall purpose of raising awareness about insider threats’ risky behaviors
through SMEs real-time consensus (Habibi et al., 2015; Hoffmann et al., 2018).
Round 1 open-ended questions, as discussed before, provided raw data that was
used to inform SMEs of findings and request confirmation during the close-ended Round
2 questions (Cleary et al., 2014). Survey 1 four open-ended questions were not intended
to produce consensus, but to gather raw data to develop subsequent survey questions for

88
Round 2 based on the 5-point Likert scale (agree, strongly agree, disagree. Strongly
disagree) until achieving consensus, saturation, and validation. In Round 1, several
questions to reasons and motivators rendered the same answers from different SMEs to
these questions; therefore, one description (i.e., answer) only was used to inquire SMEs if
they agreed during the subsequent Round 2 closed-ended questions. Neutral, or
unanswered questions that did not contribute to the goal and purpose of the study, were
not included as they did not affect the results of the study, if a 60% majority did not exist.
The reasons, motivators, security strategies, and early intervention, policies, and
procedures provided by the SMEs are the core elements of consensus in this study
(Habibi et al., 2015; Hoffmann et al., 2018). Discrepancies did not occur, making it
possible to achieve the overall purpose to identify what real-time consensus existed
among SMEs on how to identify and deter the increasing problem of insider threat
activities and risky behaviors in public and private organizations (Rosenfeld et al., 2012;
Sokolowski et al., 2016; Hampton et al., Pew Research Center Project Survey, 2017).
Data Analysis Process for Round 2 Survey Closed-Ended Questions
Closed-ended questions were drafted from the classification of the responses to
the Round 1 survey’s open-ended responses. I conducted data segmentation,
categorization, analysis, and direct interpretation to incorporate findings into the drafting
of the Round 2 survey closed-ended questions. Data interpretation dealt with responses
using similar synonyms. Talanquer (2014) noted that data segmentation, categorization,
and analysis were key elements in qualitative studies. Consensus was achieved using the
data analyzed using content analysis for the overall agreement and disagreement SME
feedback provided, using frequency counts and percentages to analyze those category
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qualifiers and identify what items met 60% (i.e., 60% of 25 responses), where 25
responses represented 100% agreement and 15 responses represented 60% agreement.
Content analysis examines the pattern of communication in a replicable,
systematic, and noninvasive manner (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004; Cleary et al., 2014;
Yin, 2010). This analytical framework was comprised of Yin’s (2010) analytical
generalizations and a path I have designed to group SMEs insider threats’ consensus for
reasons, motivators, outcomes, and impacts. Yin (2010) described analytical
generalizations as projections from the transferability of findings in qualitative data
evaluation. These generalizations were based on the theoretical analysis and evaluations
of the reasons, or consideration that produce a certain outcome in research (Birko et al.,
2015; Yin, 2010). Miles et al. (2014) described an analytical framework as summarizing
what was known in theory to what was empirically investigated. To update the analytical
framework of this study, I included other descriptions resulting from the SMEs responses
to the survey questions. This scale guided me through the data analysis and conclusions.
Developing an analytical framework in qualitative research was important because
qualitative research pursues exploration and discovery (Charmaz, 2014). Miles et al.
(2014) noted that to help identify the main data needed for saturation, particularly during
data interpretation, an analytical framework helps qualitative researchers to organize data
findings and differences, developing themes as the researcher’s analysis goes from a
broad to detailed analysis. Data analysis did not include statistical, or multivariate data
analysis, as this was a qualitative study based on 60% consensus approval (Hair et al.,
2010). References to demographic information, income, race, age, gender. Irrelevant data
that did not apply to this inquiry was disregarded.
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Because SMEs could have become distracted by their own opinions and interests,
upon achieving the first series of qualifiers for reasons, motivators, strategies and policies
and procedures from grouping similar responses in Round 1, topics and themes were
incorporated into Round 2 closed-ended questions for controlled feedback (Hsu &
Sandford, 2007). Controlled feedback was an integral part of the Delphi method that
facilitates group dynamics and interactions limiting negative effects on data validity
(Hsu, 2007).
The analytical strategies were important for this research because they could
account for real time, real life contemporary phenomena and, the boundaries between
phenomena, context relevant events unclear, or unavailable for direct observation (French
et al., 2002). Comparisons among SMEs’ common responses could help in developing
thematic frameworks and narrative analyses (Janesick, 2011). Data analysis included
three main categories to include data reduction through consolidation, data display and
data verification (Adler & Clark, 2015). No demographic data were requested from SMEs
that could include race, gender, or national origin. Data gathered were analyzed through
categorization and direct interpretation (Yazan, 2015).
Data Analysis Process for Round 3 Survey Closed-Ended Questions
In this phase of the study, the integration of SurveyMonkey and Excel
spreadsheets supported my analysis of the extensive data collected from 41 questions and
real-time answers provided by the SMEs. I used frequency counts and percentages to
analyze categories and identify what items met 60% agreement (i.e., 60% of 25
responses), where 25 responses represented 100% agreement and 15 responses
represented 60% agreement. I used this set of responses for validation and final analysis.
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The Round 3 closed-ended questions included any validation in the responses from
Round 2 where SMEs had an opportunity to validate, add, or change their prior answers.
This approach served to provide summaries of the SMEs consensus and to resolve any
misunderstandings that may have taken place due to different interpretations of the
questions and that there was no bias on my reporting of the research findings
(Onwuegbuzie et al., 2012).
Determining Final Consensus
During the final Round 3, I paid greater attention to changes, relevance and
validity for achieving consensus. There are several forms and measures used when
achieving consensus. These include several rounds, post group consensus, the coefficient
of variation, subjective percentage agreement, and subjective analysis (de Loë et al.,
Diamond et al., 20142016; Von der Gracht, 2014). The level of agreement was also a
recognized method for identifying consensus that becomes illustrative when used in
conjunction with a Likert scale (Förster & Von der Gracht, 2014). In this qualitative
study, I used frequency counts and percentages to analyze categories and identify what
items met 60% agreement for reaching consensus in every entry requiring a minimum of
60% SMEs agreement on a 5-point Likert-type scale showing agreements; (i.e., 60% of
25 responses), where 25 responses represented 100% agreement and 15 responses
represented 60% agreement (Cleary et al., 2014).
A contingency approach was to extend a fourth survey, if consensus was not
reached within the specified three rounds of surveys, due to a greater incidence of neutral
questions, that was, neither agree, nor disagree themes, or SMEs withdrawal. I reserved
the right to administer four surveys, as noted in the Informed Consent, if additional data
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were required. The SMEs were informed of a potential Round 4 survey and their right to
continue or withdraw from the study.
Optional Round 4 Survey Closed-Ended Questionnaire
Upon receipt of the SMEs validation of Round 3 findings, it seemed clear that a
fourth survey was not needed, unless the findings indicated a lack of stability, or
similarities (e.g., less than 60% agreement). A fourth survey could have been an
alternative (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Kalaian and Rafa (2012) theorized that the stability of
results over several rounds of questioning could lead to consensus, hence the flexibility
for a fourth survey, if needed.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness is the term used for validity and reliability in qualitative studies;
it is the pillar for all other terms of credibility, dependability, conformability,
transferability, and authenticity (Gallego & Bueno, 2014). The four elements applied to
this study for ensuring unbiased qualitative results were credibility, transferability,
dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). Although different opinions
were found in research about what works best for qualitative studies, or if there was not
much variation in Delphi studies’ design, researchers must try to clearly define how rigor
in research was established (Diamond et al., 2014). Trustworthiness in this study was
established by the responses received from SMEs during their final survey. I ensured that
the information provided by SMEs provided value and that the findings were based on
SMEs experiences and viewpoints (Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The SMEs assessed if the
questions were credible and appropriate to discourage biases and if the findings described
fully described their answers. As the researcher, I made sure that the questions aligned
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with the problem statement and purpose of the study identifying real-time consensus and
best practices from SMEs. As insider threats continue to rise, increased awareness about
risky behaviors and real-time strategies needed to be gathered from SMEs, who could
share their experiences and consensus on the subject on insider threats’ reasons,
motivators strategies, policies, and procedures for the identification and prevention of
insider threats, thus allowing no room for personal preferences and biases (Jacob &
Ferguson, 2012).
Credibility
The survey analysis recognized trends surrounding insider threats’ identifiers and
red flags, compliance with regulatory mandates, policies, and procedures; emerging
technologies, knowledge sharing, and management of information technology systems
and applied a 5-point Likert scale to classify feedback provided by SMEs in the first
survey questionnaire, that is, Agree, Strongly Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree.
Neutral answers provided no value to the study and were not incorporated into the results
(Dang-Pham, 2014; Kirlappos et al., 2014; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Strategies
available to assure credibility included saturation, triangulation, and peer review
(Charmaz, 2014; Hancock & Algozzine, 2015). Saturation was the preferred method to
ensure survey findings credibility, quality and validity from the methods listed above
(Fusch & Ness, 2015). Billups (2014) noted that credibility establishes believable results
on the part of the researcher and an understanding of the SMEs’ perspectives and
viewpoints (Billups, 2014). Because the final findings were presented to the SMEs for
their confirmation and verification, any perception of reflexivity, that was, my own
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personal views, beliefs and professional experiences did not affect the answers of the
SMEs.
Transferability
I accomplished transferability to the extent that it achieved external validity, or
the ability to apply data that had been gathered into a new study to enhance the research
process (Janesick, 2011). Houghton et al. (2013) noted that to achieve transferability, the
researcher must provide detailed information of the findings, explain the methodology
used and why, explain the data collection and analysis process, findings and summaries
that could provide value to the body of knowledge and enhance further research (Fusch &
Ness, 2015; Houghton et al., 2013). Chapter 3 depicts the research method and rationale.
Dependability
A study is dependable when a different set of researchers can perform an inquiry
and obtain similar outcomes based on the study design, rationale, and interpretative
judgment (Houghton et al., 2013). One exception to that dependability may be the result
of changes in conditions and views about the subject under study on the part of the SMEs
participating in the new study (Billups, 2014). Billups (2014) argued that for data
collection dependability, consistent themes must align with the original data collection
methods indicated at the beginning of the study (Billups, 2014). The flexibility and
freedom of the Delphi study facilitated the study’s dependability, and separation from
any bias (Fusch, 2015).
Neutrality
The concept of neutrality refers to the social researcher's obligation and
responsibility to overcome personal biases while doing any research. The goal of
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neutrality is to separate fact from emotion and to make individuals less stereotyped.
Neutrality is fundamental not only in sociology, but also in many other fields because it
explains basic ethics. This Delphi study was based solely on the SMEs’ consensus,
feedback, and responses, and not on my personal motivations, biases, or interests.
Researchers are responsible for striving for objectivity and eliminating prejudices while
doing research.
Confirmability
A Delphi study provides the privacy for SMEs to speak freely and without fear of
retaliation. Kornbluh (2015) noted that in such settings, SMEs could provide feedback
freely and without external influences on their viewpoints. Billups (2014) noted that
confirmability was used to determine if results were accurate, can be corroborated and
depict actual findings. In this study, I validated SMEs responses with them before
concluding the reporting of findings for my dissertation. Participant validation was a
well-accepted practice in Delphi studies to validate SMEs’ responses and reduce the
perception of reflexivity if any (Kornbluh, 2015). Reflexive journaling and auditing also
provide the transparency that can be reviewed by others to judge the methods and
approaches of this study (Cope, 2013).
Ethical Procedures
In compliance with the Walden University’s human SMEs and ethics data
collection practices, all research began upon the Walden University’s Institutional
Review Board’s (IRB) approval and receipt of the IRB Informed Consent form. No
minors could participate in this study. SMEs participation was voluntary, and these must
be over the age of 21, and able to respond to questions without feeling coerced, forced, or
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uncomfortable. Participants can withdraw at any time and for any reason. SMEs
voluntary participation, anonymity, confidentiality, and goal clarity were the drivers of
this study. SMEs have an opportunity to revise answers to reflect their real-time points of
view (Janesick, 2011).
Data gathered in this study was password-protected and maintained in
confidentiality for 5 years using a Cloud service. Participants were identified by a number
versus a name to protect confidentiality and SMEs opinions. Given the topic and the
nature of this study, ethical issues and conflicts of interest do not appear as issues that
could jeopardize the completion of this study.
Summary and Transition
In Chapter 3, the research rationale, design, role of the researcher and
methodology were introduced. The SMEs rights were clearly outlined along with issues
of trustworthiness. Three rounds of surveys were done, the first survey provided SMES
an opportunity to freely provide descriptions for reasons, motivators, strategies and
policies and procedures for handling insider threats; while the second and third surveys
used closed-ended questions to validate and achieve a 60% consensus. No pilot studies,
or interviews took place in this study. This study provided the selection logic for SMEs
participation, instrumentation, data collection and the data collection plan describing how
issues of trustworthiness encompassed areas of ethics, credibility, transferability,
dependability, confirmability. The results from this Delphi study were classified from an
analysis of the SMEs’ responses classified using the themes, patterns, and relationships
gathered from three surveys from SMEs. In this qualitative study, I gathered the
perspectives of those IT experts, or SMEs managing data security and insider threat
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issues in public and private organizations within the Washington metropolitan area. Realtime awareness and best practices to manage insider threats and data security were
needed, and this Delphi study provided the opportunity to gather real-time consensus
among SMEs on a current topic where the existing scholarship needed updating to
increase security awareness.
In Chapter 4, I presented the consensus results from the data collection and
analysis process for this Delphi study, using a dark triad theory conceptual framework to
explain risky behaviors offered by the SMEs that could lead to insider threats in public
and private organizations. The focus of Chapter 4 is on the characteristics of the panel of
SMEs and results.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this Delphi study was to identify what consensus existed among
IT SMEs regarding insider threats and data security in organizations. Specifically, 25
SMEs in the Washington, DC metropolitan area were asked to participate in three rounds
of iterative online surveys to address the following research question:
RQ1. What is the level of consensus among a panel of SMEs regarding the
reasons for insider threats in organizations?
Sub questions included in the study were as follows:
SQ1. What are the motivators for insider threats in the workplace?
SQ2. What are the security strategies and early interventions used in
organizations to prevent data breaches and insider threats?
SQ3. What policies and procedures can be developed to manage insider threats’
access to systems in organizations?
This Delphi study was targeted for completion within the Walden University
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved schedule in the IRB application form. On
December11,2019, I received IRB approval to commence study (No. 12-11-19-0429821).
I set the SurveyMonkey tool to close after 25 responses from the 50 survey invites sent to
SMEs were received. According to the Ponemon Institute (2014), survey response rates
can range from 33% to 45% or less; for this reason, I decided to double the number of
survey invitations sent to SMEs to meet or exceed my survey's 25
participation requirement. My initial contact with the prospective participants included an
email notification indicating that they would be receiving an invitation to participate in
the survey, so that my emails would be whitelisted. Whitelisting is a process where
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computer users can create an authorization to receive emails only from known sources
only. My recruiting approach included presenting the objectives of the study in the survey
invitational letter and a consent to participate form that clarified the SMEs’ roles,
responsibilities, any risk, and the right to withdraw at any time.
In this chapter, I describe the study results, setting, demographics, data collection
and analysis, evidence of trustworthiness, and final consensus. The chapter ends with a
summary, followed by a transition to Chapter 5.
Research Setting
I developed the SurveyMonkey administered survey questions within the
parameters of the problem statement and the purpose statement. As per the approved IRB
consent form and ethics approval, the term to conduct this Delphi study was 3 months.
Using SurveyMonkey and LinkedIn, I made follow-up calls and sent reminders to
participants during Round 2. Responses were expected in 7–10 days, with a total time
spent of no more than 60 minutes for all three surveys (20 minutes per survey x 3 = 60
minutes total spent time) over a 3-month span, or less, as agreed on the IRB-approved
schedule.
The panel of SMEs provided timely responses concerning the reasons, motivators,
security strategies, and early interventions needed to recognize and prevent insider threats
in organizations and the policies and procedures needed to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of personal and organizational data. The SMEs received an
automatic thank-you note when completing the surveys within 7-10 days, or a follow-up
reminder email if the survey was not accessed within 5 days. I used electronic messages
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on LinkedIn to follow up with SMEs on the status of, or delays in the submission of
Rounds 2 and 3.
Although Round 1 open-ended questions were submitted during the month of
December 2019, responses were received within a 2-week period after survey
dissemination. The coronavirus (COVID-19) and mandatory social distancing may have
had the greatest effect on the study’s outcome; either the SMEs simply raised the
importance of this insider threats’ Delphi study, or as good project managers, they
understood the significance of adhering to a schedule. The obligation to remain at home
may have made it easier for SMEs to complete the surveys in a timely manner; this was
not a possibility that I could have anticipated, and data collection was unaffected. The
SMEs reacted positively to the survey even though this killer virus had a direct impact on
their lives, job availability and location, and the health of neighbors, family, and friends.
Demographics
A selected group of 25 IT professionals in the Washington metropolitan area with
a minimum of 5 years of IT experience consented to participate in this study. Members of
organizations such PMI, ISACA, and NIST who were certified members of PMI, ISACA,
ISO, SANS, Global Information Assurance Certification (GIAC), ISC, or a similar
technology/security organization comprised the SMEs in this study. I did not conduct
face-to-face, or phone call interviews, onsite observations, or focus groups; therefore, a
visual method did not exist to gather the SMEs’ age, or race. Given the educational
requirements and education required to obtain a professional certification, no minors
participated in this study. Demographic questions were not included in any of the three
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survey rounds; the only information gathered was that tied into the requirements for
participation as indicated in the informed consent document.
Data Collection
I used online surveys for data collection. Upon SMEs’ decision to participate in
the study, 25 surveys were delivered using the SurveyMonkey tool; reminders and
updates were disseminated using private emails at LinkedIn. The data collection process
did not include interviews to eliminate the perception of any personal bias during this
study. This fast and inexpensive method was enhanced by the flexibility, privacy, and
freedom offered by a Delphi study. I collected data from 25 SMEs in the public and
private sectors of the Washington metropolitan area using three survey questionnaires:
one survey for open-ended questions and two surveys for close-ended questions. The data
were analyzed using frequency counts and percentages to analyze category qualifiers and
identify what items met 60% (i.e., 60% of 25 responses), where 25 responses represented
100% agreement and 15 responses represented 60% agreement. Content analysis
examined the pattern of communication in a replicable, systematic, and noninvasive
manner (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). In this qualitative study, how many times SMEs
responded with the same answers, or synonyms (e.g., number of repetitions) to reasons,
motivators, strategies, policies, and procedures was used to analyze themes pertinent to
real-time insider threats for risky behaviors, security, and data vulnerabilities,
remediations, and training.
To make the data easier to classify, I first integrated the survey results from
Round 1 open-ended questions into an Excel spreadsheet. I broke down the data into
categories and looked for commonalities before I was satisfied with the data and reached
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saturation. Hancock and Algozzine (2015) noted that consensus was based on the concept
of response stability and consistency for greater saturation and transparency. I applied an
analytical framework previously presented in this dissertation for the analysis and
categorization of closed-ended questions in Rounds 2 and 3, along with a 5-point Likert
scale. An analytical framework is a set of organized categories, or codes developed by
researchers to create a new structure to organize and manage data (Gale et al., 2013). I
preferred the analytical framework rather than referencing the full original accounts
provided by SMEs to support the research answers (Gale et al., 2013). In December 2020,
I finished my final data analysis using a 5-point Likert scale. In my final data review, I
aimed to better understand the SMEs’ consensus on insider threat characteristics, risk
attitudes, prevention measures, and policies and procedures.
Analysis
The three key categories of data analysis in this study for data reduction were
consolidation, data display, and data verification (Adler & Clark, 2015). No demographic
information, such as race, gender, or country of origin, was requested of the SMEs.
Reasons, motivators, security strategies, policies, and procedures in the management of
insider threats’ behaviors and data security management strategies as provided by SMEs
in their SurveyMonkey answers were added under the corresponding themes (e.g.,
reasons, motivators, security strategies, policies, and procedures) for the management of
insider threats’ behaviors and data security management strategies.
Round 1 Open-Ended Questions
The overarching research question (RQ1) was used as a frame for the open-ended
questions that aligned with the sub questions (SQ1, SQ2, SQ3) in the open-ended Round
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1 survey. Responses to these open-ended questions were completed within a 10-day
period and submitted for academic review within the next 5-10 days after the analysis and
classifications of findings were completed. The SMEs often provided the same response
for reasons and motivators. However, the survey answers reached over 100 entries for all
four questions. I condensed these responses within the study’s analytical framework and
the 5-point Likert scale, to construct closed-ended questions for the Round 2 survey using
SMEs’ real-time responses reaching at least a 60% agreement. In analyzing the data,
neutral responses such as neither agree nor disagree were not taken into consideration
because these responses would not have provided meaningful input in uncovering the
reasons, motivators, strategies, policies, and procedures for managing insider threats in
private, or public organizations, or to support SMEs’ consensus (Boone & Boone, 2012;
Wise, 2015).
Miles et al. (2014) noted that to help identify the main data needed for saturation,
particularly during data interpretation, an analytical framework helps qualitative
researchers to organize data findings and differences, developing themes as the analysis
goes from a broad to detailed analysis. The responses to the data themes gathered were
analyzed through categorization and direct interpretation (Yazan, 2015). The analysis of
the data from the open-ended questions in the Round 1 survey aligned with the categories
of the study’s analytical framework in the following category for the dark triad theory
constructs. The raw data categories were closely linked to the analytical framework to
begin the process of abstraction needed to gather findings in a meaningful manner (Gale
et al., 2013). Because this was a qualitative research study, statistical, or multivariate data
analysis was not included in the analysis of narrative findings (Hair et al., 2010).
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Round 2 Closed-Ended Questions
In Round 2, SMEs were asked if they agreed with, or disagreed with the responses
provided in the open-ended Round 1 survey and to make revisions as needed. In Round 2,
the SurveyMonkey tool included drop-down boxes to add additional reasons, motivators,
strategies, policies, and procedures if changes were required at the time that SMEs
received their second survey. With each round of surveys, the categories were updated to
reflect real-time inputs and present accurate categorization, thus eliminating any
redundancies in findings (e.g., money vs. financial gain).
The main areas for reasons and motivators were found under the following
categories: money/financial gain, retribution/revenge, political/religious affiliation, and
dislike for management/organization. The top security strategies and early interventions
used in organizations to prevent data breaches and insider threats were found under
control access, such as “need-to-know systems access,” or granting access necessary to
do a person’s job; security training; background investigations; nondisclosure agreements
(NDAs); and controlled access/logs. The top categories for policies and procedures were
focused on risk management policies, security training, reference checking, polygraphs,
NDAs, and background checks. Because the survey in Round 2 allowed for changes, as
further disclosed in Round 3, a greater number of reasons, motivators, strategies, policies,
and procedures resulted from Survey Round 2 findings (see the Glossary for a better
understanding of these categories).
Round 3 Closed-Ended Questions
In survey Round 3, I asked the SMEs to validate and come to consensus with the
previously provided reasons, motivators, strategies, policies, and procedures provided in
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response to the Round 1 and Round 2 surveys. Following the completion of Round 2 data
collection and review, I presented findings in the Round 3 survey for validation and
consensus. I introduced the survey findings to allow an opportunity to comment, make
changes, and confirm that the surveys had been performed ethically and in compliance
with the original questions. The general method that I followed during the administration
of this study’s three rounds of surveys is depicted in the Habibi’s (2017) Delphi
technique framework.
Lessons Learned
One comment received from an SME indicated that Round 2 had been too long.
This comment was part of my lessons learned for conducting a Delphi study. Perhaps
revisiting data reduction could have rendered a shorter survey, but it was my intent to be
as transparent as possible when providing SMEs’ responses to a survey. As a qualitative
study, the survey did not include a calculation for a margin of error.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
The four elements of trustworthiness applied to this study for ensuring unbiased
qualitative results were credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000). The responses obtained from SMEs during their final survey
were used to determine the study’s trustworthiness. I made sure that the information
presented by SMEs was relevant to the problem and purpose statements of the study. The
conclusions were founded on SMEs’ responses, experiences, and viewpoints (Lincoln &
Guba, 2000). To avoid prejudices, the SMEs evaluated whether the questions were
credible and relevant, as well as whether the results described accurately reflected their
responses.
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Credibility
Credibility in this study was recognized by the trends provided and the degree of
consensus achieved throughout the study by the participating SMEs, who had the
opportunity to change their answers and/or confirm previous responses surrounding
insider threats’ reasons, motivators, strategies, policies, and procedures. Neutral answers
provided no value to the study and were not incorporated into the results (Dang-Pham,
2014; Kirlappos et al., 2014; Willison & Warkentin, 2013). Saturation was the preferred
method to ensure survey findings’ credibility, quality, and validity from the methods
listed above (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Billups (2014) noted that credibility establishes
believable results on the part of the researcher and an understanding of the SMEs’
perspectives and viewpoints.
Transferability
I accomplished transferability in this study to the extent that it achieved external
validity, or the ability to apply data that had been gathered into a new research process
(Janesick, 2011). Transferability of findings was reviewed by my dissertation committee
as a part of their dissertation approval process regarding the approaches and activities that
took place to gather findings. To achieve transferability, I provided detailed information
on the findings, explained the methodology used and why, and explained the data
collection and analysis processes, findings, and summaries that could provide value to the
body of knowledge and enhance further research (Fusch & Ness, 2015; Houghton et al.,
2013). In Chapter 3, I demonstrated the research method and rationale for this study.
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Dependability
A study is dependable when a different set of researchers can perform an inquiry
and obtain similar outcomes based on the study design, rationale, and interpretative
judgment (Houghton et al., 2013). I addressed dependability through presenting the
study’s consistent findings and how these findings connected to the need for a real-time
qualitative study using the dark triad theory as the conceptual framework. In this Delphi
study, I relied solely on the SMEs’ consensus, feedback, and responses, and not on my
personal motivations, biases, or interests. For data collection dependability, consistent
themes must align with the original data collection methods indicated at the beginning of
the study (Billups, 2014). The flexibility and freedom of a Delphi study were factors that
facilitated the dependability and separation from any bias during this study (Fusch, 2015).
Confirmability
A Delphi study is recognized for its privacy (Fusch, 2015). In this study, SMEs
were able to respond freely and without fear of retaliation, providing real-time opinions
and findings. Billups (2014) noted that confirmability was used to determine if results
were accurate, could be corroborated and depicted actual findings. In this study, SMEs
validated responses before concluding the reporting of findings for my dissertation.
Participant validation was a well-accepted practice in Delphi studies to legitimize SMEs’
responses and reduce the perception of reflexivity if any (Kornbluh, 2015). Reflexive
journaling and auditing also provided the transparency that can be reviewed by others to
judge the methods and approaches of this study (Cope, 2013).
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Study Results
This section includes the study's findings as well as responses to the research
questions. Results from this study are qualitative and derived from the SMEs’ real-time
given answers to the overarching question RQ1 Reasons for insider threats in
organizations; SQ1 Motivators for insider threats in organizations; SQ2 Strategies and
early interventions to prevent insider threats; and SQ3 Policies, and procedure used to
manage insider threats and protect data. This study is valuable because it presents the
readers with options when exploring the topic of insider threats’ identification,
prevention, and securing the integrity, accessibility, and confidentiality of the data. I
presented closed-ended questions for Round 2 after grouping responses from Round 1
that had achieved a minimum of 60% consensus (i.e., 60% of 25 responses), where 25
responses represented 100% agreement and 15 responses represented 60% agreement.
Survey Question Round 1
The purpose of the Round 1 open-ended survey questions was to create a
collection of baseline responses in a manner that would allow SMEs to freely express
their opinions on the subject while also providing input based on their knowledge and
experience. A Delphi panel had the benefit of allowing participants to respond to
questions at any time, from any place, and in any way they wanted. The benefit of openended questions is that the SMEs could answer in a variety of ways.as evidenced by the
raw data SMEs provided in Round 1.
The overarching topic for this study was depicted as research question 1 (RQ1).
The raw data and percentages displayed in Tables 4-7 were derived from the SMEs'
responses to the open-ended survey questions I used to start the study. Round 1 was an
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opportunity for SMEs to respond to a question with several credible responses, allowing
them to have complete control of what they said rather than being influenced by my
opinions, interests, and/or previous experiences.
Reasons for Insider Threats in Organizations
The SMEs’ top reason for insider threats in was a lack of training, followed by a
lack of knowledge about insider threats that can be a byproduct of a lack of training,
political views, political affiliation/ideology, and a lack of knowledge about insider
threats that can be considered a byproduct of a lack of training. Subsequent categories
included: Foreign influences; social media (this percentage decreased drastically,
possibly due to the pandemic related telework mandates and the need to use social media
to advertise and recruit new employees). Dislike of peers/coworkers, dislike of
management, and company culture, intentional, or unintentional access to systems.
Discontent with the culture of the organization, a sense of entitlement, and resentment.
Employers can use the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE)
framework to train their employees on insider threat awareness (NICE, 2020).
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Table 4
Reasons for Insider Threats in Organizations
Answer choices

n

%

employees with no regard for the organization

12.0

48.0

fraudulent activities on the part of the organization

1.0

4.0

insufficient guidelines and security

14.0

56.0

lack of training

23.0

92.0

1.0

4.0

patterns)

1.0

4.0

personal recognition

0.0

0.0

employees sent by competitors

1.0

4.0

intentional,or unintentional access to systems

15.0

60.0

manager’s treatment of employees

11.0

44.0

discontent with the culture of the organization

15.0

60.0

political affiliation/ideology

18.0

72.0

foreign influences

18.0

72.0

lack of knowledge about insider threat

20.0

80.0

careless recruiting

10.0

40.0

checking

10.0

40.0

sense of entitlement

15.0

60.0

resentment

15.0

60.0

social media

17.0

68.0

dislike of management and company culture

16.0

64.0

personal recognition

11.0

44.0

political views

20.0

80.0

dislike of peers/coworkers

17.0

68.0

1.0

4.0

hiring of chronic rule violators
lack of behavioral screening (negative social

lack of background investigations and reference

unknown
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Motivators for Insider Threats
The top motivators for insider threats were money, personal gain, revenge and/or
ideology; entry level employees wanting to do social networking at work; bad intentions,
emotional, financial, or politically based motivators driving the intent, dislike of
management; disregard for authority; pushing boundaries; hackers wanting to sell your
information/ransomware (Table 5 depicts these findings). These findings align with prior
studies and insider threat motivators events such as the one previously mentioned of
Ames Aldrich, a 31- year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency, where he was a
case officer, fluent in Russian, and an expert in foreign intelligence. He spied for Russia
from 1985 until the day of his arrest in February 1994. Like the previous insider threats,
Aldrich had accumulated excessive debt and lived beyond his means. He was paid over
$1.88 million of dollars by his treason. Aldrich showed arrogance, greed and financial
need that transferred to a sense of entitlement by selling national security secrets; he also
showed a lack of conscience (Maasberg et al., 2016). This is just one example among the
many stated in Chapter 2.
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Table 5
Responses to the Motivators for Insider Threats
Answer choices
pushing boundaries

n

%
15.0

60.0

5.0

20.0

ransomware

17.0

68.0

greed

12.0

48.0

power centric

14.0

56.0

money

20.0

80.0

mental illness

1.0

4.0

immaturity

1.0

4.0

disrupting economies of scale

7.0

28.0

personal gain, revenge and/,or ideology.

20.0

80.0

1.0

4.0

at work

20.0

80.0

disregard for authority

17.0

68.0

2.0

8.0

18.0

72.0

20.0

80.0

financial gain
hackers wanting to sell your information/

depression
entry level employees want to do social networking

retribution
dislike of management
bad intentions, emotional, financial, or politically
based motivators drive the intent

Security Strategies and Early Interventions
To be successful and effective as a security professional, it is important to
understand what security strategies and early interventions work best in other
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organizations. You can accomplish this through benchmarking, reading dissertations such
as this one, or reviewing NICE and NIST publications. You should be knowledgeable of
the main security terms and tools used by other security specialists. Security systems are
built from essential building pieces in the same way that a large building is built from
individual bricks. Your insider threats awareness would also be built as you become
familiar with the top real-time strategies and early interventions used by SMEs in the
Washington metropolitan area to protect and safeguard personal and corporate data.
The top security strategies and early interventions for insider threats and data
security management the SMEs provided included: Audits and network scanning, user
activity monitoring, training, multi-factor identification, need to know access, security
logs, effective oversight, coordinated multi-disciplinary coordination, analysis, separation
of duties and mandatory training, firewalls, cybersecurity training, change management
policies, using antiviruses such as Bitdefender, security indoctrination, shielding sensitive
information from all employees, buddy system, and insider threat impact training.
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Data are not just static assets that need to be checked on only when needed, on the
contrary, the confidentiality, integrity and authorized accessibility of data requires careful
access control guidelines. Integrating new data security strategies and early interventions
with innovative technologies activities requires to be cognizant of the behaviors that may
jeopardize security as highlighted in this study. Awareness of the dark triad theory’s traits
and behaviors may help organizations to reinforce their data management strategy. A
more detailed explanation of this study’s terminology will be observed in the analysis of
Survey Round 3 individual responses that validate this study.
Table 6 depicts SMEs responses. These findings aligned with previous research
findings from the Ponemon Institute, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
and peer-reviewed quantitative and qualitative studies (NIST, 2016; Ponemon, 2016).
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Table 6
Strategies and Early Interventions
Answer choices

n

%

limited access controls

20.0

80.0

update virus protection regularly

20.0

80.0

using antiviruses/bitdefender

15.0

60.0

shielding sensitive information

15.0

60.0

cybersecurity training

13.0

52.0

change management policies

17.0

68.0

limiting administrative rights

19.0

76.0

audits and network scannings

23.0

92.0

duties, and training.

23.0

92.0

buddy system

15.0

60.0

10.0

40.0

5.0

20.0

firewalls

20.0

80.0

polygraphs

12.0

48.0

cybersecurity training

17.0

68.0

Nondisclosure agreements (NDAs)

12.0

48.0

training, multiple factor authentication

23.0

92.0

ID Cards, dual sign on/multifactor

13.0

52.0

user activity monitoring, separation of

access controls, one administrator per
site
background checks

effective oversight, multidisciplinary
coordination, analysis

22.0

88.0

need to know access

23.0

92.0

mandatory training

20.0

80.0

security indoctrination

15.0

60.0

insider threat impact training

15.0

60.0

security logs

23.0

92.0
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Policies and Procedures
Employees must learn how to utilize Information technology securely and safely,
as well as be aware of their duties, as a critical component of a company's Information
Technology (IT) infrastructure security. To help employees understand and carry out
their duties, as well as follow proper procedures, the organization must generate policies
and procedures. Adopting an effective security posture may be difficult and costly for an
organization because it involves disruption of normal operations at practically every level
with no instant results. Security compliance necessitates the collaboration and assistance
of all employees in the organization.
Policies and procedures are used to demonstrate how senior management leads
and manages the organization, to achieve compliance from all stakeholders, external
agreements with partners, suppliers, and customers may also be required to articulate
these policies and procedures. See Table 7. The top policies and procedures the SMEs
provided to manage insider threats in organizations included: Separation of duties,
enforcement of least privileged access, training and oversight policy, (this answer was an
example of how SMEs responded with multiple options to one question), logs and need
to know policy, log analysis, SOP, background screening at hiring policy, risk
management plans, controlled access Policy, training procedures, Pulseway policy,
polygraphs policy, conflict resolution plan, training policy, and rewards and recognition
for following rules practice.
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Table 7
Policies and Procedures
Answer choices

n

%

3.0

12.0

pulseway policy

15.0.

60.0

controlled access policy

20.0

80.0

log analysis SOP

23.0

92.0

background screening at hiring policy

20.0

80.0

logs and need to know areas policy

23.0

92.0

risk management activities

20.0

80.0

training policy

25.0

100.0

polygraphs policy

15.0

60.0

conflict resolution plan

15.0

60.0

training policy

15.0

60.0

nondisclosure agreements

10.0

40.0

references checking procedure

12.0

48.0

internal referrals

8.0

32.0

training procedures

18.0

72.0

hardening, interval training

5.0

20.0

risk management plan

5.0

20.0

audits/compliance

6.0

24.0

rewards and recognition

15.0

60.0

reference checking practice

13.0

52.0

hiring the right people for the right jobs

13.0

52.0

limited access SOP

13.0

52.0

different levels of access

20.0

80.0

physical security

8.0

32.0

system security plan

12.0

48.0

change control plan

5.0

20.0

limit third party usage policy/social networks

separation of duties, enforcement of least privileged
access,

regularly monitoring, access controls, technology

118
Survey Question Round 2
The preparation of the inquiries in the Round 2 survey closed-ended questions
consisted of themes arranged in accordance with the study’s framework that were derived
from the SMEs baselined responses in Round 1. While categories in an analytical
framework were closely linked to the raw data, developing these categories and codes
were a way to begin with the process of abstraction of the data and a confirmation of
initial consensus (Gale et al., 2013). With open-ended questions, I was able to delve into
SMEs' perspectives, experiences, and thoughts, gaining useful insight into the subject at
hand. Open-ended questions can be considered an essential component of a qualitative
research framework. For Round 2 of this qualitative Delphi study, the baseline for
consensus categorization was based on the 60% agreement among SMEs as evidenced by
their responses to reasons, motivators, strategies, policies, and procedures for managing
insider threats in organizations. Themes with consistent categorizations were those where
the grouping of responses achieved the preestablished level of consensus (Förster & von
der Gracht, 2012). Hsu and Sandford (2007) noted that the option, or criterion for
narrowing down responses, or consolidation may be applied to present single themes.
Additional measures, or conditions could have been used to focus on a much larger
grouping of responses, such as an 80% or 90% consensus using only a higher percentage
of discriminating factors; however, I did not find it necessary to use additional criteria to
present the full scope of the study due to saturation (Hsu & Sandford, 2007). Round 2,
the consensus was based on the concept of responses, or theme stability, and consistency
that provided greater transparency and saturation (Hancock & Algozzine, 2015).
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The findings were gated at a 60% minimum consensus, and in cases where the
SMEs indicated disagreement, the number of disagreeable responses did not reach the
minimum 60% necessary to have a significant impact in this study. Although the word
disagree has been included in the finding tables, these responses did not provide
consistency and were only added for transparency purposes as they did not reach criteria
for inclusion, or the minimum 60%. SMEs mainly chose not to answer questions in the
negative knowing that the goal of the survey was to achieve agreement, or consensus.
Reasons for Insider Threats in Organizations
In Round 2 closed-ended questions, neutral, or unanswered questions that did not
contribute to the goal and purpose of the study were not included, as they did not affect
the results of the study if a 60% majority did not exist (i.e., 60% of 25 responses), where
25 responses represented 100% agreement and 15 responses represented 60% agreement.
In Table 8, I demonstrated the number of SMEs who agreed, strongly agreed, and
disagreed, and the percentages for the main reasons for insider threats in organizations.
These numbers are indicative of the real-time level of consensus among SMEs in this
category. No panelists strongly disagreed.
The top SMEs’ responses to the survey Round 2 closed-ended questions for
reasons for insider threats in organizations confirmed previously identified traits and
behaviors in the NIST, NICE and Ponemon studies, as follows: Lack of background
investigations and reference checking, insufficient guidelines and security, lack of
training, employees with no regard for the organization, sense of entitlement, lack of
knowledge about insider threats, political views, political affiliation/ideology, foreign
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influences combined, personal recognition, social media, dislike of peers/co-workers, and
dislike of management.
One the most crucial categories in this survey question deals with background
checks and investigations. Background checks are used to assess a person's fitness for
work, whether, or not that person is who he, or she claims to be, and whether, or not that
person is hiding criminal behavior, bankruptcy, or ties that might put him, or her at risk.
Employees operating in high-security workplaces, or with access to high-value
transactions will undoubtedly need to be scrutinized more closely. Background checks
are required for some employment, particularly federal jobs that require a security
clearance. Some background checks are carried out internally, while others are carried
out by a third party.
Employees with no regard for their organizations have been observed in past
insider threats reports such as those who sold corporate intellectual property and trade
secrets, or employees who have stolen confidential, secret, or top-secret information
without regard to their organization’s loss of customer trust, financial losses, falling share
prices and regulatory fines (Ponemon, 2020).
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Table 8
Round 2 Survey (RQ1), Reasons for Insider Threats in Organization
Strongly
Agree

agree

Disagree

n

n

n

%

employees with no regard for the organization

12.0

11.0

2.0

92.0

fraudulent activities on the part of the organization

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

insufficient guidelines and security

14.0

11.0

0.0

100.0

lack of training

23.0

2.0

0.0

100.0

hiring of chronic rule violators

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

personal recognition

0.0

18.0

0.0

72.0

employees sent by competitors

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

resentment

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

social media

17.0

0.0

0.0

68.0

intentional, or unintentional access to systems

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

manager’s treatment of employees

11.0

0.0

0.0

44.0

discontent with the culture of the organization

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

political affiliation/ideology

18.0

0.0

0.0

72.0

foreign influences

18.0

0.0

0.0

72.0

lack of knowledge about insider threat

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

careless recruiting

10.0

0.0

0.0

40.0

10.0

15.0

0.0

100.0

15.0

7.0

0.0

88.0

Answer choices

lack of behavioral screening (negative social
patterns)

lack of background investigations and reference
checking
sense of entitlement
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Motivators for Insider Threats in Organizations
Many motivators were mentioned in the SMEs responses, and previous research
on insider risks has focused on human motivation to break the rules and jeopardize
security guidelines to satisfy personal wants and needs, leaving the door open
to inadvertent insider threats. Cyberstalking, digital piracy, trolling, online deceit,
internet addiction, social and sexual networks, and vandalism are among the individual
activities described for accessing unauthorized sites. These activities have been
associated to the dark triad's psychopathic traits and behaviors often observed in social
media activities (Golden, 2014).
There are many motivators provided by the SMES, but top identifiers were:
Financial gain, retribution, money, foreign influences, personal gain, revenge and/or
ideology; entry level employees want to do social networking at work, money, bad
intentions, emotional, financial, or politically based motivators drive the intent, revenge,
politics, dislike of management, hackers wanting to sell your information/ransomware,
disregard for authority, and pushing boundaries. The themes and categories related to
motivators for insider threats aligned with previous studies conducted by the Ponemon
Institute (Ponemon, 2020) about insider threats and data security worldwide.
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Table 9
Round 2 Survey (SQ1), Motivators for Insider Threats in Organizations
Agree
Answer choices

Strongly agree Disagree

n

n

n

%

financial gain

5.0

20.0

0.0

100.0

hackers wanting to sell your information/

17.0

0.0

0.0

68.0

pushing boundaries

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

greed

12.0

0.0

0.0

48.0

power centric

14.0

0.0

0.0

56.0

revenge

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

greed

12.0

0.0

0.0

48.0

power centric

14.0

0.0

0.0

56.0

money

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

mental illness

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

showing others what one can do; show off

3.0

0.0

0.0

12.0

foreign influences

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

disrupting economies of scale

7.0

0.0

0.0

28.0

personal gain, revenge and/or ideology

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

depression

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

new employees/social net at work

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

disregard for authority

17.0

0.0

0.0

68.0

retribution

2.0

20.0

0.0

88.0

dislike of management

18.0

0.0

0.0

72.0

money

5.0

15.0

0.0

80.0

bad intentions, emotional, financial, or politically

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

revenge

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

religion views

6.0

0.0

0.0

17.0

politics

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

arrogance

14.0

0.0

0.0

56.0

religious affiliation

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

ransomware

based motivators drive the intent
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Table 10
Round 2 Survey (SQ2), Security Strategies and Early Interventions to Manage Insider Threats

Agree
n

Strongly
Agree
n

Disagree
n

20.0

0.0

0.0

%
80.0

update software regularly (virus protection)

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

using antiviruses such as Bitdefender
shielding sensitive information from all
employees
cybersecurity training

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

15.0

12.0

0.0

60.0

13.0

0.0

0.0

100.0

change management policies

17.0

0.0

0.0

68.0

limiting administrative rights

19.0

0.0

0.0

76.0

audits and network scannings
user activity monitoring, SoD, and training
buddy system

23.0
23.0
15.0

0.0
0.0
5.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

92.0
92.0
60.0

access controls, one administrator per site

10.0

0.0

10.0

60.0

background checks

5.0

0.0

0.0

2.0

firewalls

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

polygraphs

12.0

0.0

0.0

48.0

cybersecurity training

17.0

0.0

0.0

68.0

nondisclosure agreements (NDAs)
effective oversight, coordinated
multidisciplinary coordination, analysis
need to know access

12.0

0.0

0.0

48.0

22.0

0.0

0.0

88.0

23.0

0.0

0.0

92.0

security indoctrination

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

mandatory training

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

insider threat impact training

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

security logs

23.0

0.0

0.0

92.0

religion views

6.0

0.0

0.0

24.0

religious affiliation

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

politics

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

arrogance

14.0

0.0

0.0

56.0

foreign influences

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

money

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

mental illness

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

immaturity

1.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

disrupting economies of scale

7.0

0.0

0.0

28.0

personal gain, revenge, and/or ideology

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

Answer choices
limited access controls
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Policies and Procedures to Manage Insider Threats and Data Security
Policies and procedures are critical in decreasing the risk of data theft, or loss by
internal, or external threats. Enforcing rigorous data regulations may be the results of
legal, or compliance regulations. For example, many areas for preventing data breaches
were provided by the SMEs in this survey (Table 11). This awareness can help prevent
the disclosure of healthcare and credit card information, regulated by law. If an
organization does not comply with regulations, it could risk significant fines and be
denied entry to the market. Employees who fail to perform their duties properly may be
consistently punished up to criminal charges if applicable. SMEs validated responses
follow: Controlled access policy, (different levels of access), background screening at
hiring policy, risk management plans, training procedures, polygraph’s policy, Pulseway
policy, conflict resolution plan, training policy, logs and need to know areas policy,
oversight policy; download protection policy, nondisclosure agreements, and rewards
and recognition for following rules. Procedures can be established with
Audits/compliance, physical security, system security plan. change control plan,
regularly monitoring, implementation of access controls, technology hardening, and
regular interval training for all on how to protect data, risk management plan; Separation
of duties (SoD), enforcement of least privileged access, training, limit third party usage
policy/social networks, log analysis SOP, and hiring internal referrals. Results for
Policies and Procedures to manage insider threats and data security management.
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Table 11
Round 2 Survey (SQ3, Policies and Procedures to Manage Insider Threats Access)
Agree
n

Strongly
agree
n

Disagree
n

%

download protection policy

23.0

0.0

0.0

92.0

limit third party usage policy/social networks

3.0

20.0

0.0

92.0

Pulseway security policy

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

controlled access policy

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

log analysis SOP

23.0

0.0

0.0

92.0

background screening at hiring policy

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

logs and need to know areas policy

23.0

0.0

0.0

92.0

risk management activities

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

separation of duties, enforcement of least privileged
access, training, oversight policy

25.0

0.0

0.0

100.0

polygraph policy

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

conflict resolution plan

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

training policy

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

nondisclosure agreements

10.0

5.0

0.0

60.0

reference checking practice

13.0

0.0

0.0

52.0

references checking procedure

12.0

0.0

0.0

48.0

internal referrals

8.0

15.0

0.0

92.0

training procedures

18.0

0.0

0.0

72.0

regularly monitoring, implementation of access
controls, technology hardening, and regular interval
training for all on how to protect data.

5.0

20.0

0.0

100.0

risk management plan

5.0

20.0

0.0

100.0

audits/compliance

6.0

19.0

0.0

100.0

rewards and recognition for following rules practice

15.0

0.0

0.0

60.0

hiring the right people for the right jobs

13.0

0.0

0.0

52.0

limited access SOP

13.0

0.0

0.0

53.0

different levels of access

20.0

0.0

0.0

80.0

physical security

8.0

17.0

0.0

100.0

system security plan

12.0

13.0

0.0

100.0

change control plan

5.0

20.0

0.0

100.0

Answer choices
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Survey Question Round 3
After completing Round 2 and analyzing the survey results, I synthesized the
information from the SMEs to construct the Round 3 closed-ended questions. Survey
Round 3 confirmed the consensus reached in Survey Round 2 on the reasons, motivators,
strategies an early interventions, policies, and procedures for identifying, classifying, and
managing insider threats in public and private organizations. I completed Survey Round 3
closed-ended questions in December 1, 2020. The Round 3 closed-ended questions
sought consensus from the 25 participating SMEs completing the study to gained final
consensus on insider threats’ behaviors and data security management strategies as stated
in the problem and purpose statements of the study. The Round 3 survey consisted of 42
questions because the Round 2 survey allowed for changes; therefore, SMEs added
additional comments, or changes to their prior responses. No diminishing returns
occurred during Round 3 because of SMEs’ steady participation that remained a constant
throughout the study. The survey findings validation using a 5-point Likert scale follow.
Survey Question Round 3
Survey Question 1. Please rate to what extent you agree/strongly agree that
employees with no regard for the organization are a reason for insider threats in
organizations.
Eighty-four percent of participating SMEs agreed that employees with no regard
for the organization are a reason for insider threats in organizations. This finding was
consistent with the findings in Round 2.
Table 12 depicts the percentages of Agree and Strongly Agree among SMEs’
responses to Round 3, Survey Question 1.
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Table 12
Round 3—Survey Question 1—Consensus: Employees with No Regard for the
Organization
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

6.0

24.0

Agree

15.0

60.0

disagree

2.0

8.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

Neither agree nor

Employees with no regard for the organization who become insider threats are not
a new phenomenon (Thoroughgood & Padilla, 2013). The history of insider threats has
shown that there was not a single industry, or business line that has not been affected by
insider threats. The list of examples included insider threats within the CIA, the FBI, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Democratic Convention, the Office of
Personnel Management, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), EQUIFAX Credit, Bank of
America, the military services, law firms, medical and pharmaceutical organizations.to
mention a few (FBI, 2016c). Some insider threats have shown compensatory behaviors
for low self-esteem and even dyslexia, as it was the case of agents who lacked impulse
control and showed symptoms of paranoia (Maasberg et al., 2016; FBI, 2016c).
A lack of care for one’s organization may be the result of perception, cultural
bias, religious beliefs, financial need, and demographic differences. Awareness of these
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differences are important in organizational behavior and leadership management because
this awareness can help incorporate methods to decrease ill feelings and resentment on
the part of employees; therefore, knowing that people with different perceptions may
have unique characteristics and needs that should be considered by managers is key to
avoiding, or diminishing negative feelings towards the coworkers and the organization
(Padilla et al., 2007).
Round 3: Survey Question 2
Survey Question 2: Please rate to what extent you agree/strongly agree that
insufficient guidelines and security training are a reason for insider threats in
organizations.
Eighty-four percent of participating SMEs agreed that a lack of cyber security
training was a reason for insider threats in organizations. This finding was consistent with
the finding in Round 2. Table 13 depicts the percentages of Strongly Agree and Agree
among SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 2.
Table 13
Survey Question 2—Consensus: Insufficient Guidelines and Security Training
Answer choices

y

n

%

Strongly agree

6.0

24.0

Agree

15.0

60.0

Neither agree nor disagree

2.0

8.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0
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Insufficient guidelines and security awareness training are reasons and motives
for insider threats in organizations. IT Managers attempting to avoid insider threats
activities and the misappropriation of organizational assets, and senior management may
benefit from a real-time, in-depth understanding of the impact that guidelines and
security training have on employee buy-in and behavior when it comes to embracinig
emerging technologies and enhancing data security countermeasures for insider threats.
This in-depth knowledge of the need for security training can support senior leadership
efforts for continued development and training budgets that tie into the total cost of
ownership to build and maintain a safer working environment (NIST/NICE, 2017).
Different types of risk management and security training exist to ensure physical,
environmental, internal, and external risks are identified and manage before these
interfere with mission essential functions. For example, a lack of cyber security training
was consistently chosen by SMEs in Surveys Round 2 and Round 3 as reasons for insider
threats.
Round 3: Survey Question 3
Survey Question 3. Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly disagree
that a lack of cybersecurity training was a reason for insider threats in organizations.
Eighty-four percent of participating SMEs agreed that a lack of cybersecurity
training was a reason for insider threats in organizations. This finding was consistent with
the finding in Round 2. Table 14 details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 3.
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Table 14
Survey Question 3—Consensus: Cybersecurity Training
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

9.0

36.0

Agree

12.0

48.0

Neither agree nor disagree

1.0

4.0

Disagree

3.0

12.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Cybersecurity training programs will help to reduce the risks of cyber-attacks
(NIST, 2016; Ponemon, 2017). While employee knowledge may not be a panacea for
protecting all risks, a cybersecurity training program will demonstrate (a) employers'
commitment to data protection and (b) that employers are taking the necessary steps to
fix vulnerabilities and intrusions. Cybersecurity training is not simply having people
follow the rules; rather, security involves empowering people to be proactive when
presented with threat situations. Cybersecurity training enables the principles of data
availability, confidentiality, and integrity (CIA). Twenty-one SMEs concurred with these
findings in both surveys, achieving a total consensus of 84%.
Round 3: Survey Question 4
y

Survey Question 4: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that personal recognition was a reason for insider threats in organizations.
Although personal recognition has been related to the dark triad personality traits,
it did not achieve the necessary 60% consensus needed to provide a substantial input to
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this survey. Personal recognition was described by 44% of SMEs as a Neither Agree nor
Disagree category for insider threats in organizations. (See Table 15).
Table 15
Survey Question 4: Personal Recognition Responses
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

1.0

8.0

Agree

7.0

28.0

Neither agree nor disagree

11.0

44.0

Disagree

5.0

20.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Maslow's hierarchy of needs (1954), or an individual's needs to excel in his, or her
performance, accomplishments, rank, or education may be linked to the need for personal
recognition, as there have been both welcomed and problematic outcomes in community,
school, and families. Psychologists, in contrast, have become interested in what motivates
people and how people can better understand each other. Balik (2014) noted that what
motivates individuals, has changed through the years. Social media for example, has
served as the battle ground for students, presidents, and players to exchange
accomplishments. Balik affirmed that social media such as Facebook with more than 800
million active users, Twitter with more than one billion users and LinkedIn®, were
examples of our technological need for personal recognition, as value assigned to the
individual was directly linked to who has more friends, followers, members, posts,
groups, lists, events, likes, and dislikes (Balik, 2014; Palfrey & Gasser, 2008).
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Round 3: Survey Question 5
Survey Question 5: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that intentional,or unintentional access are a reason for insider threats in
organizations. Table 16 details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 5.
Eighty-four percent of participating SMEs agreed, or strongly agreed that
intentional, or unintentional access was one of the reasons for insider threats in
organizations in Round 3. This finding represented an increase from 15 to 21 SMEs in
agreement in Round 2 (see Table 16).
Table 16
Survey Question 5—Consensus: Intentional and Unintentional Access
Answer choices

y

n

%

Strongly agree

4.0

16.0

Agree

17.0

68.0

Neither agree nor disagree

2.0

8.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Unintentional access occurs when untrained employees click on links and go to
sites that appear familiar to them, it may also occur when employees forget to remove the
identification cards from the system or allow others to view their passwords. As survey
findings confirmed, intentional access to unauthorize users can be the result of retaliation,
revenge, sabotage, or espionage. Innovation and modernization brought this unknown
ingredient and bugs into the systems that could take training to counter intentional, or
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unintentional unauthorized access to sensitive, confidential, and personally identifiable
information (ABA, 2017; NIST, 2016; Ponemon, 2017).
One example of unintentional, or accidental leakage can be observed with medical
records, personally identifiable information, and health records). All unauthorized
disclosures must be reported to those affected by this type of breach. All personally
identifiable information and health records releases must be preauthorized by patients
only.
Round 3: Survey Question 6
Survey Question 6: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that discontent with the culture of the organization was a reason for insider
threats in organizations.
Eighty-eight percent of participating SMEs agreed, or strongly agreed
that discontent with the culture of the organization was a reason for insider threats in
organizations (see Table 17).
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Table 17
Survey Question 6—Consensus: Discontent with the Culture of the Organization
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

11.0

44.0

Agree

11.0

44.0

Neither agree nor disagree

3.0

12.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

In Round 3, the number of responses to Survey Question 6 showed an increase in
consensus from 15 to 21 SMEs. Discontent with the culture of an organization may be the
result of not understanding the organization’s leadership, culture, mission, and goals for
innovative changes, or simply a lack of communication from leader (Padilla et al., 2007).
One important factor in information security implementation was to gain employee buyin through awareness and training to create a security culture within the organization
(Mallery, 2009). D’Arcy et al. (2009) established the need for ongoing research on
security awareness and noticed that current research mostly covers the relationship
between behavioral intentions and security awareness, thus indicating the need for
researchers to examine the relationship between the former and the actual information
security-related behaviors and compliance with information security policies (The Impact
of Cybersecurity, 2018).
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Round 3: Survey Question 7
Survey Question 7: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that ideology, foreign influence are reasons for insider threats in organizations.
y

Seventy-two percent of participating SMEs agreed, or strongly agreed that
ideology and foreign influence are reasons for insider threats in organizations. This
finding was consistent with Round 2 findings (see Table 18).
Table 18
Survey Question 7—Consensus: Ideology, Foreign Influence
Answer choices

n

%

4.0

16.0

14.0

56.0

Neither agree nor disagree

4.0

16.0

Disagree

3.0

12.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly agree
Agree

y

The FBI Director, Christopher Wray described in 2017, that foreign influences are
activities that may include covert actions by foreign governments, or individuals trying to
influence the United States’ political and/or public sentiment; and that this association of
citizens around the world, was enabled by the anonymity that the Internet provides.
Through the years, foreign influence has taken many forms and used many tactics hoping
to reach Americans secretly from outside of the United States. Foreigner influences often
use false personas and fabricate stories on social media platforms to discredit U.S.
individuals and institutions (FBI, Wray, 2017). Organizational leaders should be aware of
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social media information to help their organization avoid becoming a target (Padilla et
al., 2007).
Round 3: Survey Question 8
Survey Question 8: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that lack of knowledge about insider threats was a reason for insider threats in
organizations.
Eighty percent of participating SMEs agreed that a lack of knowledge about
insider threats was a reason for allowing insider threats in organizations (See table 19).
Table 19
Survey Question 8—Consensus: Lack of Knowledge
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

4.0

16.0

Agree

14.0

56.0

Neither agree nor disagree

4.0

16.0

Disagree

3.0

12.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

A lack of knowledge about insider threats can be observed when new employees
join an organization and are not fully trained on identifying insider threat behaviors, thus
enabling voluntary, or involuntary unauthorized access to the organization. A lack of
knowledge about the risks of insider threats was exacerbated by the Internet of Things
(IoT) and social media that often can threaten assets. Organizational knowledge, security
and legal departments must secure ways of sharing knowledge across geographical
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boundaries. Employers can use the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education
(NICE) framework to train their employees on insider threat awareness through the
granting of industry certifications and academic credentials that provide employees with
greater opportunities in the workplace (NICE, 2020).
Round 3: Survey Question 9
Survey Question 9: Please rate to what extent you agree/strongly agree that lack
of background investigations and reference checking are a reason for insider threats in
organizations.
Eighty percent of participating SMEs agreed/strongly agreed that a lack of
background investigations and reference checking are reasons for insider threats in
organizations. This finding was consistent with Round 2 findings. Table 20 details SMEs’
responses to Survey Question 9.
Table 20
Survey Question 9—Consensus: Lack of Background Investigations and Reference Check
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

6.0

24.0

Agree

14.0

56.0

Neither agree nor disagree

3.0

12.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

A background investigation was a review of your life history that includes credit,
criminal, checks, and citizenship verification, including verification of family members
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depending on the organization. A background investigation includes (a) an interview with
the investigator, (b) a request for original documents such as birth certificates, diplomas,
employment, and (c) education and military history. Supervisors, neighbors, and family
may be interviewed to corroborate facts. A background investigation was generally
conducted by the Office of Personnel Management, or the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Office that is the largest federal law enforcement agency of the United States,
Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Custom and Border Protection, n.d.;
www.cbp.gov/faqs/what-does-background-investigation-involve). A reference check was
less intrusive than a background investigation; a reference check includes the verification
of the applicant’s past performance from employers, schools, colleges, and other sources
to assess of an applicant possesses the qualifications for the job (www.Opm.gov).
When organizations do not conduct a background investigation, or reference
check, they may engage in risky hiring and engage in extensive retention problem that
may include hiring inexperienced workers, undocumented employees, outlaws, or people
with a history of poor performance.
Round 3: Survey Question 10
Survey Question 10: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that a sense of entitlement was a reason for insider threats in organizations.
Sixty percent of participating SMEs agreed that a sense of entitlement was a
reason for insider threats in organizations. This finding achieved the minimum consensus
of 60%, an increase from the 50% consensus gathered in Round 2. Table 21 details
SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 10.
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Table 21
Survey Question 10—Consensus: Sense of Entitlement
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

3.0

12.0

Agree

12.0

48.0

Neither agree nor disagree

7.0

28.0

Disagree

3.0

12.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Individuals who believe to be deserving of recognition, or additional privileges
and praises could display a sense of entitlement according to Jonason et al. (2017). A
sense of entitlement was one of the personality traits closely aligned with Narcissism and
the dark triad theory and Narcissism has been identified as one of the traits exhibited by
insider threats in organizations, as agreed by SMEs in Survey Question 1. Jonason et al.
(2017) noted that these traits allow holders to portray a changeable approach to
interpersonal influence and create a sense of entitlement in individuals (Jonason et al.,
2017).
Round 3: Survey Question 11
Survey Question 11: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that resentment was a reason for insider threats in organizations.
Eighty-eight percent of participating SMEs agreed that resentment may be a
reason for insider threats in organizations. This finding was consistent with the Round 2
findings. Table 22 depicts SMEs’ consensus.
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Table 22
Survey Question 11—Consensus: Resentment
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

8.0

32.0

Agree

14.0

56.0

Neither agree nor disagree

3.0

12.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Round 3: Survey Question 12
Survey Question 12: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that social media was a reason for insider threats in organizations.
Survey Question 12 did not achieve the minimum 60% consensus required in this
study to indicate that social media was a reason for insider threats in organizations. Table
23 depicts SMEs’ number of responses to Survey Question 12.
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Table 23
Survey Question 12 Responses
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

3.0

12.0

Agree

1.0

44.0

Neither agree nor disagree

8.0

32.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

Fifty-six percent was only three answers short of 60%, or the minimum
requirement for discussion; thus, the role of social media should be researched further to
determine the impact of social media as an enabler of insider threats. Because social
media has created accessibility of innovative and emerging technologies, particularly
during the Covid-19 pandemic and the extensive telework in place
(IBM_Security_Work_From_Home_Study.pdf; Kirkwood & Price, 2013; Panetta, 2017).
Social media has proven to be a valuable tool in communications and has opened
the doors to academic learning, collaboration, increased business, and family
communications among individuals and organizations; however, social media has not
always safeguarded accessibility and file transferability; nor was it known how well it
keeps up with firewalls and security guidelines to protect personal identifiable
information. The extent that social media pervades government sites and causes
accessibility issues was one that was not well understood; however, it was apparent that
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third party accessibility and a lack of insider threats, or cybersecurity training can
increase data security risks (IBM/Ponemon, 2016, 2017; Sonnenberg, 2020).
Round 3: Survey Question 13
y

Survey Question 13: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that dislike of management, company culture, and coworkers are a reason for
insider threats in organizations.
Ninety-two percent of participating SMEs agreed that dislike of management,
coworkers, or company culture was a reason for insider threats in organizations. This
finding was inconsistent with previous findings in Round 2 where consensus only
achieved a total of 64%. Table 24 shows SMEs responses to Survey Question 13.
Table 24
Survey Question 13—Consensus: Dislike of Management, Coworkers, Culture
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

10.0

40.0

Agree

13.0

52.0

Neither agree nor disagree

2.0

8.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

An organization’s management and leadership can be contributing factors to
culture in the workplace, and how employees adapt, and perceive their environments
(Schein, 2017). Edgar Schein (2017), a renowned professor at the MIT Sloan School of
Management, argued that culture in organizations was not built in a single day, instead
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culture was formed in due course of time as employees go through various changes, solve
problems, and adopt to the internal (peers) and external (vendors, customers)
communications. Schein (2017) noted that the culture of an organization could become
the newly learned behavior for employees’ daily interactions in the workplace, thus
forming, or enforcing the culture of the organization. The new employees who fail to
comprehend the current organizational culture, or those who do not feel included may
develop a dislike for their peers, managers, and environment in general (Schein, 2017).
Organizations must engage in proactive leadership and employee engagements by
providing proper orientations and training to counter the effect of early negative
perceptions (Borkowski et al., 2011).
Edgar Schein (2017) described three levels in an organization’s culture. The first
level was artifacts; that was, the dress code of the employees, office furniture, facilities,
behavior of the employees, and the mission and vision of the organization. The second
level was values: the ethics, morals, beliefs, and principles of the decision-makers and
individuals working in the organization. The third level was assumed values that included
the inner aspects of upbringing and human nature, or what can be construed in current
times as political correctness rather than real beliefs (Schein, 2017).
Round 3: Survey Question 14
Survey Question 14: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that pushing boundaries was a motivator for insider threats in organizations.
Only 40% of SMEs viewed pushing boundaries as a motivator for insider threats
in organizations. Therefore, this category did not meet the 60% minimum consensus
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required for this study. This finding was consistent with Round 2. Table 25 depicts the
SMEs’ responses to Question 14.
Table 25
Survey Question 14: Pushing Boundaries
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

3.0

12.0

Agree

7.0

28.0

Neither agree nor disagree

8.0

32.0

Disagree

7.0

28.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Pushing boundaries can be viewed negatively as part of one’s personality trait, or
positively during an organizational change. In this study, pushing boundaries did not
achieve the minimum 60% consensus among SMEs as a motivator for insider threats in
organizations.
Round 3: Survey Question 15
Survey Question 15: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that financial gain/money was a motivator for insider threats in organizations.
Ninety-two percent of participating SMEs agreed that financial gain and money
was a motivator for insider threats in organizations. This finding was consistent with the
Round 2 findings. Table 26 details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 15.
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Table 26
Survey Question 15—Consensus: Financial Gain/Money
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

10.0

40.0

Agree

13.0

52.0

Neither agree nor disagree

2.0

8.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Financial gain has been identified in prior research on insider threats as both the
reason and the motivator for insider threats in organizations (IBM/Ponemon, 2016, 2017).
Money and financial gain have been a factor in one’s reason and motivation to grant
unauthorized access to systems, or data as previously discussed in Chapter 2 (The
Ponemon Institute, 2015, 2016). Financial gain through the unauthorized access of credit
card numbers and banking accounts has led to drug trafficking, kidnapping, and other
illegal activities in the form of identity theft (Skillings, 2020; Willison, 2009; Willison &
Warkentin, 2013).
Round 3: Survey Question 16
Survey Question 16: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that disregard for authority was a motivator for insider threats in organizations.
Sixty-eight percent of participating SMEs agreed that disregard for authority was
a motivator for insider threats in organizations. This finding was consistent with the
Round 2 findings. Table 27 details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 16.
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Table 27
Survey Question 16—Consensus: Disregard for Authority
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

6.0

24.0

Agree

11.0

44.0

Neither agree nor disagree

6.0

24.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

The disregard for authority behavioral trait has been linked to evidence of
behaviors observed in insider threats and the dark triad traits as previously indicated in
this study. Offenders have been people with problems with the law, parents, managers, or
anyone in a position of authority (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016). Disregard for authority was
a factor that Abdallah and Gheyas (2016) introduced as a predisposition to malicious
behaviors that seemed to indicate that wrongdoers were inclined to disobey laws and
regulations, and even have delinquent behaviors (Abdallah & Gheyas 2016).
This finding ties into the conceptual framework of the dark triad for behaviors
observed in insider threats in organizations (Abdallah & Gheyas, 2016; Dang-Pham,
2014).
Round 3: Survey Question 17
Survey Question 17: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that revenge/retribution was a motivator for insider threats in organizations.
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Ninety-six percent of participating SMEs agreed that revenge and retribution
(retaliation) were reasons and motivators for insider threats in organizations. This finding
was consistent with the Round 2 findings. Table 28 depicts the findings for Question 17.
Table 28
Survey Question 17—Consensus: Revenge/Retribution
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

11.0

44.0

Agree

13.0

52.0

Neither agree nor disagree

1.0

4.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

Revenge resulting from perceived, or factual victimization involves adverse workrelated actions that purposely have a negative impact on the target’s job performance and
are intended by the instigator or perceived by the target to be a reprisal for the target’s
behavior (Cortina & Magley, 2003; Ghazzawi, 2010). Employees who seek revenge may
resort to retaliation if they perceive unfairness on the part of management, or if they
perceived unfair treatment (Yoshimura, 2007). Acts of retaliation in the workplace can be
work-related, or socially related retribution (Cortina & Magley, 2003). Actions that affect
one’s work outcomes can be concrete and addressed by senior management. Outcomes
resulting from revenge activities may lead to demotions, poor performance, and
terminations depending on the severity of the acts (Yoshimura, 2007).
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Round 3: Survey Question 18
Survey Question 18. Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that hackers wanting to sell information was a motivator for insider threats in
organizations.
Eighty-eight percent SMEs agreed that hackers wanting to sell information was a
motivator for insider threats in organizations. This finding confirms consensus in Round
2. Table 29 depicts the answers to Question 18.
Table 29
Survey Question 18—Consensus: Hackers
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

6.0

24.0

Agree

16.0

64.0

Neither agree nor disagree

1.0

4.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

The name hacker was often reference with there was a network breach, or data
loss in organizations. The definition of a hacker has ranged from that of a caring to a
vindictive actor. The term hacker was first coined in the 1960s to describe highly skilled
computer programmers. In the 1990s, the term changed to describe anyone using their
computer skills to break into computers (Skillings, 2020). Hackers’ four main motives for
breaking into computers and networks have been identified as follows:
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•

financial gain (credit card numbers and banking accounts access leading to
identity theft)

•

showing off to others what they can do, or increasing their reputation among
hackers

•

intellectual property through corporate espionage and the theft of trade secrets

•

state-sponsored attacks that provide nation states with both wartime and
intelligence collection options (Ponemon, 2017; Skillings, 2020).

Round 3: Survey Question 19
Survey Question 19. Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that bad intentions, emotional, financial, or political reasons are motivators for
insider threats in organizations.
Eighty-eight percent of participating SMEs agreed that bad intentions, emotional,
financial, or political reasons are motivators for insider threats in organizations. This
finding was consistent with the findings in Round 2 (see Table 30).
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Table 30
Survey Question 19—Consensus: Bad Intentions, Emotional, Financial, and Political
Reasons
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

6.0

24.0

Agree

16.0

64.0

Neither agree nor disagree

1.0

4.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

The consensus in Survey Question 19 has overlapping, or overarching effects into
other areas of this Delphi Study, but ultimately represents an overwhelming agreement
ranging from 84% in Round 2 to 92% in Round 3, for bad intentions, emotional,
financial, or political reasons as motivators of insider threats in organizations. These
motivators may fall within Baughman’s dimensions that describe socially malicious
behaviors. Baughman et al. (2014) stated that traits and dimensions were applicable to
socially malicious behaviors. Traits such as bad intentions, emotional, financial, and
political associations have been associated with socially malicious behaviors in the dark
triad theory, to include emotional coldness, duplicity, self-promotion, and aggressiveness
(Baughman et al., 2012; Baughman et al., 2014; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). These traits
may also be aligned to a low conscientiousness attitude, a sense of entitlement,
superiority, privilege, lack of remorse, lack of empathy, and a tendency to exploit others
(Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
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Round 3: Survey Question 20
Survey Question 20: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that entry level employees wanting to access social networks are motivators for
insider threats in organizations.
Survey Question 20 only achieved a 28% response and did not meet the minimum
consensus requirement of 60% needed for providing solutions to this study. This finding
was consistent with the finding in Round 2 (see Table 31).
Table 31
Survey Question 20 Responses
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

5.0

20.0

Agree

2.0

8.0

Neither agree nor disagree

10.0

40.0

Disagree

7.0

28.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

Although Survey Question 20 did not achieve the minimum 60% consensus as it
relates to entry-level employees wanting to access social networks, the topic of social
media was extensively covered under Survey Question 12 due to the importance that
social media in social networks has in the community. Social media has been used in
politics, important announcements, recruiting, and social interaction. Boss et al. (2009)
argued that organizations that do not account for people as a part of information systems
active players are bound to pay the price for not realizing that people—as the weakest

153
link in the organization—could have to be included in the planning, risks, and execution
phases of innovative technologies to be successful, including the organization’s
mandatory security training (Boss et al., 2009; NICE, 2017).
Round 3: Survey Question 21
Survey Question 21: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that limited access controls are a main security strategy and early intervention to
prevent insider threats in organizations.
Ninety-two percent of participating SMEs agreed that having limited access
controls was a main security strategy and early intervention to prevent insider threats in
organizations. This finding was consistent with the findings in Round 2. Table 32 depicts
the how consensus was achieved in Question 21.
Table 32
Survey Question 21—Consensus: Limited Access Controls
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

10.0

40.0

Agree

13.0

52.0

Neither agree nor disagree

1.0

4.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

The importance of having limited access controls was reaffirmed with the
responses to Survey Question 31, whereas 88% of the SMEs agreed that having a
controlled access policy was a main procedure to manage insider threats access to the
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organization and 92% agreed to this measure in Round 3. The National Institute of
Standards (NIST) 800-100, NIST 800-12 Technical Access Control AC-2 recommends
having an access control policy as a for developing an information security program for
the organization (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). An organizational risk management strategy was
a key factor in the development of the access control policy (NIST 800-100; NIST 80012. Related control: PM-9. Access controls require authentication to verify the identity of
the user trying to access a resource, or a control process. A system administrator was
generally the authority that can grant access within an application domain (e.g.,
custodian). Policies determine how authorizations could be granted based on the principle
of least privilege. In other words, an organization limits its risks and insider threats’
opportunities to disclose information by providing users with the minimum access the job
requires (NIST, 2018).
Round 3: Survey Question 22
Survey Question 22: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that updating software regularly (virus protection) was a main security strategy
and early intervention to prevent insider threats in organizations.
Eighty-eight percent of participating SMEs (88%) agreed that updating software
regularly (virus protection) was a main security strategy and early intervention to prevent
insider threats in organizations. This finding was consistent with findings in Round 2.
Table 33 depicts the SMEs responses to Question 22.
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Table 33
Survey Question 22—Consensus: Updating Software Regularly/Virus Protection
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

14.0

56.0

Agree

8.0

32.0

Neither agree nor disagree

1.0

4.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

Updating software and virus protection are two recommendations SMEs have
offered in this study to prevent data breaches and software vulnerabilities. A software
vulnerability was a security hole, or weakness found in a software program, or operating
system due to a lack of virus protection (NIST, 2018). Cyber and physical threats are real
and can expose sensitive information and lead to identity theft; thus, updating software
was key to avoid compromises. People, or companies that fail to update software expose
personal information and their clients’ information to criminals, simply by leaving
loopholes and failing to do software updates. An antivirus software provides protection
against the following types of malicious software:
•

Computer viruses: A computer virus was a type of computer program that,
when executed, replicates itself by modifying other computer programs and
inserting its own code. When this replication succeeds, the affected areas are
then said to be infected with a computer virus (NIST, 2018).
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•

Spyware: Spyware was a type of malware that gathers information about a
person, or an organization without their knowledge and sends such
information to hack another entity without the user's permission, or awareness
(NIST, 2018).

•

Rootkits: A rootkit was a collection of computer software that was typically
malicious and designed to gain unauthorized access to a computer, or an area
of its software. A Rootmask often masks its existence, or the existence of
other software (Dang-Pham, 2014).

•

Trojan horses: A Trojan horse, or Trojan, was any malware program that
misleads users with the goal of breaching the security of a computer system.
The term was used to depict deception and was derived from the Ancient
Greek story of the deceptive Trojan Horse that led to the fall of the city of
Troy (Chondros, 2015; Azizli et al., 2016). Norton (2016), among others,
created a series of software protection security solutions aimed to protect their
customers.

Round 3: Survey Question 23
Survey Question 23: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that shielding sensitive information from all employees and separation of duties
(SoD) are main security strategies and early interventions to prevent insider threats in
organizations.
Eighty-four percent of participating SMEs agreed that shielding sensitive
information from all employees, and separation of duties (SoD) are main security
strategies and early interventions to prevent insider threats in organizations. This finding
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was consistent with the findings in Round 2. Table 34 depicts SMEs consensus on
Question 23.
Table 34
Survey Question 23—Consensus: Shielding Sensitive Information/Separation of Duties
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

14.0

56.0

Agree

7.0

28.0

Neither agree nor disagree

3.0

12.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

Shielding information and separation of duties are two strong components of
network and systems security. This answer presents two categories that align with the
National Institute of Standards and Technology ([NIST], 2016) security concept of the
least privileged and zero trust, a process for granting permissions and access to network
assets of the organization at the most essential level. The least privileged access means
that employees have the minimum access, or the access required to perform their duties
(Herold, 2010; NIST, 2016).
Shielding sensitive information from all employees aligns with the government’s
Privacy Act (1974). The Privacy Act (1974) applies to the records keeping practices on
records of every U.S. citizen, or lawfully admitted resident of the United States and
applies to the records held by any agency, or organization (Privacy Act, 1974, United
States Code, Chapter 5, Sections 552a, and amendments).
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The goal of the Zero-Trust architecture was to protect all resources in addition to
network segments. This new architecture aims to provide network security in response to
the new trends arising from remote users and off-boundaries, cloud-based technologies
(NIST, 2018). The Zero Trust strategies are already a part of the government’s
cybersecurity policies and programs guided by the NIST Risk Management Framework,
including the execution of a gap analysis to identify loopholes in security (Spear et al.,
2018).
Separation of duties (SoD) also known as segregation of duties—has its roots in
the financial accounting systems, whereas a funds requestor, or receiver cannot be the
approver. IT departments share SoD requirements due to the increased number of IT
audits and the repercussions arising from a lack of transparency in IT spending under the
Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA; NIST, 2016).
FITARA was responsible for the ways the U.S. federal government buys and manages
computer technology (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 Title
VIII, Subtitle D, H.R. 3979).
NIST recommends internal controls to prevent intentional, or unintentional errors,
fraud, and theft. Internal controls facilitate control over employees having too much
control, or influence over business assets and data (NIST, 2018).
Round 3: Survey Question 24
Survey Question 24: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that cybersecurity training was the main security strategy and early intervention
to prevent insider threats in organizations.
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Eighty percent of participating SMEs agreed that cyber security training was a
main security strategy and early intervention to prevent insider threats in organizations.
This finding was consistent with the finding in Round 2. Table 35 depicts SMEs
responses to Question 24.
Table 35
Survey Question 24—Consensus: Security Training
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

9.0

36.0

Agree

11.0

44.0

Neither agree nor disagree

4.0

16.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS; 2019), pointed out that, as a part of
the preparation of the cybersecurity workforce of tomorrow, training was essential. DHS
was committed to providing the nation with access to cybersecurity training and a secure
workforce development effort to create a more resilient and capable cyber nation (Gelles
et al., 2012). Additional information on cyber security training can be obtained by
accessing the NIST/NICE Communities of Practice (NIST/NICE, 2019).
Round 3: Survey Question 25
Survey Question 25: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that a change management policy was main security strategy and early
intervention to prevent insider threats in organizations.
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Sixty percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy for change
management was a main security strategy and early intervention to prevent insider threats
in organizations. This finding was consistent with the finding in Round 2. Table 36
details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 25.
Table 36
Survey Question 25—Consensus: Policy for Change Management
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

5.0

20.0

Agree

10.0

40.0

Neither agree nor disagree

9.0

36.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

A change management policy for Information Technology has been used by
organizational leaders and IT managers to control IT changes, upgrades, purchases and
unauthorized changes to processes and network systems throughout their lifecycle. A
change management policy may also be used to administer administrative and operational
changes that could shed clarity during organizational change and to counter change
resistance. In 1996, Kotter developed an eight-step change model for implementing
organizational change across many industries. presented an important framework, or
model for understanding how employees perceive changes. Kotter’s 8 Step Change
Model presents great alternatives for leading change.
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In mature organizations, a change management policy alleviates the burden of
acceptability because the policy was managed by a change advisory board and senior
management. Change management policies are designed to manage upgrades, new IT
purchases for modernization, and to handle emergency and scheduled changes. Change
management policies minimize impact to organizations while monitoring risks and
conflicts during innovative technologies and IT disruptions (Panetta, 2017).
Round 3: Survey Question 26
Survey Question 26: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that audits and network scanning are main security strategy and early
intervention to prevent insider threats in organizations.
Ninety-two percent of participating SMEs agreed that audits and network scans
are a main security strategy and early intervention to prevent insider threats in
organizations. This finding was consistent with the finding of Round 2. Table 37 depicts
SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 26.
Table 37
Survey Question 26
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

13.0

52.0

Agree

10.0

40.0

Neither agree nor disagree

1.0

4.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0
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The function of an audit was to uncover risks and threats that could jeopardize
performance in an organization (NIST, 2019). Audits support business objectives by
providing an opportunity for risk identification, classification, and mitigation according
to the organization’s risk tolerance. Risks can be managed through the development and
implementation of policies, procedures, and security measures to decrease vulnerabilities
and intrusions (FISMA, NIST, ISO 27001 Compliance Assessments). Early interventions
are those risk management techniques put into place from the beginning of a project,
business, or activity.
Network scanning can detect network intrusion attempts to every possible
destination in a network, or a port on a given location. Early detection by such scans can
help identify more dangerous threats to a network (Muelder et al., 2005). Several
methods of scan detection exist, but these may only be familiar to a savvy attacker. The
effectiveness of network scanning depends on the thresholds that an attacker could
possibly avoid crossing (Muelder et al., 2005).
Round 3: Survey Question 27
Survey Question 27: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that a buddy system was main security strategy and early intervention to prevent
insider threats in organizations.
Only 41% of SMEs agreed that a buddy system was a main security strategy and
early intervention to prevent insider threats in organization. The responses to Survey
Question 27 did not achieve the minimum 60% required in this study to provide
consensus or add real-time value to the study. Table 38 depicts survey answers.
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Table 38
Survey Question 27 Responses
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

3.0

12.0

Agree

7.0

29.0

Neither agree nor disagree

11.0

45.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

A buddy system in organizations may facilitate team performance and enhance
communications by reducing professional isolation, augmenting the effectiveness of
training, encouraging a shared approach to problem solving, and by providing a proxy for
supervision and self-direction (Brown & Gilbert, 2014).
Round 3: Survey Question 28
Survey Question 28: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that security logs are a main security strategy and early interventions to prevent
insider threats in organizations.
Seventy-six percent of participating SMEs agreed that security logs are a main
security strategy and early intervention to prevent insider threats in organizations. This
finding was consistent with the finding in Round 2. Table 39 details SMEs’ responses to
Survey Question 28.
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Table 39
Survey Question 28—Consensus: Security Logs
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

7.0

28.0

Agree

12.0

48.0

Neither agree nor disagree

4.0

16.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

System security logs can help trace abnormal activities identified as attacks to the
data, unauthorized logs on operating systems, faulty applications, new routers,
malfunctioning firewalls, and infrastructure that create their own logs. This activity can
be observed with the increased use of mobile devices and Internet-of-Things (IoT) creates
a staggering number of activities that generate event logs. Once an event log information
was received by the IT specialist, the data are analyzed and used for security incidents
and to create profiles of normal network and user activities (Kuman & Morarjee, 2014).
This baseline log information can help security professionals identify suspicious activity
that falls outside of expected norms (Panetta, 2017).
Round 3: Survey Question 29
Survey Question 29: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that download protection policy was a main policy and procedure to manage
insider threats’ access in organizations.
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Ninety-six percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a download
protection policy was a main procedure to manage insider threats’ access in
organizations. Table 40 depicts the results for Survey Question 29.
Table 40
Survey Question 29—Consensus: Download Protection Policy
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

8.0

32.0

Agree

16.0

64.0

Neither agree nor disagree

1.0

4.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

The response to Survey Question 29 showed consistent consensus with findings in
Round 2. Having a download protection policy may be for some organizations a part of
their IT Policy, or vendor management policy. The protection policy was closely aligned
with the purchase of firewalls and other computer security tools and software.
Round 3: Survey Question 30
Survey Question 30: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that limiting third party usage/social networks was a main policy and procedure
to manage insider threats’ access in organizations.
Seventy-six percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy limiting
third party usage and social networks access was a main procedure to manage insider
threats’ access in organizations. This finding was consistent with Survey Question 4
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answers regarding social networks access and Survey Question 35 regarding least
privileged access presented in Round 2. Table 41 details SMEs’ responses to Survey
Question 30.
Table 41
Survey Question 30—Consensus: Limiting Third Party Usage/Social Networks Access
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

7.0

28.0

Agree

12.0

48.0

Neither agree nor disagree

5.0

20.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

Limiting third party access and preventing employee access to social networks,
for improved performance and for security reasons, are common practices in many
organizations, but especially among federal agencies. Preventing downloads and popup
boxes that may carry viruses, are best industry practices to control unauthorized changes
to networks and systems. Adhering to the principle of least privilege creates a protected,
and traceable environment by clearly defining high-level functions, and actively
controlling user access (Frank, 2011).
Round 3: Survey Question 31
Survey Question 31: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having a controlled access/physical security was a main policy and
procedure to manage insider threats’ access in organizations.
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Eighty-eight percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy for
controlled access and physical security was a main procedure to manage insider threats’
access in organizations. This finding was consistent with the findings in Round 2. Table
42 depicts SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 31.
Table 42
Survey Question 31—Consensus: Controlled Access/Physical Security
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

1.0

44.0

Agree

11.0

44.0

Neither agree nor disagree

2.0

8.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

A controlled access policy was a part of physical security and information
security policies for selective and secure access, consumption, and entering, or using
information assets. Such permission to access a resource was called authorization
(Borgatti et al., 2013). After the 9-11 attacks in New York, Pennsylvania and
Washington, DC, organizations have imposed the requirement for individuals to selfidentify upon entry/exit of buildings and to carry a badge, or identification document
(ID).
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Round 3: Survey Question 32
Survey Question 32: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that a Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) was a main policy and procedure
to manage insider threats’ access in organizations.
Sixty-eight percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy for
preparing standard operating procedures (SOPs) was a main procedure to manage insider
threats’ access in organizations. This was consistent with the finding in Round 2. Table
43 details SMEs responses to Survey Question 32.
Table 43
Survey Question 32—Consensus: Standard Operating Procedures
Answer Choices

n

%

Strongly agree

4.0

16.0

Agree

13.0

52.0

Neither agree nor disagree

6.0

24.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

An SOP was designed to describe an organization’s activities and operations
needed for conducting business. An SOP was used to depict activities that align with an
organization’s business needs (Taylor, 2012).
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Round 3: Survey Question 33
Survey Question 33: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that background screening at hiring was a main policy and procedure to manage
insider threats’ access in organizations.
Eighty-four percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy for
background screenings at hiring was a main policy and procedure to manage insider
threats access’ in organizations. Table 44 depicts SMEs’ responses to Survey Question
33.
Table 44
Survey Question 33—Consensus: Background Screening at Hiring
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

7.0

28.0

Agree

14.0

56.0

Neither agree nor disagree

3.0

12.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

A background screening was an investigation of a prospective candidate, or a
review of employee’s information provided in an application for employment, or when
undergoing a security clearance. In this process, the company, or agency verifies that the
person was who they claim to be by validating education, employment history, and other
activities from their past, such as criminal records. Different methods can be used to
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conduct a background screening at hiring depending on the position and location of the
job. Credit organizations conduct similar background screenings (Bauman, 2017).
Round 3: Survey Question 34
Survey Question 34: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having a risk management plan a main policy and procedure to manage
insider threats access’ in organizations.
Seventy-two percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy for a risk
management plan was a main procedure to manage insider threats’ access in
organizations. This finding was consistent with the findings in Round 2. Table 45 details
SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 34.
Table 45
Survey Question 34—Consensus: Risk Management Plan
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

8.0

32.0

Agree

10.0

40.0

Neither agree nor disagree

5.0

20.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

A risk management plan was a document that addresses how risks could be
identified, categorized, and managed. The risk management plan also details what levels
of risk (high, medium, and low) and risk responses are acceptable to the organization
(NIST, 2019). The risk management process was conducted through a rigorous risk
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assessment, sometimes using a risk matrix, or a checklist. Risk management plans should
be periodically reviewed by the project team to avoid having the analysis become stale
(PMI, 2015).
Round 3: Survey Question 35
Survey Question 35: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having a standard operating procedure (SoD), enforcement of least
privileged access and training oversight are a main policy and procedure to manage
insider threats’ access in organizations.
Ninety-two percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy on standard
operating procedures, enforcement of the least privileged, and access and training
oversight are a main procedure to manage insider threats’ access in organizations. This
finding aligns with the Round 2 consensus. Table 46 details SMEs’ responses to Survey
Question 35.
Table 46
Survey Question 35—Consensus: Standard Operating Procedures, Enforcement of the
Least Privileged, Access, and Training
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

9.0

36.0

Agree

14.0

56.0

Neither agree nor disagree

0.0

0.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0
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Survey Question 35 was one of the few questions in Round 3 that carried out
multiple answers to a specific open-ended question during Round 1. The level of
consensus that sustained such answers was consistently maintained through Rounds 2 and
3. Survey Question 35 aligns with responses in Round 2, Question 23 regarding SoD as a
main security strategy and early intervention to prevent insider threats in organizations.
Round 3: Survey Question 36
Survey Question 36: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having a conflict resolution plan was a main policy and procedure to
manage insider threats’ access in organizations.
Seventy-six percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy for conflict
resolution was a main procedure for regulating insider threats’ access in organizations.
This finding was consistent with the finding in Round 2. Table 47 details SMEs’
responses to Survey Question 36.
Table 47
Survey Question 36—Consensus: Conflict Resolution
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

6.0

24.0

Agree

13.0

52.0

Neither agree nor disagree

5.0

20.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0
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Conflict resolutions aims to decrease conflict. Conflict arises from disagreement
and day-to-day situations. Wallensteen (2018) defined conflict resolution as the
agreement between two parties in conflicting positions to solve their disagreements and
central incompatibilities, accept each other’s existence, and cease all negative actions
against each other (Wallensteen, 2018). An organization’s best gathering of such
agreements was through a conflict resolution plan (Wallensteen, 2018; Jerko et al., 2019).
Round 3: Survey Question 37
Survey Question 37: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having a polygraph policy was a main policy and procedure to manage
insider threats’ access in organizations.
Only 36% of participating SMEs agreed that having a polygraph policy was a
main policy and procedure to manage insider threats’ access in organizations. Thus, this
consensus did not meet the minimum 60% majority responses for solutions to manage
insider threats in organizations. Table 48 details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question
#37.
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Table 48
Survey Question 37 Responses
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

3.0

12.0

Agree

6.0

24.0

Neither agree nor disagree

9.0

36.0

Disagree

3.0

12.0

Strongly disagree

4.0

16.0

The results of this Delphi study reaffirmed the polygraphs’ lack of popularity
among prospective employees. A polygraph was also called a lie detector test. This
device measures physiological indicators such as blood pressure, pulse, respiration, and
skin conductivity while a person was asked to answer a series of questions (Bell &
Grubin, 2010). One example for the polygraph’s lack of trust and popularity can be
attributed to examples such as that of spy Aldridge Ames, who betrayed his country by
providing classified information to a foreign nation for many years, and yet, he was able
to provide the right answers to the polygraph administrator, who cleared him because his
answers were perceived as truthful enough during his first polygraph. After administering
a second polygraph, Mr. Ames was cleared of any illegal activity. He spied for Russia
from 1985 until the day of his arrest in February 1994 (FBI, 2016a).
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Round 3: Survey Question 38
Survey Question 38: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having an NDA was a main policy and procedure to manage insider threats’
access in organizations.
Only 52% of SMEs agreed that having a policy on nondisclosure agreements, or
confidentiality agreement was a main procedure to manage insider threats’ access in
organizations. This percentage was lower than needed for consensus. Table 49 details
SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 38.
Table 49
Survey Question 38 Responses
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

3.0

12.0

Agree

10.0

40.0

Neither agree nor disagree

6.0

24.0

Disagree

4.0

16.0

Strongly disagree

2.0

8.0
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Many government agencies and scientific organizations rely on Non-Disclosure
Agreements (NDAs) to ensure that their intelligence secrets, patents, and trademarks are
protected from disclosure to the enemy, or competition. An NDA was a binding
confidential agreement that one party agrees to keep secret information (such as trade
secrets to competitors) from being released to a third party (Radack, 1994).
Round 3: Survey Question 39
Survey Question 39: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having a conflict resolution plan was a main policy and procedure to
manage insider threats’ access in organizations.
Sixty-four percent of SMEs agreed that having a conflict resolution plan was a
main policy and procedure to manage insider threats’ access in organizations. Table 50
details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 39.
Table 50
Survey Question 39—Consensus: Conflict Resolution Plan
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

5.0

20.0

Agree

11.0

44.0

Neither agree nor disagree

7.0

28.0

Disagree

2.0

8.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0
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Conflict arises whenever a change occurs, or something different from the norm
appears to create an unbalance. Having a policy becomes instrumental to organizations
needing to set a standard for maintain a fair working environment, thus diminishing the
perception of preferential treatment. Because conflict resolution may be the result of
misunderstandings and plain disagreements between coworkers, or between supervisors
and subordinates, service providers, contractors, subcontractors, and clients, a well
though policy seems to be the only reliable guidance.
The Harvard University (2014) defined Conflict Resolution as “the informal, or
formal process that two, or more parties use to find a peaceful solution to their dispute”
Conflict resolution may be parallel to the severity of the conflict and how it was resolved.
Three components of conflict resolution are (a) cognitive resolution, or how partiers
understand the conflict based on their beliefs; (b) emotional resolution, or how the parties
could feel about a conflict, and (c) behavioral resolution, or how the parties act about a
conflict (Mayer, 2012).
Round 3: Survey Question 40
Survey Question 40: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having an internal referral policy was a main policy and procedure to
manage insider threats’ access in organizations.
Only 52% of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy on internal referrals
was a main procedure to manage insider threats access’ in organizations. The number of
responses did not meet the 60% minimum standard to be included as a solution in this
Delphi study. Table 51 details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 40.
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Table 51
Survey Question 40: Responses
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

3.0

12.0

Agree

10.0

40.0

Neither agree nor disagree

10.0

40.0

Disagree

1.0

4.0

Strongly disagree

1.0

4.0

An internal referral policy establishes ways that an organization can capitalize on
employee referrals by providing a referral fee and customizing training. An internal
referral program was structured to help find reliable personnel resources because referrals
could be known by existing employees who could receive a monetary incentive, and with
whom the organization could be familiar (Irving & Montes, 2010).
Round 3: Survey Question 41
Survey Question 41: Please rate to what extent you strongly agree/strongly
disagree that having a physical security plan, system security plan, and a change control
plan was a main policy and procedure to manage insider threats’ access in organizations.
Eighty-eight percent of participating SMEs agreed that having a policy to develop
physical security plans, security plans and change control plans was a main procedure to
manage insider threats’ access in organizations. This finding was consistent with the
finding in Round 2. Table 52 details SMEs’ responses to Survey Question 41.
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Table 52
Survey Question 41—Consensus: Physical Security Plans, Security Plans, and Change
Control Plans
Answer choices

n

%

Strongly agree

8.0

32.0

Agree

14.0

56.0

Neither agree nor disagree

3.0

12.0

Disagree

0.0

0.0

Strongly disagree

0.0

0.0

A physical security plan was a plan that describes how to secure buildings, data
networks, environmental controls, and security technology (Sennewald & Baillie, 2016).
A system security plan was a detailed narrative of a security control implementation,
system components, and inventories. A system security plan provides a systematic
method for protecting computers from unauthorized users, viruses, and system
authorization boundaries (General Services Administration, FedRAMP). A change
control plan documents the processes for ensuring that changes are introduced in a
controlled and coordinated manner while minimizing risks and tracing approvals
(Marshak, 2005).
Round 3: Survey Question 42
Survey Question 42: Please list any additional information that you think could
enhance the previously stated categories.
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No additional feedback was provided, or answers were submitted during
Round 3 completion. All 25 SMEs completed the survey in its entirety within the
expected time.
Final Consensus
The overarching research question pertained to the reasons for insider threats.
According to the final consensus of the SMEs, the most common reasons for insider
threats in organizations were (a) insufficient guidelines and training; (b) a lack of
background investigations; and (c) financial gain and money. The first sub-question
pertained to motivators for insider threats. The final consensus on the most common
motivators for insider threats in organizations was (a) pushing boundaries; (b) financial
gain; (c) hackers wanting to sell your information/ ransomware; (d) money; (e) personal
gain; (f) revenge and/or ideology; (g) entry-level employees wanting to do social
networking at work; (h) disregard for authority; (i) retribution; (j) dislike of management;
(k) bad intentions, emotional, financial, or politically based motivators driving the intent;
and (l) foreign influences. The second sub-question pertained to security strategies and
early interventions. The final consensus on the most common security strategies and early
interventions for insider threats in organizations was: (a) audits and network scannings;
(b) separation of duties and training; (c) implementing multiple factor authentication to
reduce data breaches; (d) ID cards, dual sign in, and multi-factor identification; (e) need
to know access; and (f) security logs and cybersecurity training. The third sub-question
pertained to policies and procedures for managing insider threats. The final consensus on
the most common policies and procedures to manage insider threats in organizations was:
(a) separation of duties, enforcement of the least privileged access; (b) regular monitoring
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and access controls implementation; (c) logs and need-to-know policy; (d) apply log
analysis as a part of your standard operating procedures; (e) limit third party access and
social networks; and (e) include download virus protection in your policy.
Summary and Transition
In Chapter 4, I described the study findings and the ramifications of each response
and provided supporting literature references to expand on SMEs answers. These findings
and discussions of the impact of insider threats in organizations and what SMEs
described as reasons, motivators, security strategies and early interventions are
considered real-time industry practices. In Chapter 4, tabulated results, and associated
explanations for achieving a 60% consensus were presented. This chapter includes the
findings that SMEs described as real-time best security practices when handling insider
threats in organizations. In Chapter 5, I discuss conclusions and interpretations of the
study findings, where they converge with, or diverge from the body of literature,
limitations, recommendations for future research, and the contribution of this research on
social changes.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
This chapter includes a summary of the findings from this study on insider threats
and data security management strategies, the overall research objectives, implications for
research, industry best practices, limitations of the study, and recommendations for future
research. In Chapter 4, I described the study findings and the ramifications of each
response and provided supporting literature to explain the SMEs’ answers. These findings
and discussions of the impact of insider threats in organizations and what SMEs
described as reasons, motivators, security strategies, early interventions, policies, and
procedures are considered real-time best industry practices for this study.
Specifically, this study focused on these reasons, motivators, strategies, policies,
and procedures for insider threat identification, prevention, and data security management
to lead IT practitioners and new managers towards sustainability and secure working
environments (Castellion & Markham, 2013; Stalla-Bourdillon, 2014; Talke & Snelders,
2013). This Delphi study included a purposeful sample of 25 IT SMEs’ opinions in the
Washington metropolitan area. The nature of the Delphi study facilitated the privacy of
the SMEs, who were able to openly provide answers and offer feedback on the use of
security and other aspects of risk management. In this study, I aimed to include a crosssectional discussion of best industry practices and provide new knowledge about
strategies for privacy and security to protect data and detail how SMEs manage insider
threats from a global perspective, rather than from an individualized organizational
perspective.
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Interpretation of Findings
The results of this research on reasons for insider threats in private and public
organizations are consistent with the peer-reviewed literature review. The results are also
consistent with other best industry practices established by the NIST and NICE as
common best practices for insider threat and risk management in general. The findings of
this study align with previous research findings and other security practices issued by the
NIST and NICE as recommended practices for insider threat management and data
security administration, enabling opportunities to develop tailored security programs and
employees’ skill levels relevant to asset protection depending on each organization’s risk
baseline.
Reasons for Insider Threats
The SMEs agreed that the following were among the most common reasons for
insider threats in organizations: (a) insufficient guidelines and training, (b) a lack of
background investigations, and (c) financial gain and money (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006;
Maasberg, 2015; Ponemon, 2020). Overall, training took a predominant place in all areas
of the three study rounds. These real-time findings confirmed the need for organizations
to increase the stature of training on their priority list (Anderson, 2006; NICE, 2016;
Society for Human Resource Management [SHRM], 2020). Training is frequently
reduced or canceled during budget cuts due to a lack of an adequate return on investment
metric; however, training benefits new employees and employees with tenure who can
acquire new skills, sharpen outdated ones, and adjust to the ever-changing world of
innovative technologies presenting a long-term benefit to individuals and organizations
(NICE,2016; SHRM,2020). Background investigations are a necessity for organizations
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doing business with the federal government, and after September 11, 2001, the private
sector began tightening recruiting practices and onboarding to ensure transparency in the
hiring process (NIST, 2016; OPM, 2020). Financial gain and money are self-explanatory,
as they represent not only a reason, but also a motivator for insider threats in public and
private organizations.
Motivators for Insider Threats
The SMEs agreed that the following were among the most common motivators for
insider threats in organizations: (a) pushing boundaries; (b) financial gain; (c) hackers
wanting to sell your information/ransomware; (d) money; (e) personal gain; (f) revenge
and/or ideology; (g) entry-level employees wanting to do social networking at work; (h)
disregard for authority; (i) retribution; (j) dislike of management; (k) bad intentions,
emotional, financial, or politically based motivators driving intent; and (l) foreign
influences (Maasberg et al., 2016).
Pushing boundaries can be viewed negatively as part of an individual’s
personality traits, or positively during an organizational change given an individual’s
aptitude to adjust and excel during the change process (Gheyas & Abdallah, 2016; Jouini,
2009; Zhao, 2016). The rest of the categories in this response group align with previous
literature, research, and surveys, such as those of the Ponemon Institute (2017, 2018,
2019). However, in the interest of transparency of findings, they are presented without
changes. The results of this study on motivators for insider threats in private and public
organizations are consistent with the literature review and other best industry practices
established by the NIST and NICE as common best practices for insider threats and risk
management in general (NICE, 2016; NIST, 2016).
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Security Strategies and Early Interventions
The SMEs agreed that the following were among the most common security
strategies and early interventions for insider threats in organizations: (a) audits and
network scannings; (b) separation of duties and training; (c) implementing multiple factor
authentication to reduce data breaches; (d) ID cards, dual sign in, and multifactor
identification; (e) need-to-know access; and (f) security logs and cybersecurity training.
In this category, several answers could have been grouped, as they are ultimately
closely related, or applied to the same family tree. For example, separation of duties was
related to need to know, as individuals are only given access to what they need to know
to do their jobs. Implementing multifactor authentication and dual sign in were in the
same control tree, but in the interest of transparency of findings and the number of
responses, these remained as stand-alone answers (Arping & Sautner, 2012). The results
of this study on security strategies and early interventions for insider threat prevention in
private and public organizations and data security management are consistent with the
literature review and other best industry practices established by the NIST, the NICE, and
survey findings conducted by IBM and the Ponemon Institute (2017-2020) as common
best practices for insider threats and data security management in general (NIST, 2016;
NIST, 2016).
The relationship between access to information systems and human behavior is
undeniable. This means that users need to be authenticated and authorized to access
networks, data in any form, and facilities (NIST, 2016). Insider threats can be motivated
by a variety of factors, including profiting from the activity or overuse of services via
high-speed workplace computers, web portals, the Cloud, and peer-to-peer apps, all of
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which increase dangers and accessibility to internal and external threats (Spitzner, 2013).
Modernization and e-commerce have forced organizations to explore innovations to
become more competitive, or to get best products, or services, making that access very
tempting to users who feel motivated to access purchasing sites, movies, music, and other
forms of social media and entertainment, leading to data breaches (Heilbrun & Brown,
2011; Schubert & Leimstoll, 2007). This excessive use of the Internet needs to be
controlled through mandatory and discretionary access control policies, training, and
standard operating procedures to prevent malware attacks from occurring on targeted
systems, if users are not properly authenticated (NIST, 2016; Sastry, 2016; Spitzner,
2003).
Giving access to external unauthorized users may occur when outsiders provide
credentials belonging to another user, or when internet transmissions are intercepted by
someone else using an authorized user’s credentials that may lead to malware and viruses
that propagate from system to system if the proper security is not updated according to
the vendor’s recommendations (Gregory, 2017; Kui et al., 2012; Ziegeldorf et al., 2014).
Policies and Procedures to Manage Insider Threats
Policies and procedures defining standards of authorization for access requests
and approvals, or separation of duties, ensure that no one person has too much power to
exercise authorizations that may lead to ethical concerns and conflicts of interest (NIST,
2016, 2017). Additional government cyber security legislation was reviewed in Chapter
2. This legislation often rules the development of organizational policies and procedures.
Policies and procedures that regulate employee access to facilities, networks, systems,
and data are pivotal for the success of individuals and organizations. Employees only
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need access to the equipment and systems they need to execute their jobs, according to
NIST (2016)'s "least privileged access" policy. All further authorizations would require
administrator access escalation and approval outside of this scope.
A comprehensive policy’s value comes from the fact that it eliminates any doubt
that employees may have about what to do in each situation. For example, if an
organization has a policy that all visitors to the workplace must be always escorted, it will
be much easier for employees to restrict access in this situation (Meyers, 2018). An
organization that implements a separation of duties (SoD) policy not only complies with
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002), but establishes checks and balances against the risk
of breaches to the financial side of the company, and prepares the organization for
FISMA audits, financial accuracy, and security controls. The expectation for separation
of duties under the SOX Act of 2002, outlined requirements for IT departments regarding
electronic records, or procedures that can be compromised by insider threats (Arping &
Sautner, 2012; NIST, 2016).
A corporate security policy should serve to support security awareness, and
outline in general terms, the procedures, roles, and responsibilities within the
organization. The creation and enforcement of a security policy also demonstrate the
organization’s maturity level and compliance. In this study, the SMEs agreed that the
following policies and procedures were the most commonly used for access control and
manage insider threats in organizations: (a) separation of duties, and enforcement of the
least privileged access, (b) regular monitoring and access controls implementation, (c)
logs and need-to-know policy, (d) application of log analysis as a part of standard
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operating procedures, (e) limitation of third party access and social networks, and (f)
inclusion of download virus protection (firewalls) in the policy.
The SMEs’ agreement contained in this study could aid in the introduction and
advancement of security-related initiatives, as well as the enhancement of a positive
working environment and the support of IT security policies. The study’s findings may
contribute to the body of knowledge regarding the return on investment derived from
innovative technologies and training in organizations in the future. The results of this
survey on policies and procedures to manage insider threats in private and public
organizations are consistent with the literature review and other best industry practices
established by the NIST and NICE as common best practices for insider threats and risk
management in general.
Limitations of the Study
Because I only targeted 25 SMEs in the Washington metropolitan area
(Washington, DC; Virginia; and Maryland), this survey had a limited sample, that could
be seen as a limitation, or disadvantage. The size and composition of a panel are
determined by the nature of the topics discussed, time constraints, and financial
constraints (Habibi et al., 2014). The SMEs in this study came from both public and
private sectors, and they represented a diverse workforce in the Washington metropolitan
area. This small Delphi panel was suitable for purposive sampling given the study's
nature (Miles et al., 2014).
While design, or methodological limitations may affect a research study,
including issues of transferability and dependability, some limitations may represent
possible flaws that go beyond the researcher’s control (Kirkwood & Price, 2013). Experts
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with the same level of knowledge and experience regarding insider threats were sought in
this Delphi study that may have resulted in limitations (Grisham, 2009). However, this
was not a concern because I had a LinkedIn network of over 750 accredited IT
professionals as well as memberships in professional organizations such as the PMI,
ISACA, and AFCEA, to name a few. Another limitation could have been attributed to
conflicting schedules for gathering SMEs’ responses, teleworking due to COVID-19, and
continued commitment to go through the survey process within the allocated time. The
availability of SMEs could have been affected due to loss of work, relocations, change of
jobs, promotions, apathy, and internet accessibility. These limitations could have caused
SMEs to drop out of the study at any time. However, 25 SMEs responded to the survey
invitations, and 100% of those who responded participated in the duration of the study.
Recommendations for Future Research
The findings in this Delphi study suggest that cybersecurity and training play a
pivotal role in the development of security awareness and safe working environments.
The toxic behaviors that participating SMEs identified, as viewed through the lens of the
dark triad theory, suggested that a relationship existed between toxic behaviors and
insider threats (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2010; Deloitte Center for Financial Services,
2014; Goodboy & Martin, 2015). These findings may be beneficial for organizations
seeking to improve their organizational culture and employee engagement. The findings
on employees’ disregard for the organization is one that may require a root-case analysis
to uncover how management, culture, and peer relation can curtail negative feelings
fostered, or influenced by workplace behaviors (Schultz, 2014). Researchers should study
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the relationship between employee personality, attitude, retention, and work satisfaction
in future quantitative studies (Schultz, 2014).
This Delphi study results may or may not be applicable to all areas of the United
States due to the small sample size; therefore, I recommend replicating this Delphi study
in regions outside the Washington metropolitan area using a larger sample. Nonetheless,
the issues of insider threats in organizations and data security management are considered
a global problem for individuals and organizations (Ponemon, 2017). Quantitative studies
on the return on investment (ROI) for hasty hiring decisions without the benefit of a full
background investigation, or references, onboarding of employees without training, and
offboarding of employees without proper debriefing or exit interviews may represent a
risk that organizations should consider during their human capital planning. Because the
need to raise awareness about insider threats grows with rapid innovation and changes in
the way we manage projects, the inquiry for continuous research, both quantitative and
qualitative becomes necessary. Real-time findings become outdated and the need for
continuous education remains a constant in our day-to-day lives; therefore, a need for
further research becomes imperative to gather best industry practices for safeguarding
personally identifiable information, data security, and the integrity of the cybersecurity
process that could prevent insider threats in organizations.
Implications of the Study
This qualitative Delphi study has provided SMEs opinions and best practices on
reasons, and motivators for insider threats, and security strategies, policies, and
procedures for the prevention and identification of risky behaviors and risks avoidance
that could help public and private organizations when hiring, firing, developing policies,
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procedures, and training. This Delphi study represents 8 years of research and analysis of
peer-reviewed journals, recent research, IT surveys, and cases studies related to insider
threats, compounded by the SMEs real-time responses based on their experiences and
training that may provide a solid foundation for a better understanding of the new
challenges and opportunities derived by innovative technology, the importance of
training and positive working environments in the organization.
The dark triad theory was used to gather real-time information on how SMEs
viewed this insider threats in the workplace. Some subproducts of the dark triad theory,
such as narcissistic attitudes, a sense of superiority, and a desire for recognition and to
impress others, were first presented in Round 1 open-ended questions in one variation, or
another, aligning with characteristics studied by the FBI while examining insider threats’
behaviors (see Tables 1 and 2).
The final consensus provided tools for new practitioners, academics, researchers,
and IT managers responsible for employee hiring, onboarding, development, training, and
offboarding. The managers leading new systems implementation, security, and data
management may take advantage of this research to develop baseline countermeasures
and prevent unauthorized physical and virtual access to organizational assets, hence,
preserving the confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility of the data (NIST, 2016; NICE,
2016). Federal contractors who manage the government agency’s IT environments need
to safeguard data and maintain adequate levels of trained personnel, often certified
personnel who possess the network, systems, and cybersecurity skills specified in
contract requirements. The results of this study may facilitate the path for the creation of
access controls concepts and models for their incident response plans and compliance

192
(ABA, 2017; NICE, 2017). Based on the results of this Delphi study, managers should
strongly consider the application of a zero-trust policy when granting access to their
physical and intellectual property in public and private organizations (Tables 7, 10).
Employees in the least privileged group only have access to network/system assets
needed to perform their jobs (Herold, 2010; NIST, 2016).
Social Change
Employee empowerment leads to social change. Employees who are empowered
experience a risk-free environment that their employers trust and respect them (PMI,
2015). Public and private organizations’ managers that implement effective security
countermeasures create less stressful working conditions and boost employees’ morale,
productivity, and retention, promoting positive social change (NIST, 2016). Furthermore,
creating a real-time deeper awareness of the impact that corporate culture, habits, security
training, best industry practices, and employee buy-in play in strengthening data security
management could help minimize insider threats and asset misuse. Prior case studies
provided a historical pattern of the similarities in behavior that lead to insider threats’
activities (Baughman et al., 2014).
In this chapter, I presented the SMEs’ validation of the reasons, motivators,
security strategies, early interventions, policies, and procedures for identifying and
deterring insider threats in public and private organizations with the goal of protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of personal and organizational data. The
fulfillment of the purpose of this study for gathering real-time feedback from credentialed
SMEs in the Washington metropolitan area for reasons, motivators, security strategies,
early interventions, policies, and procedures has been satisfied. Additionally, increasing
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awareness on cyber and insider threats provides managers, supervisors, and researchers
with tools to develop their own security programs. The 25 participating SMEs’ level of
consensus seemed to support the implementation and development of training programs
that could lead to professional activities enhancing positive social change that may
support IT security policies. The dark triad theory portrayed a picture of how insider
threats may respond to management policies and procedures and to external motivational
factors influencing their behaviors in the workplace (Baughman et al., 2014).
Recognizing the motivators for insider threats may increase an organization’s opportunity
to develop early countermeasures (Beck & Harter, 2015; Cohen, 2015).
The social change implications of the study may be that a greater awareness could
be achieved about what security training programs and knowledge sharing are relevant to
develop mandatory training, as a perspective for the survival of public and private
organizations (Spector et al., 2005). The deterrence of potential insider threats, the
enhancement of risk management strategies, the potential to decrease system sabotage,
and the creation of new policies that could enhance individual and organizational safety
and performance are prime functions in the prevention of intrusions, identity theft, and
misuse of organizational assets (Hoffmann et al., 2012).
Understanding the dark triad behaviors can aid managers and senior leadership in
reducing insider risks, fostering healthy working environments, managing employee
dissatisfaction, and instilling honest and ethical behaviors at all levels of the organization
(Sokolowski et al., 2016). Individuals who are aware of the dark triad theory may find it
easier to interact with peers, and safely work with diverse groups creating enriched
interactions, culture, and working environments. Lastly, private, and public organizations
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can benefit from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Security,
Education, Training, Awareness (SETA) programs for managing social engineering risks,
insider threats, remote multi-factor and password policies to manage insider threats in
their organizations (NIST, SP 800-50).
This study included a cross-sectional discussion of real-time best business
practices and security strategies for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and
accessibility of data, as presented by the SMEs’ individual perspectives, rather than a
company-funded overarching viewpoint. With the increasing challenges and risks that
teleworking and emerging technologies presented to systems users and organizations in
2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, this study combined insider threats’ awareness
and security solutions from 25 certified IT participants from various organizations and
industries, including government, private, public, and academia. This research could, in
theory, result in a road map for new hires, supervisors, managers, researchers, and
security administrators.
Conclusions from these findings could contribute to narrowing the gap in the
literature regarding how to (a) more effectively recognize and prevent insider threats’
activities and behaviors, (b) implement best industry practices, and (c) develop new
training programs that could support professional development and enhance the
profession. The study may also raise awareness of strategies to identify, detect, and
prevent insider threats’ activities and toxic behaviors.
Significance to Practice
Because of the increased use of IT in everyday operations, information systems
have become vulnerable to insider attacks (NIST, 2016). As the need for faster
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communications grows, IT systems have allowed expedited electronic communications
for companies, education, and medical records access, opening the door to insider threats’
mishaps (NIST, 2016). The use of the Cloud and Big Data present many opportunities for
data loss (American Psychological Association, 2015; Clarke, 2016; Hashem et al.,
2015). Insider breaches are user-centric; therefore, continuous monitoring and controls
are needed for early prevention (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013). The SMEs’ feedback may
provide real-time preventive strategies and controls to identify and decrease insider threat
behaviors and data breaches, as well as consensus about best practices among SMEs
(Greitzer et al., 2013; NIST, 2016). Table 6 depicts the major categories used in this
study’s analytical framework for insider threats strategies and early interventions.
Significance to Theory
This qualitative Delphi study provides the SMEs unique perspective on real-time
preventive strategies and controls for identifying and reducing insider threats’ behaviors
and data breaches. Future researchers may use the dark triad theory as a conceptual
framework to gain new insights into real-time traits and behaviors, potentially enhancing
the body of knowledge. The feedback from SMEs presented in this study may lead to
better deterrence strategies and improved recruitment and training practices (Greitzer et
al., 2013; NIST/NICE, 2016). There are implications for theory and practice that offer
methods for defining dark triad characteristics in the workplace, as well as indicators for
handling negative workplace behaviors. Unless the SME is a qualified psychologist,
labeling a person under any of the dark triad categorizations for dark behaviors, or insider
threat should be done with caution, and handled very carefully in collaboration with a
trained human factors practitioner in the human resources department of the affected
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organization. According to the results of this Delphi study, managers should take
responsibility for managing the effects of negative attitudes in the workplace and
fostering healthy working conditions to achieve the organization's mission and goals.
Another crucial recommendation is that managers should not label, or stereotype workers
based on a misunderstanding of what the dark triad categories mean.
IT practitioners and managers that exercise conflict resolution, emotional
intelligence, constructive feedback, and provide insider threats training are using best
practices to address situations where there is individual, or team conflict, or when there is
a perception that the current organizational culture may foster insider threats’ toxic
behaviors. Consistent with best practices, managers should engage their human resource
departments in any personnel action.
The results of this qualitative Delphi study could help companies improve their
return on investment by preventing data breaches, increasing employee productivity and
retention, and reducing dissatisfaction and costly departures. Pinder (2008) found a
correlation between employee loyalty and dedication, as well as turnovers; employee
departures could leave an organization vulnerable (Evans & Reeder, 2010; Kramer et al.,
2011; Mahoney, 2011). Maasberg (2016) argued that, while the proposed relationship
between dark triad personality traits, related constructs, and external process antecedents
was derived from past literature, further empirical research was needed.
Conclusions
This Delphi study identified real-time reasons, motivators, strategies, and best
industry practices in generating policies and procedures as recommended by 25 SMEs in
the public and private sectors of the Washington metropolitan area during the period
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2019-2020 and raised awareness about what traits and behaviors employees could
display at work that align with the dark personality traits and behaviors of insider threats
as depicted in the dark triad theory, prior studies and peer-reviewed literature.
Because of the demands, stressors, and challenges that new technology, system
implementations, human resource management, and business requirements place on
individuals, these findings may aid new managers, supervisors, students, system users,
and academics in preventing intentional or unintentional data breaches that may be the
result of toxic behaviors in the workplace. IT managers are responsible for leading their
employees, and for providing training, development, and upward mobility opportunities
while maintaining the integrity and quality of their programs. The findings of this study
contribute to positive social change and the body of knowledge by recommending jobrelated training, cybersecurity training, mandatory training, and activities leading to
professional development to manage the increasing demands of emerging technologies,
insider threats, and data security management.
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Appendix A: Glossary
The following definitions for data threat classification are applicable to this study:
Access Type

Privilege to perform an action on an object to read,
write, execute, append, modify, delete, and create in a
system (http://opensecuritytraining).

Accountability

The principle that an individual was entrusted to
safeguard and control equipment, keying material, and
information
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CIS
SP).

Accreditation

Formal declaration by a Designated Accrediting
Authority (DAA) that an information system was
approved to operate at an acceptable level of risk,
based on the implementation of an approved set of
technical, managerial, and procedural safeguards
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/).

Accredit adequate security

Identifies the information resources Security
commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm
resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access
to, or modification of information. This includes
assuring that information systems operate effectively
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and provide appropriate confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (OMB Circular A-130)
http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).
Access

Opportunity to make use of an information system
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP0.

Authentication

Protection of data from unauthorized (accidental, or
intentional) modification, destruction, or disclosure
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSP-

Best Practices

Processes, practices, or systems used by public and
private organizations that perform exceptionally well
and are widely recognized as improving an
organization’s performance and efficiency in specific
areas. Successfully identifying and applying best
practices can reduce business expenses and improve an
organization’s efficiency

Clearance

Formal security determination by an authorized
adjudicative office that an individual was authorized to
access, on a need-to-know basis, to a specific level of
collateral classified information (TOP SECRET,
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SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL).
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPCommunity Risk

The probability that a vulnerability will be exploited
within an interacting population and adversely impact
some members of that population
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).

Critical System Events

Interim milestones in the acquisition process that
review a system’s capability, either operational,
technical,or other, that must be questioned before a
system’s overall suitability can be known and that are
of primary importance to the Milestone Decision
Authority in reaching a conclusion on allowing the
system to advance to the next phase.

Data Integrity

Condition existing when data are unchanged from its
source and has not been accidentally, or maliciously
modified, altered, or destroyed
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).

Data Origin

Corroborating the source of data areas claimed
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Encryption

The process of translating a message from the native
form of the sender to a standard transmittable form-encoding the message--for security reasons. Also
called ciphering.

Decertification

Revocation of the certification of an IS item,or
equipment for cause
http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).

Decipher

Convert enciphered text to plain text by means of a
cryptographic system
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).

Data Transfer Device (DTD)

Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized
entity (http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).

Disruption

Any action,or series of actions that prevent any part of
an IS from functioning
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSP)

Deliberate Exposure

Incident that allows for unauthorized access to data
resulting from hardware, or software failure,
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(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CIS
SP).
Denial of Service (DoS)

The methodology used to detect imminent hardware,
or software failure and provide fail/safe, or fail/soft
recovery
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CIS
SP).

Failure Control

The aggregate of processes and procedures designed to
inhibit unauthorized access, contamination,
elimination, modification, or destruction of a file, or
any of its contents
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CIS
SP).

File Protection

Means that access to computer files is limited only to
authorized users
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).

File Security

Hardware and/or software that limits the exposure of a
computer, or group of computers to an attack from
outside. The most common use of a firewall is on a
local area network (LAN) connected to the Internet.
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Without a security system, anyone on the Internet
could theoretically jump onto the corporate LAN and
pick up any information on, or transfer anything to any
of the computers on the LAN. All access should be
logged to ensure adequate information for a detailed
security audit
Firewall

Process for authorizing access to classified, or
sensitive information with specified access
requirements, such as Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI),or Privacy Data a determination of
the individual’s security eligibility and need-to-know

Hacker

An unauthorized user who attempts to,or gains access
to an IS (http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).

Inadvertent Disclosure

Type of incident involving accidental exposure of
information to an individual not authorized access
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CIS
SP)

Incident

Assessed occurrence, or event having an actual impact

Information Assurance

Measures that protect and defend information and
information systems by ensuring their availability,
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integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and
nonrepudiation. These measures include providing for
restoration of information systems by incorporating
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP).
Insider Threat

An insider threat was a malicious threat to an
organization that comes from people within the
organization, such as employees, former employees,
contractors, or business associates, who have inside
information concerning the organization's security
practices, data and computer systems
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CISSP)

Internal Threat

Any internal failure of the infrastructure,
communications, logistics, IT resources, or planning
(http://opensecuritytraining.info/CISSPMain_files/CIS
SP).

Local area network (LAN)

A short distance data communications network. LANs
allow users to be given access to databases and
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programs running on client servers and allow users to
work jointly and send messages.
Metropolitan area network

A data network covering an area larger than a LAN,
but less than a wide area network (WAN).

Multi-Factor Identification

An electronic authentication requiring a user to

(MFA)

provide two, or more pieces of evidence (,or factors) to
authenticate: knowledge (something only the user
knows), possession (something the user has), and
inherence (something only the user is). MFA protects a
user's data from being accessed by an unfamiliar
individual, such as personal ID information, or

Network management

financial assets.
A set of procedures and practices to keep a network
operating near maximum efficiency. The International
Standards Organization defines network management
as configuration management, fault management,
security management, performance management, and
accounting management.

Private network

A network (MAN, WAN, or set of interconnected
MANs, WANs, or LANs) used by an organization, or
other end-user such as a department, agency, bureau,
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division, etc. A private network might use dedicated
circuits and private lines leased from public carriers
Ransomware

bypassing the switches, or they may use microwave
technology.
Malicious software used by cybercriminals to prevent
data owners from accessing their data. The data are
withheld until ransom, or payment is received.

Risk Analysis

A technique to identify and assess factors that may
jeopardize the success of a project, or achievement of a
goal. This technique helps define preventive measures
to reduce the probability of these factors from
occurring and identify countermeasures to successfully
deal constraints when they develop.

Security Management

One of the categories of network management defined
by the International Standards Organization. Security
management was a set of procedures and practices that
may use various tools to restrict access to various
resources in the network.

Software

The detailed instructions to operate a computer, or
other type of equipment, or hardware. The term was
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created to differentiate instructions (i.e., the program)
from the hardware.
Stakeholder

An individual, or group with interest in the success of
an organization in delivering intended results and
maintaining the viability of the organization’s products
and services. Stakeholders influence programs,
products, and services.

Telecommunications

Telecommunications arere the full range of voice, data
and video services and equipment, including the
Internet, intranet, and extranet services and equipment
as well as wireless services and equipment (e.g.,
cellular and pager), 800 services and credit card
services, excluding radio services and equipment.

Telecommunications

The governing plan showing the capabilities of

architecture

functional elements of an organization’s
telecommunications resources and their interaction,
including configuration, integration, standardization,
life-cycle management, and definition of protocol
specifications, among these elements. Equipment
includes Routers, switches, Private Branch Exchanges,
cell phones, etc., used for various modes of
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transmission, such as digital data, audio signals, image,
and video signals.
Virtual Private Network (VPN) VPNs are a means of augmenting a shared network on
a secure basis through encryption or tunneling. Such a
shared network could be an Internet Protocol Network,
Zero Trust.

or the Internet, or an Intranet, or frame relay network.
A process for granting permissions and access to
networks based on the ‘least privileged’ access
required to perform the duties of a job.
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Appendix B: Round 1 Survey Open-Ended Questions
The overarching research question for this study is: What is the level of consensus among
a panel of SMEs regarding the reasons for insider threats in organizations?

Please answer the following questions:

1. What are the motivators for insider threats in organizations?

2. What are the security strategies, and early interventions used in your organization to
prevent data breaches and insider threats?

3. What policies and procedures can be developed to manage insider threats’ access to
systems in organizations?
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Appendix C: Round 2 Closed-Ended Questions
SURVEY 2

SURVEY 2 CLOSED-

SURVEY 2 CLOSED-

SURVEY 2 CLOSED-

CLOSED-

ENDED QUESTIONS

ENDED QUESTIONS

ENDED QUESTIONS

SQ1-Based on the

SQ2- Based on the

SQ3Based on the responses

responses to the first responses to the first

responses to the first

to the first round of

round of interviews round of interviews

round of interviews

interviews questions, the

questions, the

questions, the following

following categories were

following categories categories were

categories were

identified by SMEs as

were identified by

identified by SMEs

POLICIES AND

SMEs about insider about insider threat

about SECURITY

PROCEDURES to regulate

threat?

MOTIVATORS in the

STRATEGIES &

insider threats access.

Please rate to what

workplace.

EARLY

Please rate to what extent

extent you

Please rate to what

INTERVENTIONS used

you Strongly

Strongly

extent you Strongly

in organizations to

Agree/Strongly Disagree

Agree/Strongly

Agree/Strongly

prevent data breaches

that the following are best

Disagree that the

Disagree that the

and insider threats.

industry policies and

following are

following are

Please rate to what

procedures to manage

reasons for insider

motivators for insider

extent you Strongly

insider threats

threats

threats

Agree/Strongly Disagree

ENDED
QUESTIONS
RQ1. Based on the

questions, the following

identified by SMEs

that the following are
strategies and early
interventions for insider
threats

251
ANSWERS
Employees with

ANSWERS

ANSWERS

ANSWERS

Pushing Boundaries

Limited access controls

Download protection policy

Money, financial gain

Update software

Limit 3rd party usage policy

no regard for the
organization
Fraudulent
activities on the

regularly (virus

part of the

protection)

organization
Little, or no

Hackers wanting to sell

Using antiviruses such as

security on the

your information/

Bitdefender

part of the

ransomware; Political,

organization

or religious affiliation

Lack of Training

Greed

Shielding sensitive

Pulseway policy

Controlled access policy

information from all
employees
Hiring of chronic

Power centric

NDAs

Log analysis SOP

Money

Cybersecurity training

Background screening at

rule violators
Lack of behavioral
screening

hiring policy

(negative social
patterns)
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ENDED
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RQ1. Based on the
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round of interviews
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insider threats.
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STRATEGIES &
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Strongly

extent you Strongly
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strategies and early
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threats

ANSWERS
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Personal recognition Mental Illness
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ANSWERS

Change Management

Logs and need to know

Policies

areas policy

253
Employees sent by
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Limiting administrative

Risk Management Plans

rights

Insufficient
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Audits and network

No access to social
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of scale
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Intentional, or
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Risk Management Plan

Social Media

Revenge

effective oversight,

Audits/compliance

coordinated multidisciplinary
coordination, analysis
Religion

Need to know access.

auditing, personnel vetting,
and analysis.

Politics

Training

Reference Checking
practice

Arrogance

Security indoctrination

Hiring the right people for
the right jobs
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SURVEY 2 CLOSED-

SURVEY 2 CLOSED-

SURVEY 2 CLOSED-

CLOSED-

ENDED QUESTIONS

ENDED QUESTIONS

ENDED QUESTIONS

ENDED
QUESTIONS
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RQ1. Based on the

SQ1-Based on the

SQ2- Based on the

SQ3Based on the responses

responses to the

responses to the first

responses to the first

to the first round of

first round of

round of interviews

round of interviews

interviews questions, the

interviews

questions, the following

questions, the following

following categories were

questions, the

categories were

categories were

identified by SMEs as

following

identified by SMEs

identified by SMEs

POLICIES AND

categories were

about insider threat

about SECURITY

PROCEDURES to regulate

identified by

MOTIVATORS in the

STRATEGIES &

insider threats access.

SMEs as reasons

workplace.

EARLY

Please rate to what extent

for insider threats

Please rate to what

INTERVENTIONS used

you Strongly

Please rate to what

extent you Strongly

in organizations to

Agree/Strongly Disagree

extent you

Agree/Strongly

prevent data breaches

that the following are best

Strongly

Disagree that the

and insider threats.

industry policies and

Agree/Strongly

following are

Please rate to what

procedures to manage

Disagree that the

motivators for insider

extent you Strongly

insider threats

following are

threats

Agree/Strongly Disagree

reasons for insider

that the following are

threats

strategies and early
interventions for insider
threats
Religious affiliation

Insider threat impact

Limited Access SOP

training
Revenge

Security logs

Different levels of access

Showing others what

Need to know access.

Rewards and recognition

one can do; show off

for following rules practice
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Appendix D: Survey Round 3 Consensus and Validation Questions
Insider Threats and Data Security Management Strategies Survey Round 3 – Final

A.

SMEs REASONS FOR INSIDER THREATS

1. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
EMPLOYEES WITH NO REGARDS FOR THE ORGANIZATION are a Reason
for insider threats in organizations

2. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
INSUFFICIENT GUIDELINES AND SECURITY are a Reason for insider
threats in organizations

3. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that A LACK
OF CYBER SECURITY TRAINING is a Reason for insider threats in
organizations

4. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
PERSONAL RECOGNITION is a Reason for insider threats in organizations
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5. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
INTENTIONAL OR UNINTENTIONAL ACCESS are a Reason for insider
threats in organizations

6. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
DISCONTENT WITH THE CULTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION is a Reason
for insider threats in organizations

7. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
IDEOLOGY, FOREIGN INFLUENCE are Reasons for insider threats in
organizations

8. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that LACK OF
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT INSIDER THREATS is a Reason for insider threats in
organizations

9. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that LACK OF
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS AND REFERENCE CHECKING are a
Reason for insider threats in organizations

10. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that a SENSE
OF ENTITLEMENT is a Reason for insider threats in organizations
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11. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
RESENTMENT is a Reason for insider threats in organizations

12. Please rate to what extent you StronglyAgree/Strongly Disagree that SOCIAL
MEDIA is a Reason for insider threats in organizations

13. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that DISLIKE
OF MANAGEMENT, COMPANY CULTURE and COWORKERS are a Reason
for insider threats in organizations

B.

SMEs MOTIVATORS FOR INSIDER THREATS

14. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that PUSHING
BOUNDARIES is a Motivator for insider threats in organizations

15. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
FINANCIAL GAIN/MONEY is a Motivator for insider threats in organizations

16. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
DISREGARD FOR AUTHORITY is a Motivator for insider threats in
organizations
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17. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
REVENGE/RETRIBUTION is a Motivator for insider threats in organizations

18. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that HACKERS
WANTING TO SELL INFORMATION is a Motivator for insider threats in
organizations

19. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that BAD
INTENTIONS, EMOTIONAL, FINANCIAL OR POLITICAL reasons are
Motivators for insider threats in organizations

20. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that ENTRY
LEVEL EMPLOYEES WANTING TO ACCESS SOCIAL NETWORKS are
Motivators for insider threats in organizations
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C.

SMEs MAIN SEURITY STRATEGIES AND EARLY INTERVENTIONS TO
PREVENT INSIDER THREATS

21. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that LIMITED
ACCESS CONTROLS is a main Security Strategy and Early Intervention to
prevent insider threats in organizations

22. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that UPDATING
SOFTWARE REGULARLY (VIRUS PROTECTION) is a main Security
Strategy and Early Intervention to prevent insider threats in organizations

23. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
SHIELDING SENSITIVE INFORMATION FROM ALL EMPLOYEES and
SEPARATION OF DUTIES are main Security Strategy and Early Intervention to
prevent insider threats in organizations

24. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that CYBER
SECURITY TRAINING isa SecurityStrategy and Early Intervention to prevent
insider threats in organizations
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25. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that a CHANGE
MANAGEMENT POLICY is main Security Strategy and Early Intervention to
prevent insider threats in organizations

26. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that AUDITS
AND NETWORK SCANNING are main Security Strategy and Early Intervention
to prevent insider threats in organizations

27. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that a BUDDY
SYSTEM is main Security Strategy and Early Intervention to prevent insider
threats in organizations

28. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that SECURITY
LOGS are main Security Strategies and Early Interventions to prevent insider
threats in organizations
D.

SMEs MAIN POLICIES AND PROCEDURES TO MANAGE INSIDER
THREATS IN ORGANIZATIONS

29. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
DOWNLOAD PROTECTION POLICY is a main Policy and Procedure to
manage insider threats access in organizations
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30. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that LIMITING
THIRD PARTY USAGE/SOCIAL NETWORKS is a main Policy and Procedure
to manage insider threats access in organizations

31. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
CONTROLLED ACCESS/PHYSICAL SECURITY is a main Policy and
Procedure to manage insider threats access in organizations

32. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that a
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (S0P) is a main Policy and Procedure
to manage insider threats access in organizations

33. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that
BACKGROUND SCREENING AT HIRING is a main Policy and Procedure to
manage insider threats access in organizations

34. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that having a
RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN is a main Policy and Procedure to manage insider
threats access in organizations

35. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that having a
SEPARATION OF DUTIES, ENFORCEMENT OF LEAST PRIVILEGED
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ACCESS AND TRAINING OVERSIGHT are a main Policy and Procedure to
manage insider threats access in organizations

36. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that having a
CONFLICT RESOLUTION PLAN is a main Policy and Procedure to manage
insider threats access in organizations

37. Please rate to what extent you StronglyAgree/Strongly Disagree that having a
POLYGRAPH POLICY is a main Policy and Procedure to manage insider threats
access in organizations

38. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that having a
NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT is a main Policy and Procedure to manage
insider threats access in organizations

39. Please rate to what extent you Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree that having a
CONFLICT RESOLUTION PLAN is a main Policy and Procedure to manage
insider threats access in organizations

40. Please rate to what extent you StronglyAgree/Strongly Disagree that having an
INTERNAL REFERRAL POLICY is a main Policy and Procedure to manage
insider threats access in organizations
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41. Please rate to what extent you StronglyAgree/Strongly Disagree that having a
PHYSICALSECURITY PLAN, SYSTEM SECURITY PLAN, and a CHANGE
CONTROL PLAN is a main Policy and Procedure to manage insider threats
access in organizations

42. Please list any additional information you think would enhance the previously
stated categories.
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Appendix E: Survey Invitation via LinkedIn
Dear Colleague:
My name is Gladys Cooley, and I am a Ph. D candidate at Walden University. As
a part of my dissertation requirements, I am conducting a Delphi study on “Insider
Threats’ Behaviors and Data Security Management Strategies.” The goal of this Delphi
study was to gather subject matter consensus on identifiable insider threat behaviors and
best security and control practices to counter insider threats and safeguard data.
Because you are a Certified Member of either, PMI, ISACA, ISO, SANS, GIAC,
ISC, or a similar technology/security organization, and a subject matter expert in your
field, I am inviting you to participate in this qualitative Delphi research study, consisting
of three rounds of surveys, administered by me during approximately 3-week periods. If
consensus was not achieved, a fourth survey round may be administered.
Each SME will receive an individual survey link using SurveyMonkey®.
Answering the survey questions was estimated to take between 15-20 minutes each
round. The first SurveyMonkey request, or Survey Round 1, will provide open-ended
questions and will serve to generate a baseline to determine how SMEs view insider
threat, risks, behaviors, and describe their experiences in securing the data. Survey Round
2 presents closed-ended questions based on your responses to Survey Round 1 questions.
Upon classification and analysis of Round 2 responses, Survey Round 3 closed-ended
questions will be prepared to validate answers and determine consensus.
Your participation was confidential, that was, no other participant will be aware
of your personal identifiable information. You may refuse to continue at any time, or for
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any reason. Your participation in these surveys is unpaid and voluntary. The findings will
be password protected and saved for five years in accordance with the Walden University
guidelines. After such time, it will be destroyed. A consent form will follow to confirm
your voluntary/unpaid participation. Please email me to the addresses below if you have
any questions.

Sincerely,
Gladys C. Cooley
Emails: Gladys.cooley@waldenu.edu
Walden University IRB Approval No. 12-11-19-0429821
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Appendix F: Answers to Open-Ended Survey Round 1
SURVEY 1 OPEN-

SURVEY 1 OPEN-

SURVEY 1 OPEN-ENDED

SURVEY 1 OPEN-

ENDED

ENDED

QUESTIONS

ENDED QUESTIONS

QUESTIONS

QUESTIONS

RQ1. What are the

SQ1. What are the

SQ2. What are the SECURITY

SQ3. What POLICIES

REASONS for

MOTIVATORS for

STRATEGIES & EARLY

AND PROCEDURES can

insider threats in the

insider threats in the

INTERVENTIONS used in your

be developed to regulate

organizations?

workplace?

organization to prevent data

insider threats’ access to

breaches and insider threats?

systems in organizations?

ANSWERS
Employees with no

ANSWERS

ANSWERS

ANSWERS

Pushing Boundaries

Limited access controls

Download protection

Money, financial gain

Update software regularly (virus

Limit 3rd party usage

regard for the
organization
Fraudulent activities
on the part of the

protection)

organization
Little, or no security

Hackers wanting to

Using antiviruses such as

on the part of the

sell your information/

Bitdefender

organization

ransomware; Political,

Pulseway

or religious affiliation
Lack of Training

Greed

Shielding sensitive information

Controlled access

from all employees
Hiring of chronic
rule violators

Power centric

NDAs

Log analysis
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Lack of behavioral

Money

Cybersecurity training

screening (negative

Background screening at
hiring

social patterns)
Personal recognition

Mental Illness

Change Management Policies

Logs and need to know
areas

Employees sent by

Immaturity

Limiting administrative rights

Risk Management Plans

Insufficient

Disrupting economies

Audits and network scannings

No access to social

guidelines and

of scale

competitors

networks

security awareness
Intentional, or

Personal gain,

User activity monitoring,

Separation of duties,

Unintentional access

revenge and/or

separation of duties, and training.

enforcement of least

to systems

ideology.

privileged access, training,
oversight

Manager’s Treatment
of employees

Depression

Buddy system

Polygraphs
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SURVEY 1 OPEN-
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ENDED

ENDED
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QUESTIONS
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RQ1. What are the

SQ1. What are the

SQ2. What are the SECURITY
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STRATEGIES & EARLY

AND PROCEDURES can
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insider threats in the
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insider threats’ access to

breaches and insider threats?

systems in organizations?

ANSWERS

ANSWERS

ANSWERS

ANSWERS

Discontent with the

Entry level employees

Access controls, one Administrator

Conflict resolution

culture of the

want to do social

per site

organization

networking at work

Political Affiliation

Disregard for

Background checks

Training policy

authority
Foreign influences

Financial need

Firewalls

Non-disclosure agreements

Lack of knowledge

Retribution

Polygraphs

References

Dislike of

Cybersecurity training

Internal Referrals

NDAs

Training.

about insider threat
Careless Recruiting

Management
Lack of background
investigations and
reference checking

Money
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Sense of entitlement

bad intentions,

Our organization ensures that

Regularly monitoring,

emotional, financial,

annual training is given to

implementation of access

or politically based

employees. Additionally, they are

controls, technology

motivators drive the

trying to improve the technological

hardening, and regular

intent.

aspects of protecting data by

interval training for all on

implementing multiple factor

how to protect data.

authentication to reduce data
breaches.
Resentment

Money

ID Cards, dual sign on

Risk Management Plan

Social Media

Revenge

effective oversight, coordinated

Audits, personnel vetting

Showing others what

multi-disciplinary coordination,

Reference Checking

you can do

analysis

Rewards and recognition for
following rules

Religion

Need to know access. Need to

Auditing personnel.

know access
Politics

Training

Reference Checking

Arrogance

Security indoctrination

Hiring the right people for
the right jobs

Religious affiliation

Insider threat impact training

Limited Access

Revenge

Security logs

Different levels of access

